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ABSTRACT
The territory covered by this work includes the response to new 
information in science by adults.
A central aim is to shed some light on the problem o f how new and 
more complex knowledge (specifically conceptual knowledge) 
develops or arises from old and less complex knowledge. This 
problem has challenged both philosophers and educators for over 
twenty centuries.
The study draws on perspectives from several academic disciplines, 
in particular from philosophy, science, and sociology, and to a lesser 
extent from psychology. These disciplines are used in the first part 
o f  the thesis to set the context, both for the problem and for the 
qualitative research approach which tackles it, as well as to review 
literature that pertains to the field. Among hindrances to learning 
that are considered, particular attention is given to difficulties 
encountered with science texts; trials o f some experimental 
approaches to the problems are included.
The central research question concerns how adults learning science 
respond to new information, especially information that conflicts 
with their existing knowledge. The problem is approached within a 
constructivist framework using the metacognitive tool o f  the concept 
map as a means o f  tracking the type o f  learning (deep or surface) 
that is talcing place. Data relating to the type o f learning are also 
produced through questionnaires and interviews from volunteer 
participants who are pursuing further and higher education courses 
that include mandatory science components.
The results o f  the study indicate considerable reluctance to abandon 
what has been learned previously, in favour o f  new information. 
Contrary to expectation was the discovery that adults respond to new 
information with surface learning strategies, placing extensive reliance 
(initially at least) on memory, whether or not they declare a preference 
for meaningful learning. There are implications o f  this discovery for 
those who plan and deliver short ‘refresher’ training courses.
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
The last third of a working life spent teaching science has been devoted almost 
entirely to students, most of whom were young adults in their early twenties, at both 
further and higher levels of education. The move from secondary education at a 
public school for girls to teaching those designated as ‘adults’ forced the need to 
review methods of teaching (mine) and learning (theirs). The curricula and methods 
of assessment were different, as well as the ages of the students, and a personal 
review was needed as the prelude to making a number of changes in both approach 
and organization.
Since my experience, gained through forty years of teaching science, will be 
used in this thesis as a viewpoint for surveying the contribution o f other 
researchers in learning, it m ay be useful here to identify the context in which  
this experience w as gained and, later (chapter 2), the views it helped to 
formulate.
I w as appointed Assistant M aster in a small (by today’s standards) public 
school for girls, at a tim e w hen the prosperity em erging from post-w ar 
reconstruction w as forcing such institutions to acknow ledge that conflicting 
ideals of w om en’s education w ere  posing a challenge to the curriculum. 
W hilst those girls who, through character and grace, m ade significant 
contributions to sheltered boarding com m unities w ere  still w elcom ed, and  
music and dram a continued to ride high, provision o f facilities and  
opportunities in science equal to those found in the boys’ schools w as being 
dem anded.
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Parents, their daughters, and School G overnors simply could not w ait for 
resolution of debates about w hether the ‘normal interests o f the average girl’ 
should guide the construction o f a  syllabus in science, and w hether botany 
should be replaced or supplem ented by the inclusion of som e instruction in 
anim al biology. Inadequate (or non-existent) laboratory facilities and a 
shortage o f w om en science teachers w ere  preventing the growth o f advanced  
work in science in girls schools, and so rapid solutions had to be found to 
these problems. Thus it w as that I cam e to be the first m ale appointee to this 
school with its new  laboratories. T h e  brief given w as that ‘Girls from this 
school to be reading science subjects at university within three years ’. It w as  
both a challenge to, and opportunity for, a young and energetic teacher, within 
an agreeab le  environm ent in the com pany of enthusiastic learners.
Tw o and a half decades later found m e delivering courses containing science  
m odules in the Art and Design and the Health and Social C are  Departm ents  
of a  College of Further Education which delivered H igher Education courses 
under the auspices o f a  W e s t Country university. These  w ere  in addition to A - 
level and Access to H igher Education courses. T h e  opportunities a t this 
College for my continuing professional developm ent (limited in the school) 
enabled m e to have a platform for exploration of teaching/learning issues that 
w ere  highlighted by my transfer from the School to the College. I com pleted a 
Bachelor of Arts degree in Education and Training (Plymouth University, part- 
tim e), and found that the dissonance betw een som e of w hat I w as reading  
and som e of w hat I w as observing in the classroom  fostered ideas for this 
research work. It also enabled m e to engage with m ore confidence in the  
seem ingly interm inable staff debates betw een those who argued that education
is a universal process that reflects a monolithic conception of human nature, and 
those who insisted that it must be culturally relevant to particular situations and 
societies. These debates on ideological issues seem to have been given a recent 
stimulus by James Callaghan’s speech on education, delivered at Ruskin College, 
Oxford, in October 1976, which inaugurated the ‘Great Debate’. The speech 
included a reference to science teaching which, in the view of the then Prime 
Minister, needed ‘a more technological bias’. An outcome of this debate was the 
consultative document Alternatives for Science Education (HMSO, 1979), and the 
resulting policy statement Education through Science (HMSO, 1981), which led to the 
formalising of a liaison between science and technology. But the problems were 
hardly concealed, and I recall attempts at reassurance given at the Annual Meeting 
of the Association for Science Education (ASE) in 1980 when Sir James Hamilton, 
then Permanent Secretary to the Department of Education and Science, said that, 
“nothing must be done to erode the understanding of fundamentals”, and “an ill- 
taught course in technology was not to be preferred to a well-taught course in basic 
science” (Hamilton cited in Layton 1984, p 277). However, a change in the 
curriculum relationships of science and technology, from alternatives to uneasy 
partners, carried implications for the roles of each, and science teachers tended to 
regard the technology fraternity as cuckoos in the nest.
In 1980 a manifesto, signed by one hundred and forty two leading citizens, 
announced (T h e  Times’ 27th February 1980) a new initiative of the Royal Society of 
Arts. Entitled ‘Education for Capability’, the manifesto expressed concern about the 
structure of British education and highlighted a view of the relationship between 
abstract knowledge and practical skill which the signatories saw as endemic to the 
British education system. The historical origin of this manifesto was, in part at least, 
the report of a policy committee headed by Lord Rothschild, the ‘Rothschild Report’
(1971), which argued that while basic research was concerned with an increase in
knowledge, useful research was directed to goals defined by others. Rothschild had 
a background in scientific research and supported the ‘knowing’ rather than ‘doing’ 
tradition so deplored by the ‘Education for Capability’ signatories. Today the external 
pressures towards short-term economic utility are greater than ever, but the most 
delicate and vulnerable section of the whole scientific enterprise remains in the 
education process, the training of future generations of scientists in the schools and 
universities (Mason 1991 p viii).
Efforts to modernise curricula and improve the teaching of science have been 
continuous and, in response to the Education for Sustainable Development Panel’s 
final report, the Government produced the Department for Education and Science 
Sustainable Development Plan (DfES, 2003), which has as its first objective that all 
learners will develop the skills, knowledge, and value base to be active citizens in 
creating a more sustainable society. Since, as a society, we are still finding out what 
sustainable development means, educators have to focus on building a capacity to 
learn and adapt (Scott, 2003), knowing that the political, economic and cultural 
conditions under which learning occurs are changing rapidly.
In these circumstances it seems appropriate to reconsider some fundamental 
questions about what learning is and how it may best be monitored. My particular 
interest is in the learning of science by adults, and so the findings of my research 
work may, or may not, be applicable to young learners. The implications of the terms 
‘science’ and ‘adults’ are explored in more detail in Chapter 4.
Adults will have spent much of their lives learning from experience and they are, 
therefore, likely to bring a more extensive biography to new situations than will 
younger learners. Their perceptions arise from experience and, in so far as they 
relate to science, are often based on misconceptions, for example, the direction of 
electron flow in an electric circuit, and so new information may well conflict with
4
existing perceptions. The research focuses on how adults respond to new 
information, and the tracking of that response. As a result of extensive study, 
Knowles (1970) became convinced that adults are more self-dependent, possess a 
greater reservoir of experience, are more ready to learn, and have a more problem- 
centred orientation to learning than do younger learners. But Knowles seemed to 
present a non-developmental view of adults -  as though they are simply mature 
adolescents -  and this did not accord with my observations in the classroom. It was 
clear that some new information encountered by adult learners on science 
programmes can conflict with their world view, for example, the need for 
preservatives in foods and cosmetics. Many adults have absorbed the message, or 
formed the view from advertisements, that preservatives are, at least, a potential 
source of harm. The risks from pathogenic organisms and natural biodegradation are 
generally beyond their horizons and so this new knowledge conflicts with views that 
are likely to be reinforced on a regular basis.
It was also clear that misconceptions and naive views abound amongst many 
learners. For example, although Galileo asserted four hundred years ago that freely 
falling objects move with a constant acceleration that is independent of their mass, 
the prediction that heavier objects will descend more quickly than will lighter ones is 
very common among adults learning science, in my experience. It was also clear to 
me that views, such as the one given above, which had appeared to serve well in the 
past were not to be abandoned lightly, or were difficult to abandon -  even in the face 
of apparently formidable evidence as to their limitations or incorrectness.
These observations, coupled with my dissatisfaction with the ‘explanations' I found 
being given for the failure in assessment of some adults on science programmes, 
were the prompt for this study. The territory it covers includes the responses by 
adults to new information which may conflict with their world view when learning
science, A central issue concerns the problem of accounting for how new and more 
complex knowledge, specifically conceptual knowledge, develops or arises from old 
and less complex knowledge. The problem has been recognised over many 
centuries; according to Rouse (1956 p29-68), Plato in his dialogue The Meno, has 
Menon pressing Socrates on the issue of how one is able to leap ahead of what is 
known in the search for new understanding. Menon argues that understanding 
depends on prior learning, and when new knowledge is incompatible with this 
learning, one lacks a secure base on which to build. Two dozen centuries on, efforts 
to give a systematic account of knowledge, and especially scientific knowledge, 
serve to indicate that there is no consensus regarding the nature of methods of 
knowing, or tracking the responses of learners to new information which conflicts with 
their world view. This remains an area in which there is plenty of scope for further 
research, particularly where the learners are adults.
Classroom experience has demonstrated repeatedly the pertinence of Butterfield’s 
(1968, p 1-2) observation that, it is “easy to teach anybody a new fact about 
Richelieu, but it needs light from heaven to enable a teacher to break the old 
framework in which the student has been accustomed to seeing his Richelieu”. One 
of my aims is to understand a little more about this ‘light from heaven’, that is, to seek 
to understand the process by which learners are able to develop new knowledge that 
exceeds in complexity the knowledge they already possess. The apparent absence 
of headway in solving what is generally acknowledged to be the most challenging 
problem in understanding this process of learning -  the so-called learning paradox, 
central to which is the ability to account for how new and more complex learning 
develops out of less complex learning, is justification enough for an attempt to make 
progress with it. The research I have undertaken focuses on tracking the process of 
cognitive change in adults learning science.
Mention has been made of the ‘Great Debate’ inaugurated in England and Wales
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during the October of 1976. Nineteen years earlier, the American nation was jolted 
into questioning the quality of its science teachers and the science curriculum used in 
schools, by the launching of Sputnik 1 on 4th October 1957. This event is relevant 
since it changed the social and scientific climate of the America of the 1950’s and 
1960’s. The new climate gave opportunity for the educational ideas of both Joseph 
Novak - who devised the concept map (the metacognitive tool used in my study), and 
David Ausubel - whose cognitive model is used in the interpretation of the data I 
produced.
Although theoretical approaches to learning can be traced back at least as far 
Descartes, experimental studies began when physiologists became interested in the 
operation of the senses and in measuring the speeds of simple motor responses. In 
1879 the first laboratory for experimental psychology was established by Wilhelm 
Wundt at Leipzig, where one area of interest was the field of psychological and 
educational measurement known as psychophysics. The impact of the physical and 
biological sciences on psychology was accompanied by a paradigm shift from 
functionalism to behaviourism and this provided the impetus for an interest in 
learning to develop.
Behaviour theorists, from the early studies of Edward L. Thorndike at Columbia 
University, America and Ivan Pavlov at The Institute of Experimental Medicine St. 
Petersburgh, Russia, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries through to 
the 1960s, developed theories of learning that attempted to explain all aspects of the 
learning process. Behaviourism focuses on the role of experience in governing 
behaviour and, according to Watson (1913 and cited by Mowrer and Klein 2001 
p3), the more important determinants of our behaviour are learned. Traditionally, 
behaviours are considered to be learned through either classical (or respondent) 
conditioning where the response is elicited automatically and involuntarily, or by 
operant conditioning where the response is emitted voluntarily. A main goal of the
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behaviourists was to determine the laws governing the learning process, and models 
to account for learned behaviour were put forward by Thorndike (Bower and Hilgard
1981), Hull (Hull 1943), Guthrie (1935, 1959) and Skinner (1938).
However, some limitations to these ‘global learning theories’ began to emerge by the 
1950s, in particular, Tolman’s (1959) perspective contrasted with the views of his 
contemporaries. Tolman did not see behaviour as reflecting an automatic response 
to an external stimulus, but rather that it has direction and purpose in terms of 
achieving an objective. His views rejecting the mechanistic viewpoint of the (now 
traditional) behaviourists took until the 1960’s to gain acceptance. The transition 
from the wide ranging behaviourist learning theories to more specific contemporary 
cognitive theories occurred alongside the realisation that “our biological systems 
constrain what we do or do not learn about” (Mowrer and Klein 2001 p17) and, if they 
influence the process of learning, then they call into question the concept of general 
laws of learning.
Novak worked at Cornell University through the latter part of the twentieth century 
constructing a theory of education aimed at making learning more meaningful, and 
along the way he devised the concept map as a knowledge representation tool; this 
tool is used in my study to investigate how adults learning science respond to new 
information. Novak took on board the learning theory of Ausubel, which he saw as a 
powerful model of learning to guide education. Ausubel’s assimilation theory of 
learning has been used extensively to underpin many science teacher education 
programmes in the UK over recent decades, and is appropriate to the approach of 
my study.
i
Evidence gathered in interviews from adults who participated in this study indicated 
that many of them thought they had not been well taught in science in secondary 
schools, with much emphasis placed on rote memorisation of complex data.
However, the nature of what is taught has changed, from an arena where the primary 
senses could detect those things that directly affect us, for example, Darwin 
observed flightless birds, to an arena where the things that affect us cannot be 
apprehended directly, for example, X-rays, and genes. In his 2007 Richard Dimbleby 
lecture for the BBC, the American science researcher Dr. J. Craig Venter quoted 
Dewey when he said that "in order to understand the world around them, children 
and adults need to learn to explore, challenge and problem solve”. My study looks at 
how adults respond to new information in science.
This study is about learning science and, inevitably, involves crossing traditional 
disciplinary boundaries. Thus, some appreciation of the features which are peculiar 
to science, including the methods by which it proceeds, are necessary in order to 
comprehend both the similarities and the differences between learning science and 
learning anything else. The context of the thesis is philosophical because I believe 
that philosophical methods and findings can be of use to educational theorists and 
teachers, just as they can be of use to scientists (and others, such as historians). A 
perception that philosophy is not so much a body of knowledge as an activity of 
criticism or clarification, and that all the sciences started as branches of philosophy, 
may be of use in helping the reader to understand this choice of context. Finally, the 
methods used in the study and the style of presentation of the analysis of the results, 
are very much those associated with the social sciences. Indeed, the thesis is 
submitted within the Faculty of Arts of this University and the qualitative approach it 
utilises is not so commonly associated with the physical sciences. But, this is not a 
study of science, it is a study about learning science, the approach chosen is 
considered the one with the greatest potential to be fruitful and helpful.
An argument that reappears in many guises, particularly since electronic aids for 
storage of, and access to, data have become widely available, advances the idea •
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that knowledge is somehow less important than the ability to retrieve it -  ‘we have 
Google now’. Thus, it is unnecessary for children to learn basic historical or 
geographical facts, and calculators make it unnecessary to be able to do elementary 
arithmetic. More recently, it has been suggested (Financial Times 12.08.06) that 
satellite navigation will render much of the knowledge of city taxi drivers nugatory.
My contention is that the development of theories or concepts, at anything other than 
a trivial level, requires the possession of knowledge as a framework on which to 
build. The suggestion that knowledge has no significance beyond isolated facts, 
retrievable by means of a search engine such as Google, is, in my judgement, a view 
which has implications that could be detrimental to our society.
This thesis is structured such that the three chapters which follow this introduction 
serve both to give a review of literature relevant to the territory it covers, and to focus 
on aspects of the subject matter which give a background to the study undertaken. 
Thus, Chapter 2 considers both what counts as knowledge and how we come to 
know what we know, particularly with reference to science. Chapter 3 looks at the 
conceptualisation of knowledge and issues relating to learning as conceptual change, 
and then considers some frequently encountered aspects relating to resistance (or 
barriers) to learning, including problems with the comprehension of texts. Some 
examples of problems I encountered with text comprehension, and the efforts I made 
to address these are included here. Chapter 4 explores relevant aspects of the word 
‘adult’, plus issues which -  in my experience - relate particularly to the learning of 
science. Chapter 5 discusses the research problem and all the theoretical and 
practical matters which relate to the fieldwork. Chapter 6 contains the results of this 
fieldwork together with an analysis of the findings. Chapter 7 comprises a discussion 
of these findings plus a critique of the study, while Chapter 8 includes some general 
remarks on assumptions and interpretative problems as well as setting the 
conclusions reached in a wider context.
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John Locke, in the introductory part of his ‘Essay Concerning Human Understanding’, 
known as the Epistle to the Reader and first published in 1690, identifies something 
of the intention of my thesis:
‘It is ambition enough to be employed as an under-labourer in 
clearing the ground a little, and removing some of the rubbish 
which lies in the way to knowledge.’
J. Locke, cited in O ’Connor, 1952 p32.
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CHAPTER 2
KNOWLEDGE and METHODS OF ACQUIRING IT
1. INTRODUCTION
While tradition offers us four sources of knowledge - the senses, memory, 
introspection and reason - a more contemporary list of alleged roads to knowledge, 
as given by Hospers (1967, p 122-141), includes sense-experience, reason, 
authority, intuition, revelation and faith. It is the first two items of Hospers’ list that will 
be explored in most detail, as they suggest a route by which new and more complex 
conceptual knowledge arises from less complex knowledge. This chapter examines 
that route, as context to the study I have made, the results providing some answers 
to questions about the ways in which adults learning science respond to new 
information. But first it is necessary to say something about what counts as 
knowledge and, in particular, scientific knowledge, and the way in which a philosophy 
of knowledge has influenced the teaching of science.
2. REVIEW  OF KNOWLEDGE AND METHODS OF KNOWING IT
The history of epistemology shows that the nature of knowledge, its possibility and 
scope, has been of major interest to philosophers since it emerged as a subject for 
study. One of the main preoccupations has been the attempt to provide a general 
basis which would ensure the possibility of knowledge. The Greek Sceptics 
maintained that they were inquirers, refusing to acknowledge claims to knowledge 
unless a ‘criterion of truth’, as it was called, could be produced. The seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries produced the Rationalists who emphasised the part played by 
reason, and the Empiricists who emphasised the part played by experience. The 
nineteenth century focused on induction in arriving at truths derived from experience, 
while the twentieth century brought the Logical Positivists who were great admirers of
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the scientific method. Central to their doctrines is the principle of verifiability which, as 
expressed by Ayer (1971), claims that all statements are meaningful if they can be 
assessed either by an appeal to some foundational form of sense experience 
(synthetic or empirical truths), or by an appeal to the meanings of the words that 
constitute them (analytic truths). With all these attempts to define knowledge proving 
more or less unsatisfactory, today we tend to settle for something along the lines that 
it is belief that is both justified and true. The legitimation of knowledge owes 
credibility to three traditions: rationalism, for example, in mathematics where a 
conclusion rests on its own argument; to empiricism, for example, in science where 
sensory experience is the arbiter; and to pragmatism, a ‘suck it and see’ approach -  
which may have only a limited reliance on an underlying empirical reality.
Social theories of knowledge, whether post modernist or not, which make explicit its 
social and historical character, have dominated recent times, with educational 
research often caught in the tension between competing views of the social sciences. 
The ‘traditional’ approach - that there are natural and universal laws regulating 
and determining individual and social behaviour, and the more contemporary 
approach that emphasises individuality, where people are the initiators of their own 
actions and creators of their environment. These competing views make an 
appearance in the physical sciences as well and, interestingly, Plato in his Republic 
(Lee 1955) talks of an astronomer who wants to explore the laws which govern the 
motion of heavenly bodies. The naive view is that first of all he should make the 
most precise observations. But, argues Plato, the actual motions of stars and 
planets are contaminated, because the physical reality is only an imperfect image of 
the ideas which are the true carriers of truth. He uses the example of a highly skilled 
Athenian engraver who could engrave in a metal plate the finest triangle one could 
imagine. But would anyone be foolish enough to make measurements on this 
triangle when, in actual fact, the principles of geometry establish these relations
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beyond any shadow of a doubt? Hence he comes to the conclusion that the true 
astronomer would not look up to heaven in his attempt to come to grips with the true 
laws of planetary motion, he would look down in deep contemplation, and thus find 
something which is eternal and unmarred by accidental distortions. Einstein was 
shocked into accepting Platonism and the possibility that experiments may give us 
only the tip of the iceberg, putting in jeopardy the very foundation of physics - the 
primacy of experimental evidence. The problem of wondering whether we can 
reconstruct the shape and extension of the submerged part by drawing conclusions 
from the tip which is at our disposal, is the very same problem facing the social 
scientist who wants to generalize from a small sample. The issue of generalisation is 
considered in greater depth in Chapter 5 of this thesis.
As explained in the introduction to this chapter, we source our knowledge from one or 
more frameworks or belief systems. These belief systems, while they may not be 
capable of providing answers to questions that can be subjected to proof, act as 
vehicles of understanding that can contribute insight into problems. Two such 
(mutually exclusive) frameworks within which inquiry can proceed are known as 
Patton’s ‘competing inquiry paradigms’ (Patton 1980, p 37): firstly, logical positivism, 
which uses quantitative and experimental methods to test hypothetical deductive 
generalisations. This paradigm was at its most influential during the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, and was vindicated by the scientific discoveries made during 
that period - it was so firmly established as to be often described in the literature as 
‘conventional beliefs’. The second paradigm, phenomenological inquiry, uses 
“qualitative and naturalistic processes to inductively and holistically understand 
human experience in context specific settings” (Patton 1980, p 37). This has come to 
be known as the constructivist - or interpretive paradigm.
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The fundamental features of these two paradigms are contrasted in the table below:
Table 1
The Contrasting Conventional and Constructivist Belief Systems (Lincoln & Guba 
1989, p 84).
CONVENTIONAL BELIEFS* CONSTRUCTIVIST BELIEFS
Ontology
A REALIST ONTOLOGY asserts that 
there exists a single reality that is 
independent of any observer’s interest in 
it and which operates according to 
immutable natural laws, many of which 
take cause-effect form. Truth is defined 
as that set of statements that is 
isomorphic to reality.
A RELATIVIST ONTOLOGY asserts that 
there exist multiple, socially constructed 
realities ungoverned by any natural laws, 
causal or otherwise. “Truth" is defined as 
the best informed (amount and quality of 
information) and most sophisticated 
(power with which the information is 
understood and used) construction on 
which there is consensus (although there 
may be several constructions extant that 
simultaneously meet that criterion).
Epistemology 
A DUALIST OBJECTIVIST  
EPISTEMOLOGY asserts that it is 
possible (indeed mandatory) for an 
observer to exteriorize the phenomenon 
studied, remaining detached and distant 
from it (a state often called “subject- 
object dualism”), and excluding any value 
considerations from influencing it.
A MONISTIC SUBJECTIVIST  
EPISTEMOLOGY asserts that an 
inquirer and the inquired-into are 
interlocked in such a way that the 
findings of an investigation are the literal 
creation of the inquiry process. Note that 
this posture effectively destroys the 
classical ontology-epistemology 
distinction.
Methodology 
AN INTERVENTIONIST  
METFIODOLOGY strips context of its 
contaminating (confounding) influences 
(variables) so that the inquiry can 
converge on truth and explain nature as 
it really is and really works, leading to the 
capability to predict and to control.
A HERMENEUTIC METHODOLOGY  
involves a continuing dialectic of 
iteration, analysis, critique, reiteration, 
reanalysis and so on, leading to the 
emergence of a joint (among all the 
inquirers and respondents, or among etic 
and emic views) construction of a case.
*Note: in the twenty years since Lincoln & Guba published this table, attitudes have changed 
such that it would probably be true to say that constructivist beliefs have become the 
‘conventional’ and what were formerly regarded as ‘conventional’ would be likely to be 
labelled ‘traditional’ or ‘modernist’.
As the summary table illustrates, the traditional objectivist approach takes a more 
deterministic view of human nature, and is positivist in its epistemology; the 
contemporary, subjectivist approach has its ontological roots in nominalism and is
is
decidedly anti-positivist, namely, viewing knowledge as personal, subjective and 
unique to the individual. The subjective approach more comfortably accommodates 
the constructivist approaches to learning that currently predominate in educational 
theory (Matthews, 1998, Phillips, 1995), and is generally considered well suited to 
qualitative investigations. Further, although my investigation is about the learning of 
science, it is not the science itself that is under investigation - 1 want to track whether 
a person has learned something rather than having merely learned to do something, 
so a qualitative approach is quite appropriate.
Moore & Young, (in Olssen 2004, p 251) draw attention to two opposing ideologies 
concerning the nature of knowledge: firstly, neo-conservative traditionalism, which 
asserts that there is a given body of knowledge which it is the responsibility of 
educational institutions to deliver. The experience of submitting to the discipline of 
the subject moulds a person into that kind of person whose characteristics are fairly 
predictable. As Scruton (1991) observed, this approach is not motivated by any 
epistemoiogical concerns, but by the need to pass on the culture, the knowledge 
being an end in itself. Science education has been in this mould for over a century, 
and I was instructed in this framework. The science teacher who taught me 
chemistry at secondary school proudly, and frequently, declared that he was taught 
at university by a professor who had himself been a student of Ernest Rutherford -  
who had “discovered the atom” (sic). Knowledge was handed down to me as an 
inheritance - it was not something I should attempt to construct. The second, and 
opposing ideology, is technical instrumentalism, which challenges the neo- 
conservative view, and claims that knowledge is a means to an end - rather than an 
end in itself, and that it produces a particular kind of society, rather than being a 
maker of individuals. This view supported the development of vocational education 
but, since the publication of Sir Ron Dearing’s review of qualifications for 16-19 year 
olds (Dearing 1996), the technical instrumentalists have infiltrated academic
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education. A consequence of this is that teachers of science, as well as teachers of 
other subjects, are required to incorporate key skills to show how their subject links 
with other subjects and facilitates team work and communication.
The tension between these two ideologies remains unresolved, which suggests that 
there is need for debate to be focused on the question of knowledge. Moore and 
Young (2004) argue that the post-modernists make the claim that the neo­
conservatives rely on arbitrary assumptions about knowledge. Yet they, in their turn, 
by arguing that knowledge cannot be separated from the method by which it is 
constructed, do nothing to pave the way towards a meaningful theory of knowledge.
Scheler (1980, p 76) makes an interesting contribution to the debate about what 
counts as knowledge by distinguishing between cultural knowledge (slow changing, 
for example, myths and religious knowledge), and artificial knowledge (fast changing 
and includes technological knowledge). Cultural knowledge used to be dominant, 
and education involved the teaching and learning of the culture so that it could be 
reproduced. This tended to result in ‘a sameness5 about individuals, and 
communities were based on those who conformed. Those who were different in any 
way were considered a potential or actual threat to those who were possessors of the 
cultural knowledge, namely, those who wielded power in the community, and had to 
be excluded -  the heretics. Today, artificial knowledge is more dominant because it 
is more highly valued but, because it is swiftly changing, it does not have time to 
become embedded in the culture of a society.
The context chosen for this review of issues and ideas relevant to my study is 
essentially philosophical, but it is not the only context that is possible; for example, an 
historical or experiential framework might have been used. Each of these 
frameworks would impart a unique and legitimate perspective, and it will always be 
true that conclusions reached will be related to the chosen context. But the study is 
about the nature, scope and acquisition of knowledge and, traditionally, this is the
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preserve of philosophy. However, in order to avoid entanglement in debates that 
could all too easily divert attention away from the principal theme of the thesis, I am  
starting with the assumption that there is no absolutely secure starting point for 
knowledge, and that nothing is known with such certainty that all possibility of future 
revision is removed. Abandonment of the notion that knowledge is built on an 
unshakeable foundation does not mean, though, that the traditional view of truth has 
been abandoned.
Medieval philosophers and theologians, whose beliefs and methods had much of 
their ancestry in the Athenian School of Socrates and Plato, started with the 
assumption that God and the universe can be, at least partially, understood by the 
human mind. Accepting the Scriptures as interpreted by the Church, and certain 
premises in the works of Aristotle and Plato as authority, they upheld the supremacy 
of reason and deduced by logical methods what the facts ought to be. There was, 
therefore, no reason at all for them to look through the telescope of Galileo, and they 
could deny with confidence the theory of Copernicus, and the fact that things heavy 
and light could fall to the ground at the same rate, even though Stevin, de Groot and 
Galileo had demonstrated that fact experimentally.
The men of the Renaissance, when they founded modern science, started with the 
same assumption -  namely, that nature is intelligible, and they used the same 
methods of deductive reasoning with inductive theories being an essential part of the 
procedure. But the authority was different, for primarily it was empirical, with 
observation and experiment being both the starting point and the final arbiter. The 
essence of this new experimental method was an appeal from the completely rational 
system of the philosophers and theologians, to the tribunal of facts -  facts which bore 
no relation to any philosophic synthesis then possible. The shift of authority was a 
fundamental change, for it opened up a new route by which knowledge could be
gained (see Table 2).
Table 2
Comparison of Philosophic and Theological Knowledge with Natural Science
Medieval philosophers and 
theologians
Natural science
Founders Hellenistic philosophers Renaissance
Assumption All things can be (at least 
partially) understood by minds of 
humans
Nature is intelligible
Authority A philosophic (i.e. a belief) 
system
Observation and 
experiment
Methods Reason Deductive reasoning and 
inductive theories
Outcomes W hat the facts ought to be Theories
The implications of this shift were more perplexing, for, to the Aristotelians, the real 
world was disclosed by the senses - a world of colour, sound and warmth, of beauty, 
goodness and truth. Under the analysis of Galileo, colour, sound and warmth 
vanished into mere sensations, and the real world appeared to be ‘but particles of 
matter in motion’ (Dampier 1961, p xvi), which seemed to have no connections with 
the good, the beautiful and the true.
So emerged what was, perhaps, the first problem of a theory of knowledge, namely 
the difficulties which underlie the apprehension of matter by a non-material mind. 
However, the problem did not deter Newton’s disciples (especially the French 
philosophers of the eighteenth century) from quickly converting his science into a 
mechanical philosophy, in which the whole of the past and future was theoretically 
calculable -  and man became a machine.
As it was found that more and more scientific knowledge could be expressed in terms 
of physics, confidence was gained in the method, and there arose a belief that a 
complete physical or mechanical explanation of all existence is theoretically possible. 
Modern scientific philosophy shows, however, that by its inherent nature and 
fundamental definitions, science is but an abstraction and can never represent the
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whole of existence. Concerning the sources of our knowledge, the requirement, as 
outlined by Phillips (1993) is to find and use the best and most reliable sources -  
those which are least likely to lead us into error. This is of course an idealist 
approach and all sources are liable to lead us into error at times.
Experience is one of those words that has had accum ulated an assortm ent of 
m eanings over the years. Originally it m eant the act of putting som ething to 
the test (proof by actual trial), a m eaning that later evolved to equate with 
w hat am ounted to an ‘experim ent’. M ore recently experience has com e to be 
associated with observation of, or practical acquaintance with, facts or events  
considered as a  source o f knowledge, such as w hen w e refer to experience in 
a craft or profession. T h e  empiricist concept of experience w as ‘unknown for 
most o f human history’ (M acintyre 1985, p80), being invented in the  
eighteenth century as a device to close the gap between w hat seems to be 
and w hat actually is, that is to say, betw een ‘appearance’ and ‘reality’. By 
contrast, the natural science concepts of observation and experim ent w ere  
intended to enlarge the distance betw een ‘seem s’ and ‘is’. T h e  lenses o f the  
te lescope and microscope w ere  given priority over the lenses o f the hum an  
eye, and natural science created a sharper distinction betw een appearance  
and reality. The  m eaning of ‘experim ent’ and the m eaning of ‘experience ’ 
thus diverge more sharply now than they had done in the eighteenth century. 
For a while at the tim e o f the Enlightenm ent, these two incompatible w ays o f 
approaching the world, nam ely em piricism  and natural science, co-existed in 
the sam e culture, but the m echanistic approach to hum an behaviour would  
eventually flounder. Experience, though, as the aptitudes, skills, judgem ents  
etc  resulting from practical acquaintance, or from w hat has been undergone,
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rem ains a legitim ate source o f knowledge.
Those issues of some relevance to adults learning science will now be explored in 
more depth. There are three basic questions that thinkers and researchers have put 
to themselves over the years as they have struggled to understand how we come to 
know what we know. Firstly, what is there that can be known? -  the ontological 
question. Secondly, what is the relationship of the knower to the known (or the 
knowable)? -  the epistemological question. And thirdly, what are the ways of finding 
out knowledge? -  the methodological question, which looks at the methods and rules 
for the conduct of inquiry?
Some understanding of the theory of knowledge is considered an essential perquisite 
to a study of learning, and so there will now be a brief examination of those theories 
of knowledge that have been most influential in the Western world over several 
centuries. Some methods of human knowing will be looked at with the intention of 
providing the context for this study into adults learning science.
It was Aristotle, student and associate of Plato for twenty years, who, by insisting that 
first principles be induced from observational evidence, thereby held to -  if not 
defined -  empiricist doctrine. The impact of his achievement on intellectual life in the 
West was, however, delayed until the latter part of the twelfth century because, until 
then, his writings on science and scientific method were not translated from Arabic 
and Greek sources into Latin. Thus it was that, for the next three hundred years or 
so, the main activity of medieval scholars centred on discussions and criticism of 
Aristotle’s view of scientific procedure, in particular, his position on evaluating 
competing explanations, and his claim that scientific knowledge is necessary truth, 
namely, that truth which is incapable of being false. Some scholars, for example, 
Francis Bacon (1521-1626), emphasised the practical application of scientific
knowledge, though this stood in marked contrast to Aristotle’s position that 
knowledge of nature is an end in itself. Others, for example, Isaac Newton (1642- 
1727), affirmed Aristotle’s theory of scientific procedure and, in applying his Method 
of Analysis to some deservedly famous experiments, was able to demonstrate the 
value of experimental confirmation, as well as the feasibility of deducing 
consequences that go beyond the original inductive evidence.
Bacon is credited with a new scientific methodology put forward to overcome 
supposed deficiencies of the Aristotelian theory of procedure. The two principal 
features of Bacon’s new method were an emphasis on gradual, progressive 
inductions, and a method of exclusion, the application of which was designed to help 
decide the issue between competing explanations.
The modernist empiricist approaches of deduction and induction are both dualist in 
nature -  locating the mind inside, and the world outside, the boundaries of the skin. 
Descartes’ (1596-1650) interpretation of a dream he had in November 1619, led him 
to believe that he had been called, by the Spirit of Truth, to reconstruct human 
knowledge in such a way that it should embody the certainty hitherto possessed by 
mathematics. Descartes’ theory of knowledge held that there are two sources of our 
knowledge: 1. that which the intellect acquires of its own nature, i.e. intuition, and 2. 
reasoning, through comparison of two or more objects. Thus the nature of an 
unknown thing is determined by its relation with known things.
Descartes established a method for arriving at truth through rules which enabled the 
correct choice of things (propositions etc.) to which the mind should turn. This 
method would train us to distinguish between what is absolute and what is relative. 
The problem is that deduction from intuitively self-evident principles is of limited use
in science as it yields only the most general of laws. Descartes theory of scientific 
method, including the role of hypotheses and the value of experimental confirmation,
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and its general breadth of scope, contributed to its appeal in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries.
These ideas inspired Kant and, through Kant, Piaget and the radical constructivists, 
for example, Glassersfeld (1970,1987), but this rationalism fails to address 
adequately the issue of how new mental structures develop out of old structures. The 
problem with rationalism from the point of view of learning theory centres on the 
issue of how a being devoid of contact with the world through the senses, could ever 
amass the materials needed to exercise its reason. But empiricism is not without its 
problems either - the photoreceptive film in my camera receives plenty of data but I 
do not consider it to know things about the world - so we must compromise and allow 
that rationalism can say that we do get some of our knowledge from reason.
However, Hofstadter (1979, p 365) does argue that, the knowledge that cars are 
smaller than mountains is an example of a piece of knowledge that can be created by 
deduction -  as compared with a piece of rote memorisation. He claims it is not 
stored in any single symbol in the brain, but produced as a result of the activation, 
followed by mutual interaction, of many symbols, for example, those for ‘compare1, 
‘size1, ‘car1, ‘mountain1, etc. The implication is that the knowledge is not stored 
explicitly, as a packet of information, but implicitly in a spread about manner; and so, 
such simple facts as relation of sizes of objects have to be assembled rather than 
merely retrieved.
John Locke (1632 -  1704) in the introduction to his Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding published in 1690, explains that his purpose is to inquire into the 
origin, certainty, and extent of human knowledge, together with the grounds and 
degrees of belief, opinion and assent. He wanted to determine, in other words, the 
ways in which we come to know, the different sorts of things we can know, the types 
of evidence by which different sorts of statements can be established, and the 
degrees of certainty appropriate to the different varieties of statement and different
weights of evidence (O’Connor 1952 p26). By raising the nature of knowledge as a 
problem, Locke was introducing a new point of view into European philosophy, and 
this point of view has dominated the subject since his time. He was also the first to 
develop a suggestion implicit in the work of Descartes, that philosophy should begin 
with epistemology. He thought that a study of human understanding and its functions 
would enable people to find out the sorts of enquiries for which our minds are 
naturally filled. If we fail to examine the capacities of our minds in this way, we are in 
danger, Locke thought (Fraser 1959 Introduction p4) of engaging in speculations 
which are far beyond those capabilities. Locke insisted that the most that can be 
achieved in science is a collection of generalisations about the association and 
succession of “phenomena”. These generalisations are probable at best, and do not 
satisfy the rationalist ideal of necessary truth. However, his theory does argue that 
experience is the source of all our knowledge and this prepared the way for the 
development of psychology as an independent science.
The realists -  championed by Bacon, and Hume (1711-1776), compel nature to bear 
witness, inducing new knowledge or understanding in the form of rules or laws from 
the accumulation of data, by perceiving the regularity of events in the world. The 
procedure compares with information processing which, although adequate at 
handling informative transactions with the world, is unsatisfactory for transformative 
interactions. This inference by induction is more risky than deduction -  you can 
never be sure, and the knowledge could be invalidated by subsequent experience. 
Realists look to correspondence with reality by way of verification, but induction 
(along with Piagetian synthetic deductivism) has been characterised as a head fitting 
approach to learning and cognition (Brown 1975).
Induction, the inference from particular to general, is a line of reasoning often held to 
be the basis of science; although Hume, in his Enquiry Concerning Human
24
Understanding (1748) pointed out that, because an event has occurred in the past is 
no logical reason to suppose it will be repeated in the future. The objection is often 
rejected, but with the acceptance that, if there is a truth to be known, inductive 
procedures are the best way of getting to it. But, in addition to its ability to explain, it 
is also a feature of science to predict, and in this second stage of scientific inquiry the 
generalisations reached by induction, are used as premises for the deduction of 
statements about the initial observations. This inductive -  deductive nature of 
science may be represented by means of a concept map:
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Fig. 1 The Inductive -  Deductive Nature of Science
OBSERVATIONS
Induction
▼
David Hume, an empiricist, maintained that all our knowledge is derived from 
experience (sense impressions). He thus echoed Aristotle’s dictum that there is 
nothing in the intellect which was not first in the senses, and his claim that it is 
impossible for us to think of anything which we have not antecedently felt by our 
senses, has been reinterpreted as reinforcing Baconian inductivism. The implication 
of Hume’s approach is that science begins with sense impressions, and can
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encompass only those concepts which are ‘constructed’ somehow out of sense data, 
a view that is consistent with Aristotle’s Method of Analysis, but not with Newton’s 
Axiomatic Method, which depends on what can and cannot be deduced.
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) conceded that, if the form and content of scientific laws 
wholly derive from sense experience, there is no escape from Hume’s conclusion.
But Kant was unwilling to grant Hume’s premise, and argued that although all 
empirical knowledge arises from sense impressions, it is not the case that all 
knowledge is given in these impressions. Kant distinguished between the matter and 
the form of cognitive experience, holding that sense impressions provide the raw 
material of empirical knowledge, but that the knowing subject itself is responsible for 
the structural -  relational organisation of this raw material. The relevance of this to 
my study on adults learning is that Kant believed that Hume had oversimplified the 
knowing process by reducing the operations of the mind to a mere “compounding, 
transposing, augmenting and diminishing” (Losee 1972, p 107) of ideas. According 
to Kant, Hume’s inadequate theory of knowledge was associated with an equally 
inadequate theory of science. Kant believed that Hume was preoccupied with 
inductive generalisations, and held that this emphasis draws attention from the most 
important feature of science -  the attempt to achieve a systematic organisation of 
knowledge. Kant’s own theory of knowledge was more complex, specifying stages in 
the organisation of cognitive experience.
One of the problems of science has been the difficulty of how to get from 
observations to laws and theories. John Herschel (1792-1871) maintained that there 
are two distinct ways: i) the application of specific inductive schema and ii) the 
formulation of hypotheses. Herschel’s view of the context of discovery may be 
represented schematically, as follows:
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Fig. 2 Herschel’s Pattern of Discovery - after Losee (1972, p 116)
Herschel managed to combine the Baconian ideal of a hierarchy of scientific 
generalisations with an emphasis on the role of the creative imagination in the 
construction of the hierarchy, an aspect developed more thoroughly by Warnock 
(1994) -  though not with any particular reference to science. He also demanded that 
the scientist assume the role of antagonist against his own theories (thereby 
anticipating Popper’s views), and seek both direct refutations and exceptions which 
limit the range of applications of these theories.
Karl Popper (1902-1994) was interested in the growth of knowledge generally, but 
particularly in the growth of scientific knowledge, as opposed to the mere 
accumulation of observations; and he identified this growth with the repeated 
overthrow of existing scientific theories and their replacement by more satisfactory 
ones (Popper 1963, Ch 10). The method of learning by trial and error -  of learning 
from our mistakes, is “fundamentally the same whether practised by higher or lower
animals and applies equally to scientific knowledge as to knowledge in general” 
(Popper 1963, p 216). But Popper claims that a study of scientific knowledge is a 
fruitful way of studying the growth of knowledge in general. Popper’s thesis 
concerning the growth of knowledge is also relevant to this study, and has several 
dimensions: firstly, that a criterion of relative potential satisfactoriness can be applied 
to new theories. This characterises as preferable the theory which tells us more, that 
is the one having a greater amount of empirical information, is logically stronger and 
has greater explanatory and predictive power. It can, therefore, be more severely 
tested, and, in short, has a higher degree of empirical content or testability. In this 
context, it is interesting that Lavoisier’s classical experiments which show that the 
volume of air decreases while a candle burns in a closed space, do not establish the 
oxygen theory of combustion, but rather they refute the phlogiston theory that had 
dominated (and held back) scientific thinking for a century. Secondly, high 
information content, by definition, means low probability - and thus a high probability 
of being falsified. Consequently, one of the aims of science is to achieve a high 
degree of refutability.
Thirdly, science starts with problems and not from observations, although 
observations may give rise to a problem if they clash with our expectations or 
theories. The conscious task before a scientist is always the solution of a problem 
through construction of a theory which solves the problem. But every new theory 
raises new problems and it is largely through the new problems which it raises that it 
is fruitful. Fourthly, the task of science is the search for truth, which is seen as 
correspondence with reality, and the approaches tend to be either, via the route 
which holds that whatever cannot be supported by positive reasons is unworthy of 
being taken into serious consideration, or by a route which says that whatever can in 
principle be overthrown by criticism, yet resists all our efforts to do so, may quite 
possibly be false, but is not unworthy of being seriously considered.
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Popper insists that deductive, and other methodological systems by which theories 
are developed, be regarded as stepping stones rather than ends -  as important 
stages on the way to richer and better testable scientific knowledge. He develops the 
argument (Popper 1963, p 221) with the thought that, “it is in the rational choice of 
the new theory that the rationality of science lies, rather than in the deductive 
development of the theory”. Thus the scientist will be interested in the methodology 
only in so far as it contains those choices, those rejections, and those decisions 
which show we have learnt from our mistakes and, thereby, added to our scientific 
knowledge. My interest is in the methods as means by which new knowledge 
replaces old knowledge in a person, whilst Popper is more concerned with the growth 
of scientific knowledge as an abstract concept.
One of the things expected of science is the ability to understand and explain 
phenomena, and learners expect to acquire some of this ability from their studies. By 
‘understanding’ a phenomenon, a scientist usually implies that she or he can fit the 
occurrence into a pattern of events which can be summarised in a well defined 
physical law. Descartes held that a hypothesis is justified by its ability, in conjunction 
with fundamental laws, to explain phenomena. Frequently he suggested hypotheses 
that were based on analogies - parallels, drawn from everyday experiences but, while 
the use of pictorial analogies may have contributed to the popularity of his theory of 
the universe, reliance on them also led him astray. For example, in his explanation 
of the circulation of blood in the human body, Descartes committed himself to an 
inappropriate analogy. His account (Kenny, 1970, vol.15, p 236-237) conflicted with 
the facts which he knew, having read Harvey’s book on circulation, yet he elected to 
defend his own hypothesis. Despite what might be expected to be a set-back for the 
use of analogies, the physicist N.R. Campbell held that it is not sufficient for a theory 
merely to display the required formal structure, it must, in addition, be associated with 
an analogy (Campbell 1952).
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Carl Hempel (1905 -1997), a German born philosopher, while conceding that 
analogies are often of value in guiding further research, and that they have been 
influential in the historical development of the sciences, maintained that since 
analogies do not occur as premises in the deduction of experimental laws, they are 
not part of the structure of scientific theories. A model, however, does have the 
same formal structure as a theory for which it is a model, but the epistemological 
structure is simpler. There are, however, potential dangers of thinking of a theory by 
way of thinking of a model, because one can assume that concepts involved in the 
theory correspond to all properties of the objects in the model, for example, that the 
electrons in an atom have all the spatial properties of the balls in a ‘solar system’ 
model of an atom. If models are used in the teaching of science, as frequently they 
are, then both teachers and learners must never forget that they are engaging in an 
‘as if’ way of thinking (Braithwaite in Grandy 1973, p 52): the theoretical concepts in a 
scientific theory behave as /Tthey were elements in the model, but only in certain 
respects.
Harre (1970) argued for a shifting of emphasis from the formal deductive structure of 
theories to the associated models. He distinguished three component parts to a 
scientific theory: i) statements about a model, ii) empirical laws, and iii) 
transformation rules, but insisted that the existential hypotheses suggested by the 
model, should receive more emphasis than the deductive structure which may be 
developed by, or from, the descriptive hypotheses. A good example is provided by 
Mendeleef s (1834-1907) predictions of the existence of hitherto undiscovered 
elements, where predictions of properties were subsequently shown to be satisfied 
by the elements scandium, gallium and germanium. According to Harre (1970, p 
125), if no existential hypotheses are suggested by a theory then, that theory does 
not advance our understanding of the underlying mechanisms of natural processes. 
Prediction has become more important than the construction of theories as general
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statements; and Huygens’ account of the methodology of science, written in the 
Preface to his Treatise on Light (Huygens 1690,1962, p vi, vii), that it is “possible to 
establish a probability which is little short of certainty when one employs the 
hypotheses to predict new phenomena and finds expectations realised”, has proved 
to be a prescient statement.
Dissatisfaction with both the ontological assumptions (the form that knowledge takes, 
as well as its location in the mind, or in society), and epistemological issues 
(concerning the validation of knowledge about the external world), has provided 
some of the motivation for the search for an alternative approach. Gergen (1994, p 
22) writes: “So severe are the problems of dualist epistemology, materialists, 
phenomenologists and Wittgensteinians alike have since opted (albeit on differing 
grounds) for an abandonment of dualist metaphysics". The notion that the mind is 
not in the head, whilst counter intuitive, has become a key tenet of his social 
constructionist theory, and shares much in common with the view espoused by Rorty 
(1982, p 161), who suggested that we give up what he calls “the neurotic Cartesian 
quest for certainty”. The issue in the eyes of post modern psychologists and 
philosophers is no longer one of accounting for the development of new mental 
structures; rather it is one of accounting for changes in language - the sudden 
development of new ways of talking about the world. The linguistic community is 
relied on to sort out knowledge claims, and truth is a property of language; “nothing 
more than what our peers will let us get away with saying” (Rorty , 1979, p 176).
Prigiogine & Stengers (1984) pronounced the end of certainty and described a world 
that is responsive, non-linear, rational, and self-modifying, in stark contrast to the 
earlier mechanistic Newtonian world which was isolated, solitary, linear, orderly and 
stable. Chaos theory -  which they were describing -  proposes that living systems 
operate according to their own principles of organisation. The theory challenges
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some of the most powerful educational theories which underlie current practices. It 
proposes that learning occurs not only in the ‘zone of comfort’, but especially during 
times of confusion, and that the goal of teaching is not to transmit knowledge but to 
transform it. Consistent with Doll’s (1993) ideas opposing the Tyierian step by step 
approach to educational objectives, Domaingue (1988) proposed the analogy of a 
computer programme, in which learners journey through various ‘hypercards’ that 
correspond to their learning interests. A consequence of this line of thought was that 
learners come with unique histories and learning experiences -  hardly a 
revolutionary concept to anyone who has spent time in adult education. A more 
interesting (to my mind) tenet of chaos theory is that, knowing is transactional and 
never complete, and there will always be something that is not yet apparent (Osberg 
& Biesta 2003). In this respect, knowledge is not sought for the purpose of 
understanding the world as it is, but rather for the purpose of finding novel and 
creative ways of interacting with the world, and discovering ways of creating greater 
novelty and complexity.
So much for the postmodernist epistemological strategy; the ontological strategy is 
also very simple - that knowledge resides in language, as opposed to mental 
structures, in "temporary locations in dialogic space”, to use Gergen’s (1995, p 30) 
colourful expression. But, as Orton (1995) surmises, the question as to how it is that 
we come to know anything new arises irrespective of one’s ontological commitments. 
Thus, knowledge may reside in language, but that does not solve the problem of how 
new forms of this knowledge come into being. Rorty, by way of explanation, offers 
the notion of random linguistic mutation (cosmic rays scrambling crucial neurons), but 
seems to have a somewhat cavalier attitude: “It hardly matters how the trick was 
done” (Rorty 1989, p 17). It is as though he downplays the problem of idea 
generation because he cannot account for it in his philosophical system. However, it 
is significant that Holton’s (1988) assessment, that studies of men of genius do not
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help us to understand how personality relates to scientific achievement, has yet to 
receive a serious challenge.
A further approach to the problem, and one which receives some support from 
Miller’s (1987) careful study (painstakingly pieced together from scientists’ notes) of 
the discovery process in physics, offers many illustrations of the role played in idea 
generation by some kind of ‘pre-scientific’ metaphoric thinking. This approach, as 
Prawat (1999, p 60) advises, was first formulated by the American philosopher C.S. 
Peirce (1839-1914), and for which he appropriated the term ‘abduction’, consists in 
the studying of facts and the working out of a theory to explain them. The concept 
was elaborated by John Dewey (1859-1952) (Prawat 1999, p 60-62), who had been 
a teacher of science, and so, together they argued that ideas enjoy certain 
advantages as carriers of meaning that other constructs lack, for example, they can 
overcome the problem which afflicts other constructs - of skin boundedness, a term 
first introduced by Bentley (Prawat 1999 p 51), a colleague of Dewey’s.
Prawat (1999) gives a full account of Peirce’s view of the process of idea 
development, as being one of metaphoric projection in which metaphors, like ‘food 
factory’ for leaves, or ‘pump’ for heart, are taken as examples. Ideas are said to 
originate outside of language, yet in the stage of their development in which they are 
located in a system of related ideas (the metaphors), abduction has to rely heavily on 
social discourse. Miller’s (1987) study of the development of what had been Albert 
Einstein’s new idea - the relativity of time, shows that, although his thought 
experiment was language triggered, the basis for that experiment lies outside of 
language. Einstein himself was insistent about the fact that, for him, thoughts did not 
seem to come in any sequence of words: “I very rarely think in words at all” (Miller 
1987 p204). Wolfson captures this sentiment when he writes that, words “are 
nothing but floating buoys which signal the presence of submerged unuttered 
thoughts” (Wolfson 1947, p 106-107).
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The question arises as to whether ideas are generated through a metaphoric process 
that lies outside language, or is metaphor the mediator between non-linguistic ways 
of knowing and language? There is certainly reasoning from the known to the new 
using of ideas as the instruments of knowledge. Prawat (1999, p 47-76) elaborates 
Peirce’s useful comparison of the modernist theories with abduction, by suggesting 
that deduction proves something must be, induction shows that something is actually 
operative, whereas abduction suggests that something may be.
Mention needs to be made of the philosophical doctrine of pragmatism -  that which 
works out most effectively in practice - invented by Peirce, a chemistry graduate who 
linked it specifically to science and saw in it a road to objective standards. 
Pragmatists taught that we must make do with plausible information adequate to the 
needs of practice, as there is no possibility of achieving authentic knowledge. Dewey 
developed a systematic pragmatism addressing the central questions of 
epistemology and based on intelligent inquiry experimentally testing hypotheses 
created from previous experience. Dewey attacked the notion that education 
consists in the transmission of a body of knowledge, placing stress instead on critical 
thinking, individual experimentation (discovery learning) and problem solving. 
Experiences somehow become ‘intellectualised’ when they are illuminated by ideas, 
whether these are definite or general. Deweyism has been criticised on grounds that 
what may be induced from group learning (the project method is an application of his 
principles), may be conformism to accepted mores (Bantock, 1965 p136). However, 
in the decades of the second half of the twentieth century, two theoretical changes 
took place: from the behavioural to the cognitive viewpoint and from broader to more 
narrow theory ranges. The shift to a cognitive approach was connected to the 
appearance of Gestalt psychology (Hewstone et al 1988 p 15) in America in the 
1960’s. Ausubel’s assimilation theory of learning formalised within cognitivist terms
the pragmatic trial and error nature of learning which Dewey encapsulated.
The absence of consensus, whilst being a stimulus to philosophical debate, can have 
the opposite effect on the fields of education and natural science (at a more 
elementary level). Thus, we find Carr (1995) fiercely attacking empiricism because it 
never managed to provide an epistemology that met the needs of the natural 
sciences, while Kuhn (1962), and Popper (1963) were busily undermining the very 
principles of empiricism. Popper’s contention that no scientific knowledge can be 
regarded as established, so long as the scientist knows only the evidence that 
confirms it, and has not undertaken to discover evidence that disproves it, was taken 
on board by the scientific community, and these somewhat revolutionary ideas were 
developed by Lakatos (in Lakatos & Musgrave,1970), a sophisticated falsificationist, 
who argued that a theory is acceptable only if it has corroborated excess content 
over its predecessor (rival).
Thomas Kuhn (1922-1996) demonstrated that sociological factors have been 
important in the development of scientific knowledge. He also saw claims for 
scientific advances as largely circular arguments because they do not conform to the 
format in which observation always precedes theory, with logic and solid data always 
pointing to one, and only one, theory. Although his objectives were shared by 
sociologists of the ‘Edinburgh School’, their methodologies are different and Kuhn 
would not have shared their belief that scientific knowledge is only a communal belief 
system with a dubious grip on reality.
Lawson uses the language of Kuhn (1962) when discussing how adults learn: “we 
operate with paradigm examples and change the paradigms when they fail in too 
many instances” (Lawson 1998 p135). However, beyond making the point that 
paradigms and paradigm shifts apply adequately in some circumstances but not in 
others, Lawson does not present a critical appraisal of Kuhn’s theory. An example of 
where the theory seems deficient is Newtonian physics which has not been
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abandoned despite inadequacies in its explanatory power regarding some 
phenomena. Although Kuhn may be imprecise about the nature of paradigms and 
paradigm shifts, his theory remains a useful vehicle for progress in describing the 
way a theory is revised when it fails to work. This thesis is more concerned with the 
process of learning -  that which involves an interpretation and translation into our 
concepts and fund of knowledge acquired previously.
There was need for a fresh approach, and it came in the name of constructivism. 
Advocates of constructivist models have in common that, they believe that theories 
and expectations precede and guide the observations an individual makes, and are 
not the result of observation. Constructivist pedagogy has existed, albeit unlabelled 
as such, since the fourth century B.C. Constructivist epistemology, as an offering to 
teachers of a “moral imperative for deconstructing traditional objectivist conceptions 
of the nature of science, mathematics and knowledge and for reconstructing their 
personal epistemologies, teaching practices and educative relationships with 
students” (Hardy & Taylor 1997, p 148), can be said to have emerged following the 
publication of a paper by Driver & Easley (1978). This claimed that achievement in 
school science depends more on the student’s specific abilities and prior experience, 
than on general levels of cognitive functioning. Teaching would no longer be seen as 
filling empty minds. Constructivism, therefore, emerged as a theory of learning, 
though it is necessary to remember that learning theory is not epistemology, and the 
mechanisms whereby sense and nonsense are learnt are the same. However, 
constructivism is more open to, and hence more cautious about, the fact that what is 
learnt may be ideology or a way of being socialised -  hence it is more inherently 
sceptical. The distinction between belief and knowledge (recognised since at least 
Plato’s time) has been obscured in the development of constructivist theory, though 
this theory has dominated science education over the past thirty years. Matthews 
(2000) has highlighted its limitations in relation to teaching the content of science.
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Many educationists have written about constructivist principles but Grayson- 
Wheatley, a Canadian science educator, has summarised them succinctly: "The 
theory of constructivism rests on two main principles... Principle one states that 
knowledge is not passively received, but is actively built up by the cognising subject... 
Principle two states that the function of cognition is adaptive and serves the 
organisation of the experiential world, not the discovery of ontological reality... Thus 
we do not find truth but construct viable explanations of our experiences" (Wheatley 
(1991, p 10). Schwandt (1998) corroborates this idea with his conclusion that human 
beings construct or make knowledge, rather than discovering it. He thought that the 
mechanism by which this occurred involved the invention of concepts, models and 
schemes to make sense of experience; these constructions would then be tested and 
modified as experience proved necessary. Thus, it seems that, it is the ‘active’ role 
of the learner, which entails more than ‘finding out’ something that was out there 
waiting to be discovered, that differentiates itself from discovery learning and from 
didacticism as well.
In an article explaining the implications of constructivism for practising science 
teachers, Lorsbach and Tobin argued that the constructivist epistemology asserts 
that the only tools available to a knower are the senses. It is only through seeing, 
smelling and tasting that an individual interacts with the environment. With these 
messages from the senses, the individual builds a picture of the world. Therefore, 
constructivism asserts that knowledge resides in individuals (Lorsbach & Tobin1992). 
Matthews (2000) disputes the claim that people build up meanings from sensory 
inputs; rather, he takes the view that meanings are learned with varying degrees of 
accuracy.
Harlen (1999) makes the interesting observation that, children already have formed 
ideas which they bring into new science investigations, influencing both what they do
and what sense they make out of what they find. Their learning, therefore, is not a 
discovery of some new ideas, rather the development of the ideas they bring and are 
constructing for themselves.
The theoretical problem for constructivism is that, if knowledge cannot be imparted 
and must be a matter of personal construction, then how can those without 
knowledge come to know of complex conceptual schemes such as valency and 
oxidation, that have taken many years to develop? Even Driver, one the most 
influential constructivists in science education conceded that, “the theory that rusting 
is a chemical reaction between iron, oxygen and water, resulting in the formulation of 
a new substance, is not one that students are likely to generate for themselves” 
(Driver et a ll 994, p 206).
W hilst at school 1 w as taught in both science and other subjects by the  
transm issive method, with much of the body of knowledge learned by rote, 
this w as well suited to the exam ination style and so the process appeared  to 
be unproblem atic. W hen  learning to teach science I w as introduced to  
discovery learning and constructivist principles, both of which w ere  plausible 
and attractive. In retrospect, I fear I w asted m any contact hours with pupils in 
efforts to enable the content of science syllabuses to be known by them  
according to these ideals. I adm it to never finding w ays in which abstract 
notions, for exam ple, valency, could be generated according to constructivist 
principles and, in the end, I w ondered just how much more a phrase such as 
‘construction of know ledge1 says than the old word ‘learning’, or the phrase  
‘personal construction o f m eaning’ than the word ‘understanding’. The  
classroom  teacher is conscious of the responsibility for ensuring that his/her 
students have knowledge of scientific orthodoxy, and that they are trained
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adequately in the methods and procedures o f the discipline. I found I could 
placate my frustrations to som e degree under the guise of ‘training’, for in this 
area  I, and not the students, could be the arbiter of truth. These, not entirely 
satisfactory, experiences testify to the unsolved problem of how com plex  
conceptual knowledge can arise from sim pler knowledge.
There is no reason why constructivism should be applied only in the cognitive 
domain, though most of the models for thinking about the learning of science have 
approached the problem in purely or predominantly intellectual terms. The 
assumption in this approach is that, difficulties in learning science reflect structural or 
functional characteristics or, more frequently, limitations of the cognitive system. 
Remedial action is therefore aimed at freeing the ‘cogs’ of cognition. But maybe the 
problems of school science learning should be located within the wider context of 
pupils’ emotional, personal and social lives, as has been hinted at by Bloomer 
(2000). Claxton (1998) proposes that, a pupil’s achievement and demeanour in 
lessons can only be properly understood as the response of a whole person to a 
complex whole person predicament.
Thus, the nature of the intellectual task is represented by one cluster of variables in 
the personal equation that determines how to be in a lesson. Other variables are to 
do with personal concerns and feelings, unresolved issues from outside the 
classroom, competing priorities and ambitions, assessment of personal capabilities 
and limitations, social mood of the class as a whole, feelings and assumptions about 
the teacher etc. The implication is that pupils are architects of their own learning and 
authors of classroom behaviour, not caged birds imprisoned within the limitations of 
their cognitive systems. Thus the stance they adopt in a lesson is the outcome of a 
subtle decision-making process, which in its turn influences strongly what and how 
they learn.
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It appears that, not only is there an absence of consensus regarding the nature of 
methods of knowing, there are also conflicting views on the nature of the world 
known by science, which seems to reflect a lack of knowledge regarding both the 
content and method of science.
Lonergan (1957) made an heroic effort to understand the process of human knowing. 
According to Lonergan, human knowing is a dynamic structure, involving several 
distinct, irreducible but interrelated activities. The activities include: seeing, hearing, 
touching, tasting, smelling, inquiring, imagining, understanding, conceiving, reflecting, 
marshalling and weighing the evidence, and judging. Lonergan refers to human 
knowing as a three-levelled process involving experience, understanding and 
judgement, and each of the above activities can be located on one of the levels, for 
example, activities involving the senses are located on the level of experiences. 
Although it is possible for any of the above activities to be complete themselves, 
Lonergan claims they do not, and cannot, individually, fully constitute human 
knowing. Without prior presentations by the senses or by the imagination, there is 
nothing to inquire about and nothing to be understood, and so there can be no 
understanding without the prior occurrence of experience. Understanding and 
experience together do not fully constitute human knowing, because judgement 
without understanding is arrogance, and the evidence in support of a prospective 
judgement is found in experience. His view of human knowing, then, was that it is 
not any of the qualities of experience, understanding or judgement, nor is it a 
combination or mix of any of them; it has to be seen as an occurrence in which each 
quality makes an essential contribution. This whole is not a static structure, however, 
but is self-assembling and self-constituting. It is experience that stimulates inquiry, 
brings intelligence to act and leads from experience and imagination through insight 
to the emergence of concepts. Concepts stimulate reflective inquiry which leads to 
judgement, where what is understood is either affirmed or denied, or left open to
doubt, thus leading to further inquiry, and a repetition of the same set of operations.
Some important features of insight can be identified, insight comes as a release to 
the tension of inquiry, it comes suddenly and unexpectedly, there are no rules to 
ensure its occurrence. Insight is in no way like a logical deduction of conclusions 
from premises, although it can be formulated in such a manner. Polanyi (1958) 
argued that established rules of inference offer public paths for drawing intelligent 
conclusions from existing knowledge. The pioneer mind, which reaches its own 
distinctive conclusions by a leap across a logical gap, deviates from the commonly 
accepted process of reasoning to achieve surprising results.
It is the recognition of insight as a non logical operation that is an integral part of 
human knowing, that is a central theme to Poianyi’s argument. Insight involves a 
grasp of relations in what is presented by the senses or the imagination, and so goes 
beyond the given, but the movement from data to theories is not simply a logical 
process. Insight is a function of inner circumstances and not outer conditions. To 
have an insight, one must be faced with a question that specifies the nature of the 
investigation, and one must also possess the relevant data. Insight is radically 
different from sensation: there is no analogy between looking and understanding, and 
the non-scientist can gaze at the same data as the scientist, but does not have the 
same insights.
New and interesting studies are being conducted, with new models of learning and 
teaching being considered by Bereiter & Scardamalia (1996), amongst others. But it 
is to neuroscience that we are likely to be turning increasingly for new knowledge.
For example, Leslie Hart (1983) has highlighted one of the key characteristics of the 
neocortex: the ability to detect and make patterns of meaning. The process involves 
deciphering clues, recognising relationships and indexing information. The clues that 
the brain assembles are best recognised in a Gestalt format, not in a digital, ‘adding
upJ process. Hart claims that pattern recognition depends heavily on what 
experience one brings to a situation, so constructivist principles seem to apply here. 
And, while Gregore (in Tobias 1994) has concentrated on the differing kinds of 
abilities shown by different personality types (the abstract sequential types are said 
to have the best ability to conceptualise an idea), Allan Snyder and John Mitchell, of 
the Centre for the Mind at the Australian National University in Canberra, in a new 
interpretation of the powers of savants, have argued that such people have access to 
a world of unconscious information denied to the rest of us. Rather than savants 
having special powers - as others have argued - they claim (Snyder & Mitchell 1999) 
that the same powers exist in everybody’s brains, but only those with a rare 
abnormality can access them.
That unconscious operation of the brain can explain why ‘sleeping on a problem’ 
often leads to a solution; Professor Snyder, writing in The Times (22.03.1999 p. 18) 
newspaper suggests that, periods of creativity may follow times when the brain may 
be thinking about a problem without our being conscious of it doing so. If the 
mechanism for this incubation could be understood, then maybe creativity could be 
increased. Savants have long been a puzzle to philosophers and scientists for the 
remarkable feats they can perform, for example, the multiplication of large numbers 
in their heads. Snyder & Mitchell (1999) say that in a normal brain the underlying 
arithmetical operations are overlaid by conceptual processing that obscures them. 
Savants are often autistic which means they lack the ability to conceptualise, so 
unconscious information comes through to them un-sifted. They suggest that drugs 
might allow non autistic people to tap into their unconscious mind and match the 
feats of savants, but of more interest to educators is the possibility of increasing 
creativity by encouraging the unconscious processes of the brain. Meanwhile, a 
team led by Marcus Raichle (1998) of Washington University at St Louis, by using a 
scanner to map neurological activity, has demonstrated that paying focal, effortful
attention to something, calls large regions of the brain into action. But once the brain 
finds an optimal way to respond to a certain situation, the wider scaffolding rapidly 
falls away. It is not that practice makes more efficient use of the pathways that were 
active during conscious learning, it is that the brain no longer needs to carry a 
running memory of its recent performance, and so the response can be reduced to its 
bare essentials - creating a memory trace in motor or language areas, which then lies 
dormant until the right input passes by again. Raichle believes the scanning data 
suggests that the brain has two distinct sets of pathways, one for dealing with 
novelty, the other pathway for habits. The suggestion is that over a lifetime of 
conscious learning the brain accumulates thick strata of local routines - habits of 
perception and reaction that allow most things to be processed swiftly and 
automatically. So what forms our centre of attention is essentially self-selecting - the 
bit of the moment that turns out to be the least routine. Our layers of habit form a 
mental filter that let only the novel or difficult grab our attention. Raichle is now 
turning his attention to discovering those areas of the brain which you have to inhibit 
to be able to think about things in a novel way.
As to the question of whether a single theory can encompass the entire learning 
process, Tolman (1959, p 93) commented, “I think the days of such grandiose, all­
covering systems ... are, at least for the present, pretty much passe”. Possibly the 
single most important factor in the transition from global learning theories to 
contemporary learning theories that focus on specific aspects of the learning 
process, was the realisation that our biological systems constrain what we do or do 
not learn about. Traditional learning theory was “premised on the assumption of the 
generality of the laws of learning across all stimuli, responses and situations”
(Mowrer & Klein 2001, p 17). There seem to be many research findings at odds with 
these assumptions, but what is clear is that our biological underpinnings influence the 
process of learning and call into question the concept of general laws of learning.
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3. SUMMARY
While it was not the purpose of this chapter to attempt a full review of the long history 
of philosophical ideas about the nature of knowledge and knowing, the identification 
of some of the ideas that are prominent in epistemology will serve to provide a 
context for this study. It also demonstrates that human knowledge consists of a 
series of constructions which, because they are humanly generated, are problematic, 
namely, indeterminate, unsettled, and ambiguous. This fact can be lost sight of in 
the arena of science which is widely regarded as the way to discover truth. The next 
chapter will examine the links between conceptual change and learning.
CHAPTER 3
THE LEARNING PROCESS
T  INTRODUCTION
This chapter begins with a brief look at some contemporary ideas concerning the 
learning process and then explores aspects of altering concepts that relate to adults 
learning science. Consideration is then given to some factors which act as barriers to 
conceptual change, especially problems with reading science texts for learning and 
comprehension. Though much of the work on reading and comprehension has been 
pioneered with children, wherever possible, emphasis in this study has been placed 
on adults learning science.
2. SOME ISSUES RELATING TO LEARNING AS CONCEPTUAL CHANGE
Whilst questions of scepticism and certainty, as they apply to arguments about 
whether saying one knows a fact allows the claim to a right to be sure of it, are 
properly the subject matter of philosophy, any investigation into the acquisition of 
new knowledge must also give some consideration to the nature of that knowledge, 
and to the consequences of holding particular views. Human beings tend to organise 
their experiences into coherent, explanatory frameworks, and these are normally 
expressed in more or less specific sets of words that are commonly referred to as 
conceptions (Vosniadou 2002). The conceptualisation of knowledge in terms of 
conceptions, has dominated science education research since the late 1970’s. There 
is also evidence for the existence of conceptions that differ from the standard 
conceptions of science, which has led to the invention of terms such as
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misconception, alternative conception, etc. (Pfundt & Duit 2004). The robustness of 
a student’s conceptions in the face of efforts to change them, is also well reported 
(Pine & Messner 2000). Different models have been proposed for describing the 
conceptual changes that students undergo (Chi 1991), and some studies have 
identified conditions that support the evolution of initial conceptions held by learners, 
to scientifically correct ones (Strike & Posner 1992). Although these studies differ in 
the way they go about inducing change, they share two assumptions: (i) conceptions 
are located somewhere in the mind, in the form of mental models (Vosniadou 2002), 
p-prims (di Sessa 1993), or internal structure (Reiss & Tunnicliffe 2001), and that (ii) 
language is a means for expressing internal conceptions to the outside world, but has 
little effect on the constitution of the conception.
New and different ways of thinking about knowledge have been proposed by 
Edwards (1993) and Gee (2004) in which knowledge is thought of in terms of 
discursive practices. Here the emphasis is shifted from something which is located in 
the mind, to the word ‘conception’ - referring to “publicly displayed forms of meaning- 
making talk” (Givry & Roth 2006, p 1087). Conceptions, therefore, have to be 
understood and theorised in terms of situations and language in use; they embody a 
cultural way of articulating the world. While all this seems a very long way from 
conventional models of interpretation used in science, the demise of positivism has 
opened the way for alternative approaches such as this.
Traditionally, the word ‘learn’ referred to the acquisition of knowledge or skill as a 
result of study, experience or instruction. The steady increase in attention given to 
learning through experience over the last twenty years, has resulted in some 
researchers using the term ‘learning’ as though It described only the acquisition of 
knowledge or ability through experience. Such a view contradicts the belief that not 
all modifications of behaviour as a result of experience result in learning; compare
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this with the biological phenomenon of ‘imprinting’ where an experience can 
determine future behaviour, which is not generally considered to be the same thing 
as learning. However, experiential learning has come to dominate the scene and 
many forms of it have emerged, for example, action learning (Revans 1980), 
transformative learning (Mezirow 1991), and it seems that all forms can be 
behavioural, action based, cognitive or social. Kolb produced a diagram to illustrate 
the pathways involved in experiential learning (Kolb & Fry 1975):
Fig. 3 Experiential Learning Cycle, after Kolb
Though Kolb’s representation has achieved some renown and has been published 
frequently, it has been criticised as overly simplistic and lacking in recognition of the 
social context of human learning. But these omissions have been the stimulus to 
other researchers to develop and improve the diagram, so that more details of the 
learning process can be included. Jarvis, for example, has produced a model to 
“capture the multiplicity of the different processes of learning” (Jarvis in Olssen 2004, 
p 32) - this is reproduced on the next page. Jarvis not only identifies different routes 
(from boxes 2 and 3 in his model), but he also recognises that not all learning is 
intended, so his categories are sub-divided further, according to intention, or lack of
it. Jarvis uses awareness as the criterion for intention; I think it would be difficult to 
collect evidence showing that different processes take place depending on the 
presence or absence of conscious awareness. My interest is in how adults respond 
to new information and I have made it an assumption that the mechanism of the 
response is the same, whether the new information is sense or nonsense.
Fig. 4 A Model of the Process of Learning - after Jarvis (in Olssen 2004 p 32)
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Novak simply categorises learning to be rote (when the learner memorises new 
information without relating it to prior knowledge), or meaningful -  for which there are 
three requirements: (i) the presence of relevant prior knowledge, (ii) some meaningful 
material to learn, (iii) the learner choosing to learn meaningfully. This last point, if 
correct, would seem to carry an implication that unintended learning could never be 
meaningful, and I am not sure that either Novak or Jarvis would find that conclusion
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acceptable. Both researchers accept the importance of motivation; Novak’s first 
principle in his theory of education (Novak 1998, p 224) states: "there must be 
motivation to learn. No learning will take place unless the learner chooses to learn”. 
Jarvis (1999, p 38) says: “But if there is a disjuncture between my biography (the 
sum of my experiences both conscious and unconscious) and a particular 
experience, I might seek to learn to close it”.
Confrey (1990, p 108) argues that, “we construct our understanding through our 
experiences, and the character of our experience is influenced profoundly by our 
cognitive lens”. Yet it is only fairly recently that recognition of students’ prior 
experiences, and of how they came to make sense of these experiences, have come 
to be recognised as important elements in establishing effective learning 
environments. Bendixen, Dunkle & Shraw (1994) draw attention to the way in which 
the epistemological beliefs about learning and the acquisition of knowledge influence 
the quality of student learning. They report that it appears that epistemological 
beliefs may drive the type of information processing a learner uses. Marton & Saljo’s 
(1984) study, referred to later in this chapter, also revealed views of learning as held 
by learners. My study aims to discover how adults respond to new information 
regardless of their epistemological beliefs, motivation or intention. It also tests for the 
existence of any link between the conception of learning by a learner as determined 
by questionnaire, and the type of learning as revealed in concept maps drawn by the 
same learners.
Changing and, or, increasing knowledge involves altering concepts, or acquiring new 
ones, and some implications of this will now be considered. Many terms relating to 
conceptual change, and many meanings ascribed to these terms, are found in the 
literature. Thus, in addition to the frequently used term ‘conceptual change’, are the 
following terms; ‘knowledge restructuring’ (Carey 1985), ‘belief change’ (White & 
Gunstone 1989), ‘conceptual capture’ (Hewson 1981), ‘assimilation’ (Posnereta!
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1982), ‘conceptual exchange’ (Hewson 1981), and ‘conceptual refinement or 
extension’ (Tytler & White 1996). Some commonality can be identified, and these 
terms all seem to embrace the replacement, and/or addition, of new ideas that can 
account for phenomena that could not be accounted for by previous understanding.
All of them also hold to the view that knowledge is personally and socially 
constructed, and that alteration of ideas is a mostly linear process. The possible 
influence of teacher expectations on the self-conceptions of students, and any effect 
this might have on their learning, is explored in Flude’s (1974) account of theories of 
social difference in education.
For the purpose of this study, use of the term ‘conceptual change’ will be confined to 
my own working definition - ‘conceptual change be taken to describe an alteration in 
existing knowledge, to account for new and, or, more complex phenomena which 
were not satisfactorily accounted for to the individual, by previous knowledge’. The 
definition applies to individual knowledge, as opposed to the more general 
knowledge that may constitute scientific orthodoxy. Conceptual change may move 
towards this, but it is not required to by definition. The term ‘understanding’ is often 
used to indicate the final outcome of a learning process, but I prefer to place learning 
at the apex of conceptual change, because it describes something that encompasses 
both memory and understanding; it means to have knowledge of, whereas 
understanding refers to perception of meaning. There are countless errors, 
misconceptions, mythologies, ideologies and fantasies that can be understood in 
themselves (Matthews 2000), but this understanding does not equate with 
knowledge, if learners and teachers limit themselves to understanding alone, then 
the possibility of any theory of learning leading to knowledge is severely 
compromised.
Conception goes beyond what can be presented by sense or imagination. For
example, in the discussion of chemical structure, the concepts of bond length and 
bond angle emerge. It is possible to consider a ‘ball and stick’ molecular model, but 
the reality is in no way like the model. The model helps one to understand, but the 
understood molecule is not identical with the model; thus, "the movement to concepts 
involves a movement into the field of the unimaginable” (Danaher 1988, p 52). 
Concepts are constituted by the activities of supposing, thinking, formulating, 
understanding, and defining, and these occur after insight has occurred. As an 
example of concept formation in chemistry, geometric isomerism will be considered, 
using the molecule 1,2 dichloroethene.
Fig. 5 Structure diagrams illustrating geometric isomers of 1,2 dichloroethene
Insight into either structural formula enables one to come to an understanding of the 
particular features of that compound, for example, the number of bonds, the bond 
angles, and the spatial arrangement of the atoms. The notion of geometric isomers, 
however, does not emerge from a consideration of the topology of any single 
structure. To discuss geometric isomerism, both cases must be considered and, 
through insight into the particular cases, plus further thinking, one is able to grasp 
that there is a topological difference between the two molecules, and this is related to 
the relative positions of the chlorine and hydrogen atoms. Thus, the concept of 
geometric isomerism emerges. To arrive at this concept, and to be able to give a 
general explanation of the structure of geometric isomers and the grounds for their 
occurrence, it is necessary to consider more than one case. Conception selects 
what is essential, namely, the topological difference, which is reflected in the different 
relative positions of the hydrogen and chlorine atoms, and disregards the incidentals 
- the size, the colour and the type of diagram, or even the particular chemical
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symbols. The function of concepts does not fully constitute human knowing. It is 
only in the act of judgement which follows insight into data, the foundation of 
concepts, and the formulation of hypotheses or probabilities, that the process of 
knowing is complete.
The six conceptions of learning identified by Marton et al (1989) provide a useful 
framework against which to view data from this study. Three of the conceptions, 
namely: increasing one’s knowledge, memorizing and reproducing, and applying, 
view knowledge as being ‘out there’, waiting to be picked up, taken in and 
stored. Notions of meaning are absent here, though this quality features in the other 
three conceptions: understanding, seeing something in a different way, and changing 
as a person (through learning).
Atherton (1999, p 78), however, offers a simpler classification of conceptions of 
learning, which he describes as being either additive or supplantive. He states that 
most learning consists in adding to one’s stock of knowledge and skills - the additive 
concept. Supplantive learning involves material which replaces, or threatens, 
knowledge or skills which have already been acquired. It might also include, as 
Biggs (1987, 2003) maintains, new learning which triggered reminders of past 
failures, and, or, difficulties; but what is important is that, what was formerly ‘known’ 
has to be given up in favour of the struggle up the learning curve. Those students 
who view learning as the acquisition of knowledge or information as a commodity, 
tend to adopt surface learning approaches, whereas those who see learning as 
sense-making or comprehension, are disposed to adopt deep approaches.
A further approach, mentioned by Watters & Watters (2007, p 22), described as an 
achieving or strategic approach, is adopted by students who aim to get good marks 
and adopt strategies to achieve these as short-term goals. A motivational factor and 
a strategic factor thus exist within each dimension.
Posner et al (1982) offered prerequisite conditions for a learner’s exchange of 
existing conceptions for new conceptions: firstly, dissatisfaction with currently held 
conceptions, and secondly, the new conception must be (a) intelligible, (b) initially 
plausible, (c) fruitful. The model, though very rational, neglects affective and social 
issues but was strengthened by Inclusion of Toulmin’s (1972) idea of conceptual 
ecology. This idea included the learner’s epistemological commitments, metaphors, 
analogies, beliefs, connecting conceptions, and knowledge from outside the field 
(Strike & Posner 1992). The use of the word ‘ecology’ has been promoted by 
teachers of biology, for example, Watson (1986 p 340) writes about the “conservation 
of ecosystems of conceptions” and Kinchin (2000b p 12) refers to “learning within an 
appropriate teaching ecology” which he sees as the total teaching environment that is 
contributed to by teachers, students, and the ‘conditions’ in which they communicate. 
As I caution in Chapter 5 (Methods of Inquiry: interpretation p130) an analogy, whilst 
it may be a useful source of insight, is not evidence that can confirm the truth of that 
insight.
The information processing model of learning (Novak 1958) assumes problem 
solving is a function of two traits: firstly, knowledge stored in the mind, and secondly, 
information processing capability. Ausubel’s (1968) theory suggests these two 
processes are confounded in the process of new learning, where integration of new 
and old knowledge is a function of both the quantity and quality of cognitive structure 
organisation. This is Ausubel’s assimilation theory which represents a significant 
shift because it spearheaded a cognitive revolution in learning, even though the ideas 
initially found more ready acceptance in Europe than in the America of their origin.
At the core of this theory is the role of the subsuming concept in meaningful learning, 
which is an interactive role, facilitating movement of relevant information through 
perceptual barriers, and providing a base for linkage between newly perceived 
information and previously acquired knowledge. In the course of this linkage, the
subsuming concept becomes slightly modified, and the stored information is also 
altered.
In AusubePs theory, variation in amount of recall depends primarily on the degree of 
meaningfulness associated with the learning process. He says information learned 
by rote cannot be anchored to major elements in cognitive structure, and hence form 
a minimum linkage with it. However, rote learning does have one advantage over 
meaningful learning -  precision, which is useful for telephone numbers, and for 
science as examined in schools; perhaps this is why many teaching strategies have 
adopted it, and why its reputation is tarnished and misconceptions abound.
AusubePs (1968) view is that concept development proceeds best when the most 
general, most inclusive concepts are introduced first, and then these concepts are 
progressively differentiated in terms of detail and specificity. But it is submitted that, 
in science at least, determination of what in a body of knowledge are the most 
general, most inclusive concepts, is not easy. Furthermore, training in the selection 
of possible hierarchical relationships among concepts, may not form part of teacher 
education and, consequently, of lesson planning. Thus, the success of integration of 
new knowledge could depend, to a significant extent, on this one teaching strategy. 
The implications for curriculum design from primary science upwards, and for teacher 
education, are potentially extensive.
Support for the Ausubelian argument is found in the study by Munn at al (1992, p 11). 
In answering the question as to why some students taking courses designed for 
those with no prior experience, but who nevertheless value having previous 
knowledge, Munn et al (1992, p11) concluded that the students “like to relate material 
to that which they already know.”; see also Merriam & Cafarella 1991, Cross 1981, 
and Knowles 1986. In the social sciences, existing knowledge can derive from life 
experience; in the natural sciences, this tends not to be the case unless the students
have a job or hobby in that field. Therefore, any familiarity with the subject matter, 
even if gained many years ago, is seen as a distinct advantage.
Chinn & Brewer (1993) recognise five ways in which new knowledge can be related 
to old knowledge: (i) No new knowledge - Structured knowledge; requires that the 
mind starts as a clean slate (tabula rasa) onto which new knowledge is deposited. It 
is argued that when learning about phenomena that are ‘invisible’ in everyday life (for 
example, molecules or diffusion), then the student has no knowledge upon which to 
build, (ii) Fragmented knowledge - Structured knowledge; argues that naive 
learners start out with a multitude of disconnected intuitions (p-prims), which are 
gradually refined to form a ‘structured whole’, (iii) Simple core knowledge -  
Elaborated knowledge; learning simply elaborates and adds to core conceptions 
without changing them, (iv) Structured knowledge -  Conceptually-consistent 
structured knowledge; a change in theory or understanding that does not require any 
change in explanatory concepts, (v) Structured knowledge -  Conceptually 
inconsistent structured knowledge; this involves a major shift in underlying theories 
such that there is a fundamental change in key conceptions.
While this classification approach may have its applications within a general review of 
knowledge acquisition, some at least of the terms it uses (for example, ‘simple core 
knowledge’) cannot be given precise definitions. My study is designed to illuminate 
the response of an adult to new information, recognising that this may result in 
conceptual change.
Strategies to promote conceptual change may be based on cognitive conflict, where 
emphasis has to be placed on the design of appropriate interventions by teachers. 
These are aimed at ‘loosening’ existing cognitive structures, making them more 
amenable to restructuring at a higher level (Adey, Shayer & Yates 1989, p 241). 
Schwandt (1998, p 129) states that "one’s constructions are challenged when one
becomes aware that new information conflicts with the held construction”. However, 
it cannot be assumed that any reconceptualisation will comply with the orthodox 
view, and evidence can be misinterpreted to fit existing theories (theory-laden 
observation).
3. BARRIERS TO LEARNING
Classroom observations suggest the existence of barriers to the development of 
adults as learners of science, these stem from the unique personal experience of 
some individuals. Some work has been done on this, though mostly not with 
reference to science, or with adults. Arising from a brainstorming between 
themselves is a list of eighteen barriers that emerged from the experiences of Boud, 
Cohen & Walker (1993, p 80). This led them to the working definition that, “Barriers 
are those factors which inhibit or block learners’ preparedness for the experience, 
their active engagement in it, and their ability to reflect rationally on it with a view to 
learning from it”. Concerning the types of barriers, Boud, Cohen & Walker classed 
these in terms of their origins as they saw them. Thus, external barriers can relate 
to: (a) the learning environment, namely, the larger personal situation and context of 
the learner. These external barriers correspond to the situational resistance of 
Atherton (1999, p 86) which include: administrative and technological failures, lack of 
pre-course information, course organization, venues and resourcing, credibility of 
tutor, for example, issues such as a male tutor teaching areas which have become 
preserves of ‘feminists’ etc., (b) social forces, which may include stereotyping, 
classism and cultural expectations, and (c) people, for example, censorial attitudes.
Internal barriers, corresponding largely with ‘ulterior’ resistance (Atherton 1999 p 86), 
and which stem from the unique personal experience of the learner, can include: (a) 
previous negative experiences, (b) accepted presuppositions about cognitive ability, 
(c) lack of awareness of one’s assumptions, (d) emotional state of the learner,
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regarding the need to change (this component was explored in an interesting and 
seldom quoted text by More (1974) and may be an epiphenomenon i.e. a by-product 
of some other factor), and (e) established patterns of behaviour, risk and loss.
Stress and anxiety have often been used as interchangeable terms and observable 
symptoms would tend to support this practice. However, Catell (1963) points out 
that, the basic physiological anxiety pattern is not the same as that associated with 
stress, for example, anxiety affects metabolism and may cause a loss of weight. He 
also provides an interesting psychological example to distinguish stress from anxiety. 
When a difficult problem is tackled, stress symptoms are demonstrated, whereas 
anxiety is displayed when the person retreats or utilises other escape mechanisms. 
Catell also distinguishes anxiety from fear, as showing basically different 
physiological response patterns. Ausubel et al (cited in Singer 1968, p 95) defined 
anxiety as an “acquired reaction-sensitivity in individuals suffering from impaired self­
esteem causing them to overreact with fear to any adjustive situation that contains a 
further threat to self-esteem”. He separated students into low and high anxious 
groups, based on Rorschach Anxiety Test scores. No significant differences 
between the groups were observed on a mirror tracing test and a blindfold stylus test, 
but more complex tests showed that higher anxiety people perform less well than 
those low in anxiety. Moreover, those who scored low on anxiety tests perform more 
effectively under stress (in complex tasks) than under normal conditions. This is not 
the case with high anxiety individuals, who are less effective performers under stress 
-  which can result from psychological, physiological and emotional origins (Selye, 
1956).
Classroom observations (unquantified) have suggested to me that adults learning 
science constitute a higher-anxiety group than younger students, and it would be 
interesting to study, more extensively, the connection between anxiety states and 
performance in adult science learners.
To be a learner is to be an intellectual adventurer, but there are risks and costs. 
People tend to be, as Thaler & Sunstein (2008) suggest, present oriented - with a 
bias in favour of the status quo, but it is impossible to be ‘as we were’ as well as ‘as 
we will become’ at the same time. Yet, I found my students reluctant to abandon 
past known positions in favour of unknown future ones -  if meaningful learning 
involves changing who one is, then they tend to avoid this. There is risk associated 
with change and, “as risks multiply, the pressure grows to pass oneself off as 
infallible and thereby deprive oneself of the ability to learn” (Beck 1992, p 177).
Interplay between external and internal barriers may be expected -  thus barriers can 
be experienced as internal, but may arise from external influences in the past. The 
triggers for these barriers were found by Atherton (1999, p 84) to vary greatly from 
person to person, "issues which engendered great concern and resistance among 
some course members were no problem to others, who may however have been 
disturbed by quite different things”.
Certain topics were found to have a higher probability of provoking resistance than 
others, e.g. equal opportunities. But none of these barriers are specific to the 
development of adults as learners of science. Tytler & White (1996) identify the 
following as possible barriers to conceptual change: firstly, epistemological beliefs, 
secondly, a lack of domain specific knowledge, thirdly, specific problems associated 
with applying conceptions to new phenomena, and fourthly, past histories of 
conceptual application.
Classroom contexts, including the nature of interactions between teacher and 
students, may also be of considerable importance. Bentley & Watts (1987) 
recognised the consequence of requiring learners to have an active role - they find 
themselves having to reveal their thinking while, at the same time, having to be open
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minded enough to change that thinking. This requires a highly supportive classroom 
environment, where learners’ ideas are accepted by the teacher, and the risk of other 
learners ridiculing the thinking of any individual is eliminated.
Pintrich, Marx & Boyle (1993) drew attention to a paradox which exists for the 
learner. On the one hand, current conceptions potentially constitute momentum that 
resists conceptual change, but they also provide frameworks that the learner can use 
to interpret and understand new, potentially conflicting information. Learners have to 
embrace a certain amount of an Orwellian type of doublethink (holding two 
contradictory beliefs simultaneously and accepting both of them) in order to manage 
this paradox. Even learners’ views can be a learning barrier, due to the discontinuity 
that is often assumed to exist between novices’ and experts’ knowledge (Larkin 
1983, McCloskey 1983). Once this no longer exists, then careful analysis can 
uncover aspects of their knowledge that are continuous with, and may be used by, 
them to generate scientific understandings (di Sessa 1990, Smith et al 1993).
The factors that influence the evidence selection part of the process of knowledge 
acquisition represent biases and have been examined by Rosser (1994) and 
Klaczynski & Narasimhan (1998). Their conclusions point to a more biological 
explanation, with existing beliefs having the dominant influence because they are 
recognised and can be processed with less cognitive effort than unrecognised or 
conflicting evidence. This latter is, therefore, less readily assimilated into existing 
knowledge. Barker (2000 b) argues that, the effort required to understand ‘hard’ 
ideas can be too great, so ignorance remains bliss.
Salomon and Globerson (1987, p 623-634) claim that the gap between what learners 
can do, and what they actually do - the zone of proximal learning, can be narrowed 
down to a great extent by the notion of mindfulness. They define this construct as, 
"the volitional, metacognitively guided employment of non-automatic, usually effortful
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processes". Mindfulness, thus, reflects a voluntary state of mind and connects 
among motivation, cognition and learning. It is both a general tendency and a 
response to situational demands. Bloomer’s (2000, p 5) Further Education 
Development Association funded research illuminates transformations in young 
people’s relationships with, or dispositions to, knowledge and learning. Fie states 
that, “friendship groups, illnesses, student and parent relationships, and personal 
relationships, frequently had a bearing upon changes in young people’s educational 
values and attitudes to learning... these events... were partly the products of chance”. 
It is relevant here to emphasise the distinction between the environment in which a 
learner learns, and the mechanism by which the learning of new material takes place. 
The importance of the former is not disputed, but this study focuses on the latter.
Pine and Messner (2000) found primary school teachers were struggling in science 
lessons, because pupils were reluctant to alter their beliefs about the way the world 
works. By the time they start school, children have created theories about a range of 
scientific concepts, and simply teaching them the right ideas about science is no 
guarantee they will give up their views. They will either disregard the evidence of 
experiments or simply misinterpret them to confirm their own belief. Thus, as Karen 
Pine states (Daily Mail 18.09.2000 p 31), “older students and adults still have wrong 
ideas about some aspects of science ... The challenge for teachers is not just to 
introduce children to new science topics but to help children unlearn their existing 
ideas".
Pine & Messner addressed the question as to why children should develop their own 
naive theories about the world, if so often these ideas are incorrect or incomplete. 
They advance the explanation that,
prior to being exposed to any formal science education these naive ideas 
served to give the very young child some basic principles and heuristics for 
dealing with the world around him since most of the time they are proved
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right. The fact that they are inaccurate, erroneous or incomplete also means 
that, whilst they may have been useful in an informal setting, they can actually 
hinder the child’s ability to learn further about a topic in the context of more 
formal education.
Pine & Messner (2000, p 6) 
Barker’s (2000 a) work seems to confirm this, her Royal Society of Chemistry report 
showing that, although children may be in possession of all the cognitive skills 
needed to answer questions, their naive views may result in these answers being 
incorrect. Barker’s Report, in addition to confirming that children tend to have naive 
ideas, and that these ideas are resistant to change, further highlights the fact that 
children do not reason consistently, using a mix of sensory and logical reasoning, it 
seems that where matter is not visible, then sensory reasoning dominates. A 
consequence of this behaviour is that sensory reasoning about matter persists 
through secondary school ages, even though logical reasoning ability may be well 
developed and applied in, for example, mathematics. I argue that the findings of 
research work on children is relevant because it helps to explain how it is that adults 
come to have views that are so resistant to correction or, indeed, to change of any 
sort. Fritz et al (2000) were driven to recognise that prior knowledge (whether naive 
theories or misconceptions) play a significant role in the new knowledge that these 
students will construct. And they, along with Ferrari & Chi (1998 p 1234) found that 
“faulty explanations are very resistant to change”.
The suggestion here that naive theories are synonymous with misconceptions, 
prompts a review of some of the terms used in the literature to refer to children’s 
explanatory structures, prior to classroom instruction: (a) Misconceptions (Helm & 
Novak 1983) - a term currently used widely, for example, Barker (2000 a) and Pine & 
Messner (2000), but can be argued to be erroneous, due to the a-priori disregard of 
children’s ideas as being simply wrong, (b) Preconceptions - appears to be used
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rather casually to describe Ideas which might exist in the mind of an individual, before 
the adoption of an idea currently accepted by the scientific community as orthodox 
science, namely, a concept, (c) Alternative conceptions (Gilbert, Osborne &
Fensham 1982) - a term used to highlight commonalities in the cognitive structure of 
many individuals, (d) Alternative frameworks - Driver (1981) uses the term to refer to 
features of the mental organisation of an individual that were used for 
conceptualising his or her experience of the physical world, (e) Synthetic models -  
Vosniadou & lonnides (1998) use the term to describe models constructed by 
children in their attempt to reconcile the scientific information they receive, with 
presuppositions and beliefs supported by their everyday experience.
Kaiser et al (1986) concluded that younger, pre-school, children were more 
successful - because they were working without any preconceived theory, namely, it 
is the having of a theory which leads to errors. Gadamer, however, quoted by Robin 
Usher in a discussion on some neglected epistemologica! assumptions, argued 
otherwise; that
“one’s pre-understandings, far from being closed prejudices or biases (as 
they are thought of in positivist empiricist epistemology), actually make one 
more open minded because, in the process of interpretation and 
understanding, they are put at risk and modified through the encounter with 
what one is trying to understand. So rather than bracketing or ‘suspending’ 
them we should use them as the essential starting point for acquiring 
knowledge. To know, one must be aware of one’s pre-understandings even 
though one cannot transcend them”
Scott & Usher 1996, p 21
Phil Sadler of Harvard University, in discussion which formed part of the television 
programme Simple Minds (BBC2 1994), argued that, from a very young age, children 
develop their own personal theories about how the world works. The mental models
63
they produce are based on their interpretation of the things they experience. 
Frequently, the models are incorrect, but are firmly held, because the thoughts are 
their own. In order to be able to predict what can happen in nature, however, you 
have to get beyond your misconceptions, because each one is a block to new 
learning. Sadly, most children do not get beyond their misconceptions and, to add to 
the problem, teachers can generate as many misconceptions as new “correct" 
explanations.
Conducting science experiments in a formal setting like the classroom, does not 
necessarily cause students to alter their misconceptions. Schauble (1996) found 
many children and adults still retained their incorrect beliefs. She noticed that 
participants refused to generate evidence, or entertain ideas, that did not fit with their 
existing knowledge, causing them to dismiss relevant evidence and cling rigidly to 
their current beliefs, even when they were wrong. Barker (2000a) confirms this, by 
claiming that the evidence indicates that one reason for the impact of current 
teaching of pre-sixteen year olds, is that students find it very difficult to ‘unlearn’ an 
idea. Gabel & Samuel (1987, p 697) note with concern that: “even after the study of 
chemistry students cannot distinguish between some of the fundamental concepts on 
which all of chemistry is based such as solids, liquids and gases, or elements, 
mixtures and compounds in terms of the particle model”. Taber (1997) had reflected 
on this, noting that students never seem to be able to discard old ideas about 
chemical bonding but, instead, add new thinking to what was already there. Fie 
reflects that, for many the result of this addition is confusion and an absence of clear 
understanding. Taber concludes that, if students cannot unlearn ideas, then they 
should be taught the science they really need to know from the beginning.
The importance of ancillary skills to gaining understanding and knowledge is an area 
that may be worth investigating - it could be that the extent to which teachers 
appreciate the struggle with mathematics by learners of the physical sciences, is
underestimated. The extent to which this is, or is not, a barrier to learning science by 
adults offers scope for further exploration.
Boud, Cohen & Walker (1993, p 81) state that, “facilitation of learning is essentially 
about helping learners deal with their barriers to learning. Helping them to conceive 
of a barrier to learning as susceptible to influence rather than an inherent deficiency 
can be a personally empowering step”. They identify four steps which can help with 
the alteration or transformation of barriers: (i) acknowledgement of existence of 
barriers, (ii) identification by name or description of barriers, (iii) examination of the 
origins of barriers, in order to see how they operate, and (iv) working with barriers 
using strategies which may be either confrontational or transformative.
The removal of barriers to learning that have become deep seated through being 
learned over many years, especially where some degree of emotional impairment 
has occurred, is a specialised study. Though closely linked to successful learning, it 
is beyond the scope of this thesis.
The term ‘unlearning’ has relevance to this study, though it has nothing to do with 
Plato’s paradox of some things being unlearnable because they must be known 
before any process of learning could be undertaken. It is also not synonymous with 
forgetting, from which it will be distinguished later in this chapter. Unlearning is a 
term used by Brew (in Boud, Cohen & Walker 1993, p 88) to describe what happens 
when our ‘world view’ is changed, and cannot be reconstituted in its original form, 
because new experiences have transformed existing understanding into something 
else. The destruction of previous learning will be triggered when a set of anomalous 
ideas cannot be incorporated within a framework of understanding, and so a 
conceptual reordering takes place. Brew likens the process to a Kuhnian paradigm 
shift, and says it can occur to both cognitive and experiential knowledge. Brew 
considered the assumption that, an accumulation of experiences leads to, or
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parallels, the accumulation of knowledge. She found that, for herself, whilst there 
was an appearance of a progressive deepening of understanding of issues that she 
was considering about herself which was fed by a strong desire to know more, she 
was also conscious of a strong desire not to know, or to not know. Brew then 
discovered that she had a repertoire of mechanisms and procedures for preventing 
her finding out what she did not want to know. Although some of these things she 
did not want to know were derived from her personal history, others she found to be 
embedded in the culture of academic inquiry; for example, traditional academic 
inquiry de-emphasises the role and value of human subjective experience. Brew 
argues that the implications of this suggest that the learning we do from experience, 
can be a way of avoiding what we need to, or should, learn.
There is a difference, of course, between the pursuit of self-knowledge referred to 
above, where what we learn is what we learn, de facto, not what we choose to learn, 
nor maybe what we might liked to have learned, and learning science where 
situations are planned in order to bring about specific learning. However, unlearning, 
seen as triggered when evidence necessitates a conceptual reordering of the whole 
or a part of one’s world view, is a process that needs to be understood and used by 
all learners.
In contrast with unlearning, are the related processes of forgetting and obliterative 
subsumption. Ausubel (1968) introduced the term ‘subsuming concept’, to cover the 
interactive role of facilitating movement of relevant information through perceptual 
barriers, thus providing a base for linkage between newly perceived information and 
previously acquired knowledge. This interactive process, between newly learned 
material and existing concepts, is the central core of Ausubel’s assimilation theory of 
learning. Subsuming concepts may become established in the course of meaningful 
learning, or may become obliterated in that process.
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‘Forgetting’ has an everyday meaning as the failure to recall something, and a 
specific technical meaning where it describes failure to recall after rote learning. The 
diagram in the Tools’ section of Chapter 5 shows the relationships between 
forgetting and obliterative subsumption. Novak (1998, p 60) refers to studies which 
show that substantial forgetting occurs in a matter of hours for nonsense syllables, a 
matter of days for poetry and story passages, whilst for science or history retention 
drops to a fraction of original learning in a matter of weeks. Some information, 
especially if it has been rehearsed extensively, can be retained for months or years.
In Ausubel’s theory, variation in amount of recall depends primarily on the degree of 
meaningfulness associated with the learning process, although Novak emphasises 
the shorter periods of retention when contrasting rote learning with meaningful 
learning. However, the point he is trying to make is that there is a residual 
enhancement of cognitive structure with meaningful learning, which is not present 
following rote learning.
An obstacle to learning that I had noticed with children of secondary school age when 
learning science, and which appeared to be equally prominent with adults, concerns 
the ability to comprehend texts relevant to the topics being studied. I shall refer to 
my experiences with a pre-Access to Higher Education course, during the week that 
the National Year of Reading in September 1998 was being launched. I wondered, 
some time later, whether the publicity associated with this event had alerted my mind 
to the observations I was making. There had been a poor response to the first 
allocation of home study, and one student was courageous enough to say she didn’t 
understand the work. I responded by going through the work with the group, word by 
word, and began to see that, although they knew some science, they could not 
effectively comprehend what they had read from the text book. Their difficulties were 
confirmed at the first practical session, where quickly it became obvious that some of 
the students were unable to read instructions meaningfully. Their mannerisms
67
suggested that they had developed the habit of watching what other students did but, 
in this situation they were finding this difficult because they were a group who were 
mostly new to each other, and were as yet unsure of who could do what.
Written language does not have all the supporting cues (stress, intonation, tone of 
voice, gestures, facial expressions and social context) that accompany spoken 
interactions. Whilst it is often the case that once children have learned to decode 
words reasonably efficiently, comprehension will follow automatically, there is not 
always a high correlation between word recognition ability and reading 
comprehension ability. This may be because an individual is so preoccupied with 
word decoding that he or she may not have the cognitive capacity to carry out 
comprehension processes at the same time. In addition, the rapid loss of information 
from short term memory makes it difficult for very slow readers to hold information 
from earlier in a sentence so that they can relate it to what comes later. The problem 
can be compounded by the reader’s belief that the point of reading is ‘getting the 
words right’, and they may not connect this activity with deriving meaning from a text 
if it were read to them.
The Gunning Fox Index enables texts to be compared for readability, and the steps 
for the calculation are given in Appendix 7. The most important factor in this formula 
is the length of the sentence and, although it would always be possible to get an easy 
readability rating by using very short sentences, this would tend to produce writing 
that sounds like a children’s book. Another key factor is the intellectual span of 
attention of the reader and, hence, in matching the ‘unloading rate’ of information to 
this span. I could not, for example, give the following to my pre-Access to Higher 
Education class simply because they lacked the expertise to decode the technical 
language: ‘Crystals were grown as hexagonal plates, up to 300microm. x lOOmicrom. 
in thickness by vapour diffusion of 2.1 M-ammonium sulphate, in trisacetate buffer
(pH 7.0), in the presence of 0.01 M-Mg’. However, the information could be 
communicated to them by re-writing it as several sentences. They were completely 
lost by the following (unattributed) passage, where the important information is 
spread very thinly:
‘In recent years, since the Second World War, a proliferation of the sizes and 
types of aluminium conductor utilised in overhead electric power lines has 
occurred. An attempt is made in this article to provide a guide to the range 
now available to the designer of lines. For super-tension transmission lines, 
increasing voltage, heavier currents, and longer lines have introduced 
demands for conductors having greater diameter, larger cross-sectional area, 
and increased strength, the emphasis on one or other of these factors being 
variable in accordance with the function for which each particular line is 
erected.
The production of phase conductors having a high degree of capacitance and 
a lower level of reactance can be achieved by the utilisation of bundles of two, 
three and four conductors, which practice usually reduces radio influence and 
corona loss to levels which are acceptable almost regardless of the route of 
the line. It is regrettable, however, that special problems are presented by 
conductors in bundle form in climates of an extreme nature, such as at 
elevated altitudes or where ice loads or heavy winds are prevalent; and in all 
environments considerable accentuation of the mechanical problems 
presented by bundles occurs when the sub-conductors in the bundle are 
three or four in number rather than two. Thus, in spite of new developments 
in respect of bundling, a trend towards large diameter conductors continues to 
be evident.’
They digested this more successfully when I presented it as:
This passage is a guide to the sizes and types of aluminium conductor
69
available to the designer of overhead power lines. In recent years, the choice 
has widened. Now that we are concerned with super-tension transmission 
lines, increasing voltages, heavier currents, and longer lines, we need 
conductors with greater diameter, greater cross-sectionai area, and greater 
strength. Which of these factors is most important depends on the function of 
the line being erected.
Bundles of two, three and four strandings can be used to make phase 
conductors with higher capacitance and lower reactance than single 
conductors, and with acceptable levels of radio influence and corona loss.
But bundle conductors set special problems in extreme climates, for example, 
where there is ice or high wind, and the mechanical problems presented by 
bundles are always worse where there are three or four sub-conductors in the 
bundle rather than two. So, large-diameter conductors are still preferred to 
bundles.1
‘Unloading rates’ do not seem to have been quantified by formulae in the same way 
as readability, although some of the more complex formulae dealing with this do take 
account of the number and frequency of technical terms. But I had a suspicion that I 
was attempting to fine tune something that may not be fine tunable if the students 
had never been taught to interrogate text in an active way. it did appear that they 
seemed to imagine that, so long as what they read is vaguely sensible and relevant, 
it will somehow be absorbed or, if not, that is because they are too dim, and so there 
is nothing they can do about it. But the kind of passive reading that was all they 
seemed to know, must result from teachers, like myself, setting homework 
accompanied by instructions similar to: ‘make notes on this section’ - instructions 
which are analogous to giving students a general instruction to do an experiment, 
without any indication of the particular purpose of the experiment, or of how to go 
about doing it. They needed to be directed to a more active and interrogative kind of
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reading, and a practical session would provide a suitable opportunity for this. I gave 
the students a piece of text which I judged would be understandable, plus a work 
sheet:
The Text
Here is another way of finding out about charges. You have four strips of 
plastic. Two are cellulose acetate (the clear ones), the others are polystyrene 
(the opaque ones). Rub one of these strips with a duster and balance it on 
the watch glass. Now bring it near a rod of the same kind which you have 
rubbed with the same duster, and observe what happens as you bring the 
ends near each other. Do they attract or repel? Each strip has obviously 
been given the same charge because they were both treated exactly the 
same way. What do like charges do to each other?
Now repeat the experiment using two strips of the other material. Do they 
attract or repel each another? Does this agree with what you found in the first 
part of the experiment?
Now rub a strip of one materia! and balance it on the watch glass, and bring 
up to it a strip of the other material, which you have also rubbed. What 
happens this time?
Can the charges be alike? If they are not, they must be opposite or ‘unlike’. 
What can we say unlike charges do to each other?
The Worksheet
1. First read the complete passage on the sheet to the end.
2. Decide how many experiments are described.
Draw a line across the page between each experiment, and number the 
experiments.
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3. (a) For the first experiment, underline in pencil the names of any pieces of 
apparatus you will need.
(b) Put a circle round the words which tell you what to do.
(c) Underline in red any questions you see.
4. Do the first experiment.
5. For the second experiment, again underline the pieces of apparatus, then 
circle the words telling you what to do, and underline questions in red.
6. Do the second experiment. And so on, until you have finished all of the 
experiments.
7. Finally, look again at the questions you have underlined to check that you 
have answered them.
This was a successful exercise and yielded an important piece of information in the 
form of a question: ‘Can we actually mark the handouts?’ The discussion which 
followed revealed that teaching not to annotate texts had been widely effective. The 
reading of scientific texts is a specialised technique, and not the natural activity I had 
come to assume it is after many years of familiarity with them, requiring skills 
additional to those needed for general reading. Further, I was accepting a 
professional obligation to teach the necessary techniques and to provide suitable 
texts. However, Lunzer & Gardner (1979) found, from a survey, that the pre­
processing of information for pupils in the form of notes and worksheets by teachers 
does not make the problem of textbook difficulty go away.
That the majority of students do not use texts effectively is no reason to abandon 
them - it may be more profitable to try and change the approach to using texts, rather 
than trying to change the students, or change the texts. One attempt I made to do 
this succeeded only in causing frustration among the students. I had verbally 
outlined an experiment and reached a stage where I thought they understood what to 
do. Then I handed the instructions in scrambled form and told the students to
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reorganise the list into meaningful order before proceeding.
The Scrambled Text:
To measure the heat given out per second by a Bunsen burner flame
Set the Bunsen burner onto a blue flame
Record the new temperature of the water
Measure the mass of the beaker plus water
Calculate the temperature rise of the water
Start the stop-watch
Calculate the number of joules of heat received by the water, assuming that
the specific heat capacity of water is 4200 JKg'1 K‘1
Place the beaker on a tripod with a gauze
Measure the mass of a clean dry 250cm3 beaker
Calculate the number of seconds for which the water was heated
Stop the stop-watch and note the reading
Place the Bunsen burner under the beaker
Add approx. 50 cm3 cold water to the beaker
Calculate the number of joules received by the water each second
After about 5 minutes, remove the Bunsen from under the beaker
Calculate the mass of water in the beaker (in kg)
Take the initial temperature of the water
The exercise caused more difficulty than I had anticipated, much time was lost and, 
in the end, I had to get some copies made of the correct order and distribute these, 
but, by now, there was insufficient time to get all the work completed, hence the 
frustration.
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To measure the heat given out per second by a Bunsen burner flame
Measure the mass of a clean dry 250cm3 beaker
Add approx. 50 cm3 cold water to the beaker
Measure the mass of the beaker plus water
Take the initial temperature of the water
Place the beaker on a tripod with a gauze
Set the Bunsen burner onto a blue flame
Place the Bunsen burner under the beaker
Start the stop watch
After about 5 minutes, remove the Bunsen from under the beaker 
Stop the stop-watch and note the reading 
Record the new temperature of the water 
Calculate the mass of water in the beaker (in kg)
Calculate the temperature rise of the water
Calculate the number of joules of heat received by the water, assuming that 
the specific heat capacity of water is 4200 JKg'1 K"1 
Calculate the number of seconds for which the water was heated 
Calculate the number of joules received by the water each second.
Other reconstruction exercises were more successful, as were text marking and text 
analysis, and I had learned that the fault is often as much due to the writer as to the 
reader. Thus, I might once have written, ‘Human beings hope to survive, and be 
comfortable, on this planet for a length of time that far exceeds the duration of all fuel 
reserves. Physicists, therefore, are now applying themselves to the question of 
whether science can possibly harness alternative sources of energy’. Whereas, I 
would now write, ‘We hope to survive in comfort on this planet for longer than fuel 
reserves will last. This is why physicists are always asking, ‘Can we harness other
The Correct Text:
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sources of energy?’
However, this does nothing for the level of literacy of learners which has to be 
increased if they are to read successfully for learning in science. Understanding a 
text results in a mental representation of the state of affairs it describes, and a 
number of skills are needed to construct such representations, for example, 
inferential skills, meta-linguistic skills and the ability to understand text structure.
Yuill & Oakhill (1991), working with children whose comprehension is poor in relation 
to their word recognition ability and chronological age, have shown that such children 
differ from those with good comprehension, in their ability to make inferences and 
integrate information from different parts of the text, and in their meta-linguistic skills. 
They could be characterised as superficial readers - they seem to process text fairly 
literally, without deriving the meaning of the whole. Such children do not have 
general memory problems, although they do have a deficient working memory 
capacity. Since working memory is important in making inferences, and in the 
construction of a meaningful representation from a text, it is not surprising that those 
with poor comprehension are deficient in these skills. Those with poor 
comprehension, like young children, do not have a clear awareness of what 
comprehension is, and when they have been unsuccessful they may fail to realise 
that they have not understood a text properly. There is evidence that their problems 
might arise, at least in part, because they fail to make use of comprehension 
monitoring strategies (Garner 1987) and, once again, working memory may play a 
part in such processing. In general, people who are poor at understanding written 
text, but who do not have any problems at the level of single words, are also poor at 
listening comprehension, and even at understanding and narrating the main point of 
a picture sequence. Thus, comprehension skills do not necessarily develop 
automatically, and so my efforts may not be successful in trying to encourage 
students to become more active in their relationship with text, however hard I try.
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In teaching science it is important to be aware that scientific knowledge is not simply 
a ’collection of facts’ but a ‘way of thinking’. There are difficulties in learning scientific 
concepts and making them into ways of thinking about the world. One of these 
difficulties is making distinctions that we would not ordinarily make in everyday life, 
such as the distinction between temperature and heat, as the following example 
illustrates. Although the temperature of two ice cubes is the same, even if one ice 
cube is twice the size of the other, the effect they have in cooling a drink is different. 
At least one of my students thought that the larger ice cube had a lower temperature 
than the smaller one as a consequence of the fact that they had different effects in 
their capacity to cool a drink. Another difficulty can be that scientific concepts often 
require reasoning about non-perceptible aspects of the physical world; a good 
example is the particulate nature of matter. We deal, in everyday life, with a world 
that is continuous, in which objects are solid and undivided. Yet to understand many 
of the changes that we observe in the world it is necessary to develop a way of 
thinking about the world that describes our solid objects as bundles of particles, 
namely, discontinuous elements that are kept together in some way. Piaget and his 
colleagues (Piaget & Inhelder 1974) were pioneers in the investigation of children’s 
understanding of the particulate nature of matter, and set out a pattern of 
investigation by pointing out that, it is when children have to understand change that 
they come to ‘invent’ an atomic theory about the world.
A major source of difficulty with my students is that they have already developed 
some knowledge about the world, and this knowledge differs from that which I am 
aiming to teach in the classroom, both with respect to the different conceptions they 
have and the formal characteristics of the concepts used. Thus, whereas scientists 
strive to explain the largest number of phenomena with the smallest set of 
assumptions, a principle known as parsimony, in everyday life we do not strive to 
achieve this principle. Vygotsky (1978) has described this difference between
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everyday and scientific concepts by suggesting that we learn scientific concepts from 
the general to the particular, but we learn everyday concepts from the particular to 
the general.
Studies of the solutions to problems by both experts and novices made by Smith & 
Good (1984) identified the differences between those experienced in the methods of 
science and those new to them. These included: (i) a tendency among the 
experienced to treat problems as tasks of analysis and reasoning, rather than trying 
to remember algorithms that would lead to solution, (ii) a tendency among experts to 
use a knowledge development approach that required structuring the information 
obtained, and testing possible conclusions against new information, and (iii) a 
tendency among experts to have and use accurate knowledge.
All these points are both important and relevant, because they highlight the point that 
learning the way of thinking that is science, is more than being able to read science, 
although this is where the process must start, and the first hurdle any learner must 
conquer. Although ‘scientific literacy' is a term which some have coined as a 
scientific core skill requirement, what the term actually means and how it overlaps 
with the capability to actually ‘do’ science, seems to lack a broad consensus among 
users. Wolf (2008) claims that it is an astonishing feat to be able to translate the 
squiggles packed on to a page into a vast array of images in one’s head. She 
reminds readers that reading is only a few thousand years old -  too new to be 
encoded into our genes. Therefore we have to learn it the hard way.
4. SUMMARY
This chapter has considered, briefly, some contemporary ideas concerning learning 
in general, but particularly with learning viewed in terms of changing concepts. Some 
aspects of resistance to conceptual change were looked at, and my experiences with
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learners who encounter difficulties with reading science texts have been included. 
Some of the research has been carried out with younger children (by, for example, 
Piaget), in the next chapter issues about learning science, particularly as they relate 
to adults, will be considered in more detail
CHAPTER 4
This study is concerned with adults learning science, and in the first part of this 
chapter some of the more relevant aspects of the term ‘adult’ are explored. It will be 
seen that adults are not the simple blank sheet that children, apparently, present, and 
that previous experience of adult learners is not the chronic disadvantage it used to 
be seen to be. What may have been dismissed as handicaps which creep up with 
age, are more likely to be a natural resistance to peremptory and authoritarian 
methods of teaching.
The second part of the chapter considers some of the issues relevant to the study 
that relate to learning science. It may not be easy to find a consensus regarding a 
definition for the word ‘science’, but the approach used by Waddington (1948, in his 
Forward p x), that science is the organised attempt of mankind to discover how 
things work as causal systems, covers the activities referred to in this thesis. It is the 
pursuit, by characteristic methods, of this context independent goal to elucidate the 
laws of nature that marks a project as scientifically significant. School science can 
sometimes appear to be presented as a box of tricks which work; with adults, and 
arguably with children also, it needs to be presented more as an attitude to the world, 
a way of living. This section of the chapter does not explore either issues of 
curriculum, or strategies of teaching science, as both of these are outside the scope 
of the thesis. Rather, it tries to focus on issues relating to the nature of what has to 
be learned, and some of the problems encountered by adults in dislodging existing 
beliefs when contrary evidence is presented.
ADULTS LEARNING SCIENCE
1. INTRODUCTION
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Because the word ‘adult’ can be used in different ways, it is necessary to conduct a 
brief survey of some of these uses as a prelude to a study of learning by adults.
Thus the term can refer to a stage in life after a predetermined age, or it can 
represent a status in society. In a sociological context it could describe a subset of 
people (as are children, for example), or a set of culturally determined ideals and 
values. The UNESCO description (UNESCO 1976) suggests that adults are persons 
regarded as adult by the society to which they belong. It clearly categorised the state 
of ‘adulthood’ as a social construct and, as such, it is context dependent, with 
variations within areas, class, culture, and era. The care that must be exercised in 
reading the work of other researchers is illustrated by, for example, Johnstone and 
Rivera (1965, p 26), an adult is “anyone either age twenty one or over, married, or 
the head of a household”. Merriam and Caffarella (1999, p 393) suggest that people 
are adults “because they have assumed responsibility for managing their own lives”. 
Aspin et al (2001, p xvii) believe that adulthood is seen as the “point when individuals 
may be regarded as having attained a degree of autonomy”.
The significance of these different perspectives assumes importance when one is 
considering adulthood and education. Thus, Rogers (1992 p169-178) may be 
accurate in his assumption that in most societies an adult is someone who has a 
measure of internalised independence in decision-making, and is no longer under 
another person’s authority. However, such views may carry, or may have carried, 
implications where women are denied many of the expressions of adulthood, and in 
situations where men live within an extended family where their role does not include 
much in the way of personal responsibility. Yet there would not be dispute over 
describing these people as adults. Rogers (2003) surmises that adulthood is 
confirmed by reference to childhood, and that there are three main characteristics of 
the construct of adulthood as contrasted with children. The first is maturity, namely,
!  ADULTS LEARNING
that they have developed their potential more fully than children have. Secondly, 
adults have more autonomy - they have responsibility for themselves and, or, for 
others, this arising from the greater independence they have than do children.
Thirdly, adults have a greater sense of perspective in relation to the world, not being 
the centre of the world that children often seem to think themselves to be. For all 
this, a young person who is earning his or her own living is not necessarily an adult. 
They are only so when they can demonstrate their possession of the standard of 
development, maturity and expertise, and the independence of action, which 
traditionally accompany adulthood within their own culture. These are the qualities 
which attract recognition of the state of adulthood by society at large. In medieval 
times the boundaries between childhood and adulthood were blurred; at Winchester 
School, the first and most generously endowed independent school, relatives of the 
founder could stay until they reached the age of twenty five years (Orme 2006).
All of the learners who have been involved in the field work for this study have had 
post school employment experience (see Appendix 5 for an indication of typical age 
profile). All of them are accustomed to responding to their own learning needs 
through self direction, and some may have participated in vocational education.
The more traditional kinds of learning theory dealing with internal mental processes 
are based on the assumption that, learning occurs by means of certain innate mental 
mechanisms that have been generated throughout the history of our species’ 
struggle for survival (Simonsen 2005). The general assumption is that, in general, 
these mechanisms are at the disposal of any normal human being, although the 
ability to practise them fully only emerges gradually during the years of childhood. 
More recently, learning theories have emerged which feature social processes 
(Gergen 1991), an example being that of social constructivism, where age certainly 
influences the learning processes, the reason being that the ways in which the
individual is involved in social processes, are strongly influenced by age. There is, 
however, no one definition, model, or theory that explains how adults learn, or how 
the learning process is facilitated.
Until the mid twentieth century what was known about adult learning was embedded 
in studies by behavioural and cognitive psychologists. These were studies which 
focused on problem solving, information processing, memory, intelligence and 
motivation. Much of this work was conducted in laboratory settings, and interest 
centred on how advancing age affected the learning process. Thorndike et al (1928, 
p 178) reported the results of adults being tested in a laboratory, under timed 
conditions, on various learning and memory tasks. The authors concluded that 
adults between twenty five and forty five years of age, could learn “at nearly the 
same rate” as twenty year olds. Further work found that, when the time pressure 
was removed, adults up to the age of seventy did as well as younger people. An 
implication of this is that if adults do not perform well, the cause should not be 
assumed to be linked to their chronological age.
By the mid twentieth century adult educators were considering how learning in 
adulthood could be distinguished from learning in childhood. This resulted in the 
identification of three features: the first is andragogy, a European concept introduced 
to North America by Malcolm Knowles in 1968, to distinguish adult learning from 
children’s learning (pedagogy). Andragogy is characterised by a set of assumptions 
that the adult teacher has about the adult learner (Tennant 1988), videlicet: Firstly, 
there is a development of the self concept from dependency to self direction. 
Secondly, adults have accumulated experiences and these can be a rich resource for 
learning. Thirdly, in children, readiness to learn is a function of biological 
development and academic pressure. In adults, readiness to learn is a function of 
the need to perform social roles. Fourthly, children have a (conditioned) subject 
centred orientation to learning, whereas adults have a problem centred orientation to
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learning. Fifthly, for adults, the more potent motivators are internal.
T Andragogy
Using these assumptions as a starting point, Knowles then specified the skills, 
processes and techniques of helping adults to learn. His scenario for adult learning 
has been critically analysed by Griffin (1983), Jarvis (1984), and Brookfield (1985), 
who have highlighted the gap between theory and practice, the untenable nature of 
the andragogical assumptions, the lack of supporting evidence, its conceptual 
limitations, and its ideological impact. Some observations supported by classroom 
experience are given below: (i) Self-concept - Knowles (1990, p 58) suggested that, 
"as a person grows and matures his self concept moves from one of total 
dependency to one of increasing self directedness”. I am not convinced that 
everyone aspires to self dependence, and it is possible that this proposition reflects 
the ideology of American individualism; certainly it was written by a Westerner who 
had attained a certain degree of independence, (ii) Experience - here Knowles 
(1990, p 59 ) claims that, “as an individual matures he accumulates an expanding 
reservoir of experience that causes him to become an increasingly rich resource for 
learning, and at the same time provides him with a broadening base to which to 
relate new learning”. The assumption here is that experience is chronological rather 
that contextual. Classroom observations suggest that growth in experience need 
bear little or no relationship to age, but just to the biography of the one who 
experiences, (iii) Readiness to Learn -  Knowles (1990, p 60 ) claims that “as an 
individual matures, his readiness to learn is decreasingly the product of his biological 
development and academic pressure and is increasingly the product of 
developmental tasks required for the performance of his evolving social role”. He 
further suggests that pedagogy assumes that, children learn what they ought to 
because of their biological development, whereas adults learn what they need to 
learn in order to cope with the exigencies of their daily living. Yet adults do seem to
learn because of their biological development, for example, in old age they learn 
strategies to compensate for reduced physical powers; so, again, I wonder whether 
Knowles correctly analysed the process of biological development, (iv) Orientation 
towards Learning - Knowles (1990, p 61) claims that "children have been conditioned 
to have a subject centred orientation to most learning, whereas adults tend to have a 
problem centred orientation to learning”. He does not present this distinction as a 
‘natural’ difference between adults and children, and one wonders whether if children 
were not conditioned to be subject centred, they would ‘naturally’ be problem 
centred. Implicit in this assumption is the idea that, adults require immediate 
application of their learning, whereas children do not. I think Knowles could be taking 
the fact that, for children, postponed application of much of their knowledge is 
inevitable, whereas adults may be likely to have more opportunity to apply knowledge 
soon after acquiring it; Knowles presents this as ‘natural’, arising from the differences 
in chronological age. It could be argued that adults have a greater capacity to 
tolerate postponed application of knowledge because they are able to conceptualise 
time over a different scale, (v) Motivation to Learn -  the Knowles (1990, p 57) model 
distinguishes between internal (concerned with self-esteem and self-confidence) and 
external motivators (concerned with external pressures), and argues that, for adults, 
the more potent ones are internal. Tennant (1988, p 23) is very clear in his view on 
this, “the proposition that internal motivators become more salient with maturity has 
no support in the literature on life span developmental psychology.”
Knowles’ assumptions led to a debate in the journal Adult Education (and elsewhere) 
which Elias (1979) initiated and to which McKenzie (1979), and others, responded. 
This forced Knowles to revise his distinctions and reflect this in a new edition of his 
work (Knowles 1980) - the subtitles changing from ‘pedagogy versus andragogy’ to 
‘from pedagogy to andragogy’. The substance of the change was the admission that, 
adults could learn both pedagogically and andragogically, but he held to the belief
that there were different forms of teaching and learning which had a tendency to 
occur chronologically. Jarvis (1994) very clearly summarises the falsity of relating 
andragogy and pedagogy to biological age, whilst acknowledging that there is a 
possible, but not necessary, association; although epistemological, ontological and 
organisational considerations are omitted. Jarvis points out that an adult’s 
experiences are contextual rather than chronological, so what is important are the 
levels of experience of the learners. However, the actual distinctions drawn between 
the two types of teaching and learning are not necessarily incorrect, and may be 
relevant to the differences between initial and continuing vocational education.
Useful though Knowles’ work was, however, it was still a non-developmental concept 
of adulthood -  it having been assumed that adulthood is a non-developmental period 
in life. Thus the model of adult thought was the same as the model of fully matured 
adolescent thought. Piaget (1972), although he never studied adults, did predict that 
certain changes would take place in formal reasoning during adulthood, because an 
adult’s experiences in work and social relationships would necessitate adaptations in 
the adults’ thinking processes. This concept, of thought becoming progressively 
adaptive through interaction with adult life experiences, is central to much of the 
theory which has emerged in the study of adult development.
2. Self directed learning
The second feature said to distinguish learning in adulthood from learning in 
childhood, is self-directed learning; learning that occurs as part of an adult’s everyday 
life that is systematic, yet does not depend on an instructor or a classroom. The 
impetus for this model of adult learning came from Tough’s (1971) research with 
Canadian adult learners, though the initial descriptions have since been extended to 
include opportunities for learning found in one’s environment, including chance 
occurrences. Brookfield (in Galbraith 1991, p 5) comments on the element of 
authority dependence in many adults’ socialisation, and which predisposes them to
regress to childlike behaviour when entering an adult classroom. He advises that 
adults returning to formal education should not be seen as “lions of self-directedness 
roaring to escape the leash of teacher and institutionally imposed constraints’’. 
Anxiety and insecurity are to be expected, to varying extents, in all adult learners.
3. Transformational learning
The third feature is transformational learning, which is about the cognitive process of 
‘meaning making’, rather than focusing on the learner. It is dependent on adult life 
experiences, and a more mature level of cognitive functioning than is found in 
childhood. Mezirow (2000) is considered the primary architect of transformational 
learning, which claims the learning process is initiated by a disorientating dilemma. 
Merriam (2005, p 45) describes this as, “a life experience that cannot be 
accommodated by one’s existing worldview”. Such an experience leads the adult to 
examine, and critically reflect on, the assumptions and beliefs that have guided 
meaning in the past, but are now no longer adequate. From an examination of 
current beliefs, the learner moves to exploring new ways of dealing with the dilemma 
and, in dialogue with others, tests out new assumptions, understandings, and 
perspectives. The new transformed perspective is more inclusive and 
accommodating than the previous perspective. The involvement of other people is a 
requirement for transformational learning, and is one of the ways it may be 
distinguished from the ‘active’ learning described by Rogers (1989) - where an 
internalisation process occurs in which the learning becomes identified with the 
learner. Rogers gives an example relating to British Rail which, in the 1960’s had to 
turn steam locomotive drivers into people who understood something about 
electricity, and who could do simple fault finding when driving diesel electric 
locomotives. British Rail’s first attempt, by giving lectures on the subject of the 
principles of electricity, had a very high failure rate. E. and M. Belbin (1972) devised, 
and introduced, a series of circuit boards of increasing complexity, the first board
carrying only a battery, ammeter and switch. Trainees were supplied with a bulb, 
bulb holder, a more powerful battery, two small electric motors, wire and clips.
Written instructions directed them as to which pieces of apparatus to assemble with 
which, and invited them to experiment in various ways with the apparatus, then to 
observe and draw conclusions. The trainees came to see, through their own 
observed experience, that an electric circuit must have an undisturbed path, before 
current can flow from one pole of the battery to the other. The last board of the 
series simulated the power circuit of a diesel electric locomotive. The Belbins called 
their method, the Discovery Method (the name giving an immediate reminder of the 
Dewey approach), and it was considered an important contribution to wider theory 
because it revealed that process (activity) matters more than the subject. The 
distinction illustrates a trend to move learning beyond a preoccupation with the 
individual learner, a trend towards contextualising learning, as, for example, in the 
approach to adult learning known as situated cognition. This posits that learning is 
context bound, and is most effective and meaningful in situations where cognitive 
processes are required, rather than in the simulated activities that are typically found 
in educational institutions.
The issue of context as it applies to learning -  both in science and in other fields of 
knowledge -  has been studied with respect to women’s learning. Barr and Birke’s 
(1994) findings concerning women’s perceptions of science highlight the ways in 
which groups, rather than individuals, are important for learning, and the need for 
science education to draw on approaches to curriculum development which have 
emerged in recent decades, before these become lost in the strong moves towards 
vocationalism that exist at present. Though Barr and Birke acknowledge differences 
in attitude which they related to varied life histories -  due, for example, to age, social 
class and ethnicity, they noted (Barr and Birke, 1995 p123) consistent themes within 
similar groups, for example, a refusal to accept the notion of ‘scientific facts’ which
the authors’ took to indicate a resistance to accept the concept of objective 
knowledge -  though it might equally be linked in some way to the idea of 
‘authoritative knowledge’. Some twenty years ago Belenky et al (1986) identified five 
categories of knowledge construction relating to women’s learning; from silence -  
where women are passive and what they know is defined by others, to constructed 
knowledge - in which women are active creators of their own knowledge. Yet science 
teaching, from the style and language of texts to laboratory design, is still criticised 
repeatedly for being stuck in a patriarchal framework, and this has been used to 
explain the under representation of women in academic and industrial employment. 
There seems to be little recognition that, if women are saying that science is not for 
them, then it could be saying something about science itself as well as the processes 
of science education. My own experience, based on delivery of a variety of courses 
in which women tend to predominate -  broadly supports the findings of Barr and 
Birke, and that when the fears and prejudices that seem to originate early in 
secondary education are broken down, women find science stimulating and 
rewarding, and achieve as well as men on the same courses. Rich (1979 p. 240) 
encapsulates this rather well by suggesting that the most important thing a woman, 
and especially a woman returning to education as an adult, can learn is that she is 
capable of intelligent thought.
Riegel (1973) accepted that formal logic - on which model Piaget’s theory was based, 
offers a model for certain types of adult thinking, but argued that the nature of adult 
thinking was potentially more complex. Riegel’s theory draws on a system of 
dialectic logic, namely, reasoning, wherein ‘contradiction’ rather than ‘identity’ is the 
most essential feature. According to Riegel the most effective adult thinking is not 
that which provides immediate answers, but that which first discovers the important 
questions and, or, poses the important problem. Therefore, it is not primarily a 
matter of eliminating contradiction, but of tolerating it and, thus, allowing for new
questions and problems to emerge. This hypothesis, that mature adult thought is 
qualitatively different from the thought of adolescents, has led to more serious study 
of the potential for cognitive development, and the nature of thought, during the adult 
years. It seems to me that, Riegel’s hypothesis is a development of an idea in which 
‘doubt’ is identified as the motive for thinking and ‘thought’ is characterised as 
appeasing the irritation of that doubt.
Researchers in many fields seem driven by a ‘Linnean’ mission to classify and 
subdivide into categories the subjects of their study with greater or lesser utility, and 
the activity of learning has not escaped this. A variety of approaches has been used 
and accounts can be found in Jarvis, Holford and Griffin (1998) as a full description of 
possible types of learning is outside the scope of this thesis. The concept of 
reflective thinking or reflective learning is, however, used widely and referred to by 
Piaget (1967) as being present in adolescence, though he does not suggest that the 
facility continues to develop through later life. Moshman (1979) has demonstrated 
that meta-theoretical thought (thinking about one’s own theories), develops 
subsequent to formal operational problem solving, but, whether this ability is 
necessary to, or follows from, mature reflection, is also not clear. It would be 
interesting to explore whether reflecting on how we think about our environment and 
experiences is a necessary prerequisite to asking questions, discovering problems, 
and to contradiction becoming a basis for thought.
There is evidence (Labouvie-Vief 1980) that adult development is achieved by the 
loss of certain competencies, in order to gain more adaptive ones. Piaget's biology 
of knowledge, which von Glasersfeld (1970) was aware of, also characterised 
learning as an adaptive function, and Plotkin (1994) further developed the concept of 
knowledge as adaptation. Also, according to Thelen and Smith (1994, p 313-314), 
“infants come into the world with a rich set of adaptive biases, epigenetically
acquired, but having a strong selective value.... ”. Schaverien and Cosgrove (1999 p 
1227) state, “no longer can learning be considered to occur by means of instruction, 
but rather by means of selection”. Their paper refers to learning per se, although 
many of their references are to child development.
Schauble (1996) points out that, adults’ experimentation strategies are generally 
superior to children’s - even when the adults had little formal education and no 
science instruction when at school. She also draws attention to the fact that little is 
known about the differences in how children and adults learn in the context of self­
directed experimentation, an observation which seems to imply that such differences 
do exist. Schauble does, however, identify further relevant factors: firstly, the 
greater proportion of valid inferences made by adults may be due, in part, to their 
tendency to be both more systematic, and more comprehensive, in their 
experimentation. Secondly, the differences in the structure and content of their 
knowledge bases account for some observed differences in the reasoning of adults 
and children. Thirdly, adults possess a variety of heuristics that appear to serve as a 
check on reasoning biases. Children may be less likely to have, or to use, such 
heuristics. Fourthly, there is evidence for the existence of very early precursors, 
competencies, errors, and biases which persist, regardless of maturation, training 
and expertise.
Simonsen’s summary (in English, 2005) gives a useful general overview of the 
differences in biological age and learning, and this is included in order to conclude 
this section of the chapter. The overview being that children want to capture their 
world; the characteristics of childhood learning are that it is uncensored, confident 
and must be done with the support of adults. Young people want to construct their 
own identity, which is different from that of adults. In terms of learning, the main 
orientation in adulthood is broadly towards the management of the life course and its 
challenges, typically centring on family and work, and more broadly on interests, life­
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style and attitudes. The beginning of the adult period may typically be marked by 
external events, such as starting a family or finishing education. There are no 
decisively new cognitive opportunities; what happens in terms of learning and 
consciousness is that the person takes on the management of, and responsibility for, 
his or her own life, with this normally occurring gradually as a long process 
throughout the years of youth and into adulthood.
2. LEARNING SCIENCE ~ some background issues 
There has long existed in the social sciences a controversy concerning two opposite 
methodological approaches to the study of social phenomena. One emphasises the 
methodological unity of the natural and social sciences; the other stresses the 
subjective quality of social phenomena, and argues that the social sciences require 
different methods of inquiry from those used in natural science investigations. These 
two methods are competitors; thus, as Hempel and Oppenheim (1953, p 330) write, 
"the existence of empathy on the part of the scientist is neither a necessary nor a 
sufficient condition for explanation, or the scientific understanding, of any human 
action”.
Only during the last fifty years - after the emergence of science as an organised 
profession, have sociologists begun to pay attention to science and scientists as 
social phenomena. During the inexorable growth of science from the seventeenth 
century onwards, there was virtually no attempt to describe and analyse the workings 
of the scientific community. While this may be partly a reflection on the growth of the 
social sciences themselves, it is also partly due to the intimidating jargon and 
complexity of science -  something that ought to have implications for teaching the 
natural sciences. Meanwhile, natural science has not only been solving technical 
problems, for example, how much vitamins to add to our cereal, it has also 
developed an attitude to the world which makes some things seem valuable and
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others not. This cultural aspect of science is relevant when considering the 
standards by which social change is judged desirable, or not. Toulmin and Goodfield 
(1962) develop the view that scientists, and non-scientists alike, show increased 
understanding for their behaviour when criticising each other and justifying 
themselves, by citing as the factors relevant, not the physical or mechanical causes 
underlying their actions but, rather, the reasons for which they acted as they did. A 
consequence of Wittgenstein’s contribution to the subject of meaningful behaviour is 
that the social sciences were seen to be as rule bound as the natural sciences 
(Winch 1958, p 63).
Just as there are two approaches to the study of social phenomena, so there are two 
conceptions of science, described by Medawar (1969, p15) as the romantic and 
poetical, and the rational and analytical. The former is based on the idea of 
imaginative insight - “truth takes shape in the mind of the observer: it is his 
imaginative grasp of what might be true that provides the incentive for finding out 
what is true” (my italics). Every advance in science is, therefore, the outcome of a 
speculative venture, an excursion into the unknown. According to the opposite view, 
truth resides in nature and is to be got at only through the evidence of the senses 
(Dixon 1973, p 24), and the scientist’s task is essentially one of discernment.
These romantic and rational schools of thought have, in part, been reconciled in 
Popper’s hypothetico-deductive system (Popper, 1959). The scientist is seen as a 
person who alternates, sometimes rapidly, between imaginative and critical phases 
of thought. During the imaginative period, she or he makes a guess at some aspect 
of the world, and frames a hypothesis. By deduction and experiment she or he tries 
to falsify this hypothesis, and only when it has survived severe scrutiny can it be even 
temporarily accepted. This line of thinking is to do with how science should be done, 
as opposed to the doing of science -  the distinction being between the philosophy of
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science and the practice of science. Students tend to be pitched into the latter 
without having considered what characteristics distinguish scientific inquiry from 
other types of investigation, and what conditions must be satisfied for a scientific 
explanation to be judged ‘correct’.
Another consequence of the lack of explanation of the nature of science lies in a 
misconception as to the nature and status of facts, for example, the existence of an 
absolute zero of temperature is not a fact but a conceptual matter -  a consequence 
of the way in which we give meaning to the notion of temperature and put degrees of 
warmth and cold into relation with the number series. There is, of course, no 
connection between numbers and the notions of heat and cold until we create one. 
Concepts of science are formulated by thought and not by experiment -  the purpose 
of the experimental test is to reveal whether, in the real world, that application of 
concepts is just or not. Learners of science at pre-degree level generally have 
limited opportunity to design or make critical evaluation of experiments, hence they 
are not necessarily aware of the assumptions that underlie a particular experiment, 
and so cannot see the weaknesses inherent in some approaches. A simple example 
can be taken from the work of Galileo who, whilst he collected evidence that the 
earth together with the other planets, revolve around the sun, failed to provide a 
theoretical reason why looking through a telescope should be expected to give a true 
picture of the sky. The new 'instrument based’ perception was accepted as more 
real than was the world based on faith and belief, and it became understood that to 
see through an instrument (telescope or microscope), was to see a more profound 
reality than could be observed by the eye. The legitimacy of science came to be 
based, in large part, on its claims to describe a world in visual terms. The absence of 
a logical reason went unquestioned.
A further sense in which Galileo’s discovery illuminates ail other investigations is the 
role of existing knowledge in the assimilation of new knowledge. It is because we are
ail reliant on existing knowledge to make sense of new experiences that a scientist 
will make use of what already counts as knowledge in deciding what should come to 
count as new knowledge. The existing accepted knowledge is not just the personal 
knowledge of the individual that has come from their own experience, it is the 
“inherited and shared knowledge of a given scientific community” (Barnes 1985,
P63).
The problem Galileo experienced was how best to describe his observations in terms 
of existing knowledge, and he was forced to accept that the knowledge of science is 
provisional and uncertain. There is a paradox which is of relevance to science 
education here, for learners of science are encouraged to accept knowledge as it is 
accepted at any given time, with no attempts to justify or validate this knowledge.
This is partly because much of the knowledge learned is procedural (and science in 
this respect resembles a craft), and partly due to the way the information is set out in 
texts and passed on in lectures, so as to create conviction. Although these issues 
form the backdrop to this project - where the response to new information is being 
tracked, issues of curriculum design and content are not part of my investigation.
Crombie (1979 vol.1) makes a strong case that it was the Greeks who invented 
science as we know it. In ancient Babylonia, Assyria and Egypt, as well as in ancient 
China and India, technology had developed on a scale of astonishing effectiveness, 
but, so far as is known, it was unaccompanied by any scientific explanation. A good 
example of this ancient technology is the methods of predicting astronomical motions 
by the Babylonians and Assyrians in the third century BC, but they offered no natural 
explanations of the phenomena they could predict with considerable skill. The texts 
in which they set out to ‘explain’ the world, as distinct from predicting its happenings, 
contain myths in which the visible order of things is attributed to a society of gods 
personifying natural forces, for example, thunder.
The Greeks invented natural science by “searching for the intelligible impersonal 
permanence underlying the world of change” (Crombie 1979, p 25). By hitting upon 
the brilliant idea of a generalised use of scientific theory they proposed the idea of 
assuming a permanent, uniform abstract order, from which the changing world of 
observation could be deduced. Thus, the myths were reduced to the status of 
theories, and their entities tailored to the requirements of quantitative prediction.
With this idea -  the generalised use of theory, Greek science must be seen as the 
origin of all that has followed. Thus, order was brought about by abstract thought, 
and it remained characteristic of Greek scientific thought to be interested primarily in 
knowledge and understanding and, only very secondarily, in practical usefulness. 
Therefore their curiosity was directed, not to the nature of the fire which baked bricks, 
but to the nature of fire itself. While the Babylonians made no attempt to generalise 
the results of their investigations, Greek thought differed from all that had gone 
before, in respect both of generality and of rigour. It is through general thinking that it 
is possible to pass from percepts - things to which one can point (such as triangular 
fields), to concepts - which are creations of the process of abstraction. One of the 
characteristics of science as understood today is the “generalisation of perceptual 
experience by means of adequate concepts” (Wightman 1966, p 5); whilst history 
records their growth, philosophy critiques their adequacy.
A consequence of the marriage of the empiricism of technology with the rationalism 
of philosophy, was the birth of the new empirical science - which sought to discover 
the structure of nature. By the beginning of the seventeenth century, systematic use 
of new methods of experiment, and mathematical abstraction, produced such striking 
results that the name ‘scientific revolution5 has been given to the movement. The 
instinctive question for a scientist to ask is not “is it reasonable?”, as if it is known 
beforehand the shape that rationality has to take, but rather “what makes you think 
that might be the case?” This is a question at once open and demanding. It does not
try to specify beforehand the form that an acceptable answer has to take, but if a 
scientist is to persuade anyone that some possibility -  whether expected or not -  is 
true, then evidence in support of the claim will have to be produced. Science trades 
in the search for explanations that are supported by evidence that is verifiable.
One of the distinctive features of scientific theories is that they contain expressions 
such as ‘electron’, and ‘magnetic field’, terms which do not occur in everyday 
discourse, and items that these terms designate are likely to be unfamiliar to non­
scientists. This has (at least) two consequences: the first is more philosophical, and 
focuses on the distinction between the two kinds of objects mentioned, which can be 
labelled simply as ‘observable’ and ‘unobservable’. The contrast between 
observable and unobservable objects highlights the difference between those objects 
of which we can have some direct perceptual experience, and those which we can 
perceive only indirectly. The concern relates to unobservable entities, and the 
questions as to whether they exist, and of how we could come to know anything 
about them. Although no current curriculum approaches science by highlighting the 
distinction, I have been surprised at how many times it has been the source of 
confusion in students; this is a good example of how some appreciation of philosophy 
is of real value in classroom teaching. The second consequence of science having 
its own distinctive language is that it can be, and often is, the source of confusion and 
misconceptions in adults, though probably not so much in children - who are less 
likely to have encountered the terms before. Examples I have encountered 
frequently include confusion between the terms ‘mass and weight’, ‘gene and 
genome’, ‘atom and molecule’. Casual use of language is often the cause of 
confusion in adults trying to express their views and, although this could be said to be 
associated with communicating science rather than learning it, I argue that there is a 
link between successful communication and understanding. An example here might 
be the use of skin colour as a surrogate for race, in a debate which may be trying to
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link race with intelligence. Since there is no basis in the human genetic code for the 
notion that skin colour will be predictive of intelligence; the term has been used 
inaccurately, and out of context - it being a social and not a scientific term.
Habermas (1972), however, prefers not to consider the influence of the cultural 
(social) upon the individual, and believes that unhelpful perceptions are self-induced 
rather than socially induced constructs. Habermas is concerned that reason has 
become an instrument for the pursuit of pre-established goals and has, thus, lost its 
critical thrust - judgement and deliberation have been replaced by calculation and 
technique, and reflective thought has been supplanted by a rigid conformity to 
methodical rules.
According to Carr (1995), Habermas claims that the mutilation inflicted on the 
Enlightenment concept of reason is an inevitable consequence of the successes and 
accomplishments of the natural sciences. This success has, he claims, fuelled the 
belief that the scientific patterns of reasoning which have enabled us to extend our 
control over the world of nature can be used, with equal success, to extend our 
control over the social world as well. As a result, scientific rationality now operates 
as an uncritically accepted way of thinking that not only pervades modern intellectual 
disciplines, but also penetrates al! aspects of everyday social life. Indeed, Habermas 
argues that the spread of scientific rationality has been so powerful, that our 
understanding of the relationship between philosophy and science has become 
seriously distorted. Instead of accepting that science has to justify its knowledge 
claims against epistemological standards derived from philosophy, it is now assumed 
that epistemology has to be judged against standards laid down by science.
Habermas (1972) calls this reduction of epistemology to the philosophy of science 
‘scientism’, and he identifies it as ‘the most influential philosophy of our time’. A 
consequence is that we can no longer understand science as one form of possible
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knowledge but, rather, must identify knowledge with science. Habermas mounts a 
critique designed to undermine the dominant scientistic epistemology, by 
demonstrating that there are various legitimate forms of scientific inquiry, each with 
its own internal epistemological standards, and each oriented towards the 
satisfaction of different human interests and needs; these are, firstly, technical 
interest; secondly, practical interest, and thirdly, emancipation - deriving from a 
desire to be free of those constraints on human reason (ignorance, authority etc.) 
which impede the freedom of individuals to determine their purposes and actions on 
the basis of their own rational reflections. This ‘emancipatory’ interest, thus, gives 
rise to the idea of a ‘critical social science’ - a science that aims to enlighten 
individuals about the origins of their existing purposes, beliefs and actions by 
promoting emancipatory knowledge; this is a form of reflective acquired self- 
knowledge. Habermas has, thus, tried to provide a logical basis for reflective 
learning, although in doing so he claims that self-reflection, knowledge and interest 
are identical, yet he does not explain how they can be.
Adults who have enrolled for courses in Further and Higher Education that include 
science components are generally aware of practical reasons, beyond intrinsic 
intellectual interest, why they should have a basic knowledge of science. The 
practical reasons include a reduced likelihood of falling victim to fraud and 
superstition (from astrology to quack cures), and a need to understand what is really 
at stake in contemporary political issues (from global warming to embryo research). 
One of the difficulties encountered is a comprehension of the word ‘science’. Quite 
apart from the world of advertising, where the naming of some claim or line of 
reasoning as ‘scientific1 is done in a way that is intended to imply some kind of merit 
or special kind of reliability, the word can refer to particular methods of discovery, or it 
can refer to the body of knowledge arising from what has been discovered, or it can 
relate to the new things that can be done with the new knowledge (technology).
Where the methods of science are concerned, some often quoted sayings that 
contain words that are no longer used in their earlier context can be the origin of 
much confusion. An example of this is ‘the exception proves the rule’, whereas it is a 
principle of science that if there is an exception to any rule, then that rule is wrong. 
The word ‘prove’ used in this way really means ‘test’, in the same way that one 
hundred proof alcohol is a test of the alcohol; so the phrase should be restated for 
today as ‘the exception tests the rule’. AH of these examples are factors that relate to 
knowing science and, if not taken note of by teachers, can lead to misconceptions 
and confusion. There is no consensus on how to achieve, (a) the encouragement of 
practical skills, (b) the introduction of an element of discovery into the study of 
science, and (c) the realisation of the importance of the sociological and economic 
implications of advances in science; neither is there an appreciation of the students’ 
difficulties in absorbing the many unrelated facts. This study joins a long tradition in 
attempts to move towards these goals.
Munn et al (1992) collected student views through semi-structured interviews of 
mature students on science, mathematics and engineering courses. They found that 
these students stressed that, having a foundation of knowledge of specific subject 
areas was immensely helpful, mathematics tending to be mentioned most often. The 
students were, of course, speaking from personal experiences, Had they, for 
example, been taught thinking skills from a young age, or had their learning on the 
course undertaken been differently managed, then a different story might (or might 
not) have emerged. An apparently typical comment was: “dealing with electricity ... 
it’s not like banking or accounting where you see what’s going on. You’re dealing 
with something you can’t see - the fundamentals. Once you’ve picked them up, 
that’s half the battle... previous knowledge is invaluable” (Munn et al 1992, p12).
Yet Duit and Kesidou (1988, p 193) found that the second Law of Thermodynamics 
does not seem to run against student’s everyday experiences; “most students have
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intuitively the correct idea that temperature differences tend to equalise and that the 
processes will not run back after equalisation.” However, Barker (2000 a) suggests 
that the first Law of Thermodynamics is more problematic, because the energy 
transfers included in a system are frequently invisible. Stavy (1990) reports that 
children reason differently when the substance studied remains visible. This is 
interesting when set in the context of the trend to greater emphasis of study being 
laid on the invisible; fifty years ago, as a child I learned something of biology by 
studying whole animals. Within twenty five years biology had become interested in 
the cell, and now cellular biology has been supplanted by molecular biology. Is it 
possible that the science that is the focus of interest today has, by its very nature, 
become a more difficult subject for study by young minds? Critical thinking theorists 
(Perkins et al 1993) have noticed that there exist two essential problems that 
students face when they encounter the kinds of problems that fail within the territory 
of science. Firstly, they must possess the competence to reason critically - a 
competence that, at least in certain forms, has been observed to become 
increasingly evident with age. Secondly, they must be able to dislodge their existing 
beliefs from evidence presented in the problems.
The ability to dislodge existing beliefs is a difficulty that seems to transcend age 
groups -  probably because they are enforced ideologically in the culture, although 
Klaczynski and Narasimham (1998) suggest that with increasing age, this difficulty 
may decline. Could this difficulty, to conceptualise the invisible, explain the 
observation by Ross (1993), that students acquire the incorrect idea that energy is 
‘used up’? Maybe, from everyday experience of batteries going flat, petrol tanks 
needing refilling, and electricity, seemingly, ‘used up’ in providing heat and light; or is 
it that the concept of energy transfer is more complex? More work on this subject 
needs to be done, to enable educators to understand the difficulties for ‘adults 
learning science’ that are intrinsic to the nature of the subject being studied.
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While this thesis is not about the nature of scientific knowledge, and its standing as 
an account of physical reality, it is nevertheless considered important (for the reason 
given below) to emphasise the theoretical nature of science. The existing knowledge 
of science comprises not a direct reflection of the real world, but a theoretical 
interpretation of that world. Theories are invented by people, and used to describe 
and interpret their observations and experimental findings in terms of what is known. 
One consequence of this is that any finite set of observations and findings is 
compatible with any number of theories, so no set of observations and results can 
ever suffice conclusively to establish a theory (because the data produced is always 
finite).
Scientific knowledge is theories which we (or our predecessors) have invented, and 
which we are content to use for the time being as the basis of our understanding of 
nature, because we have found it trustworthy in use. There is no expectation that it 
will be permanently valid, for knowledge accepted today is not thought of as a set of 
fixed truths, more a developing interpretation of some parts of the world. Yet, for ail 
this, natural scientists do have immense confidence in the accepted knowledge of 
their field. Professional training makes no serious attempts to justify and validate the 
knowledge it conveys, the presumption being that the knowledge will be absorbed 
and accepted. Part of the reason why it is accepted is that much of the knowledge 
acquired by learners is procedural, in the same way as a musician in training learns 
skills for a future occupation. Texts, therefore, tend to downplay problems and 
uncertainties, as they are designed to create conviction.
The focus on procedural knowledge existed because of the policy in schools and 
colleges to discover and train the few who showed some aptitude for science, as 
opposed to concentrating on broad schemes for the general diffusion of scientific 
knowledge. However, a proposal that arose from the 1957 Policy Statement of the
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Science Masters’ Association (called Science and Education and published in the 
November 1957 issue of The School Science Review as Recommendation No. 2) 
intended to change this. Rather, teaching would be ‘about science’, so that by the 
end of formal instruction, learners would have acquired some appreciation of the 
‘scientific attitude’. They would be able to comprehend the social and technological 
consequences of it, as well as knowing something of its methods. What eventually 
emerged from this proposal was the Nuffield Science Teaching Project. The 
emphasis would be on learning rather than being taught, on understanding rather 
than amassing information, and on finding out rather than being told.
Half a century later, in 2006, a new attempt was made in response to a perceived 
crisis in science education -  this most delicate and vulnerable section of the scientific 
enterprise that is responsible for the training of future generations of scientists in 
schools and colleges. A new General Certificate of Secondary Education course was 
designed with the intention of persuading more students to take science at A-level 
and university by making it more interesting and relevant. The three disciplines of 
chemistry, physics and biology were conflated as ‘scientific literacy’; children were 
encouraged to discuss topical issues such as global warming and MMR vaccines 
with particular reference to media coverage. Critics, for example Whelan (2009), 
argued that this approach treats science as a branch of media studies rather than as 
a group of discrete bodies of knowledge to be transmitted to the student, that it 
assumed learners can relate only to what they know and they should not be 
challenged by new concepts, that it replaced the controlled laboratory experiment -  
the backbone of modern scientific enquiry -  with field studies. The danger is that 
pupils will be less likely to read for science degrees at university because they will 
just not know enough to do so. The novelist, and one-time research chemist, C. P. 
Snow who delivered the 1959 Rede lecture on “The Two Cultures and the Scientific 
Revolution’’ in which he warned of an academic emergency arising from a gulf of
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mutual incomprehension between scientists and literary intellectuals, would be 
appalled at this project.
The foregoing section of this chapter is not intended to be a clear statement of 
current views on the nature of science; indeed it is difficult to see how 
characterisation of a single category “science" can be established or defended. 
Different areas of knowledge can be investigated concerning their aims and the 
means by which those aims are accomplished, and even the degree of success 
achieved -  but there is probably no justifiable, timeless and universal conception of 
science or even of scientific method that can rule out certain areas of study. But 
these are philosophical issues and my aim in the latter part of this chapter was to 
highlight some background issues relating to those areas of study which, perhaps for 
convenience, have been grouped under the banner of science for teaching purposes 
at introductory level.
3. SUMMARY
This chapter has focused on two of the foundation pillars of this thesis; namely, 
issues surrounding learning by adults and the learning of that which is called science. 
There is an extensive literature relating to both topics. The survey given has, 
necessarily, been brief, but the scene is now set for consideration of the research 
problem that is the basis of this study. Chapter 5 will explore the research question, 
and the methods of inquiry used.
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CHAPTER 5
THE RESEARCH PROBLEM 
&
METHODS OF INQUIRY
1. INTRODUCTION
Chapter 2 included a consideration of the epistemological and ontological 
perspectives that underpin the design of this research project. This Chapter begins 
by developing these points that lead to the identity of the research problem. The 
methods of inquiry are then set out with appropriate noting of related contextual and 
quality issues. An explanation of the approach to data analysis used in this study 
completes this section of the thesis.
2. IDENTIFYING THE RESEARCH PROBLEM
The middle years of the twentieth century were dominated by ‘behavioural’ models of 
learning based, largely, on animal studies. One of the pioneers who helped to move 
the study of psychology from these behavioural models to cognitive models - that 
focus on how people construct new meanings and use knowledge in creative 
problem solving - was David Ausubel. His assimilation theory of meaningful learning 
(1962), where new information becomes related to an existing relevant aspect of an 
individual’s knowledge structure - is still seen as comprehensive and powerful. It lies 
at the core of Novak’s (1998) influential theory of education - meaningful learning 
underlies the constructive integration of thinking, feeling and acting, leading to 
empowerment for commitment and responsibility. Meaningful learning is contrasted 
with, and seen as more valuable than, rote learning, which occurs when the learner
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Rote learning is dismissed by Novak as being of use only in the memorizing of such 
information as telephone numbers, but there is evidence to show that people whose 
lives depend on the ability to memorise large amounts of information are better at 
retaining information than those whose lives do not (Flood 2005). Increasingly, over 
the last three decades, science has been taught on the assumption that access to 
information is just as valid as data having to be held in long-term memory; but 1 think 
this argument has limitations, since we do not know what we do not know. The use 
of stored knowledge may allow us to solve a problem, since it can direct us to what 
we need to know. If our knowledge state is a tabula rasa, we have no starting point. 
My classroom observations suggest to me that there are always students showing 
talent in science (up to level 3) by dint of having good memories; for example, in 
qualitative chemical analysis, recognition of having ‘seen this before’ can save both 
labour and time. So my suspicion is that rote learning may play a more important 
role in learning science than, for example, merely recalling arbitrarily chosen 
distinguishing features in classification keys used within biology to aid the 
identification of a plant or animal, or symbols for elements.
But whether constructive integration or memorizing, learning is described in terms of 
a process by these education researchers in the United States. Herein appears to lie 
a theoretical weakness, because the implication of this kind of definition is that if the 
process is observed as occurring, then that kind of learning must be taking place -  it 
is a tautology, for the proposition about learning is true by virtue of the meaning of its 
terms. Such definitions do not illuminate the object of their attention and, though the 
presence of such a weakness does not demolish the entire edifice of the cognitive 
approach, nevertheless, the base of the Ausubel and Novak argument is weakened 
in the light of this criticism. My work takes the useful learning tool devised by Novak 
(the concept map), and applies it to another perspective on learning.
memorises new information without relating it to prior knowledge.
105
Using the framework of the research approach called phenomenography, which aims 
to reveal the qualitatively different ways in which people experience, and 
conceptualise various phenomena in the world around them, Saljo (1979), in an 
interview study, investigated the notion of learning. The results, replicated by Martin 
and Ramsden (1987), and taken further by Marton (1988), revealed two principal 
types of learning which are characterized by the presence or absence of meaning, 
and designated ‘deep’ and ‘surface’ learning. Sub-classes of each type are 
described (developed further in Chapter 3), and inter-relationships are explored. 
Though the terminology is different from Ausubel and Novak’s, there is much 
common ground between deep and surface learning, and meaningful and rote 
learning. But there is also a weakness in this way of looking at learning - the type, or 
conception, of learning can only be found by asking the learner. The first question 
asked of all those interviewed in the study conducted by Saljo and by those who 
replicated the work was, “What exactly do you mean by learning?” There is no other 
instrument to track the response of the learner to new information, no other way of 
verifying that the type of learning, said by the interviewee to have taken place, is in 
fact the type that has occurred. Whilst it may be argued that some measure of 
reliability will be conferred by involving large numbers of respondents, this does not 
remove the presence of the weakness.
One of the aims of my study is to test whether there is a link between the conception 
of learning as seen by the learner, and the kind of learning that actually takes place 
as indicated by changes to concept maps which show what process has taken place. 
Thus, these two ways of looking at learning, each with their own inherent weakness, 
can be tested against the concept map to see if the claims made for them are 
demonstrable.
Adults will have spent much of their lives learning from experience, and this
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experience will be both the foundation of, and stimulus for, the more formal learning 
which takes place in the classroom. Yet, though experience may be the foundation 
of learning, it does not necessarily lead to it and there needs to be an active 
engagement with it. Knowledge making is, thus, a participatory process in which 
social interaction precedes meaning making, and action - knowledge and meaning 
are created between, rather than within, people (Mead, 1934). Learning is, thus, 
intricately bound up with the formation of self, “it implies becoming a different person” 
(Lave & Wenger 1991 p 53). This brings us back to the idea of types of learning.
The classification of conceptions of learning adopted for this study is the one 
developed by Saljo (1979) from a study of data collected from Open University 
students’ views of learning, and extended by Marton (1988). The relative merits of 
this approach, and the differences from other systems of categorization, are 
examined in greater detail in Chapter 3; but it is worth indicating here that the 
research findings of Bloomer and Hodgkinson’s (1997a and b) Further Education 
Development Association (FEDA) supported longitudinal study, “do not indicate types 
of learner in any permanent sense” (Bloomer 2000 p. 4). While they found it was 
often possible to discern deeply held dispositions to knowledge and learning, how 
learners acted, frequently varied from situation to situation.
For the purpose of examining the response to new information that occurs in adults 
learning science, it is assumed that there are basically two types of learning: 
meaningful and rote (Novak 1998) - though other terminologies, such as deep and 
superficial, are in use. Meaningful learning is viewed as crucial in successful 
education by Novak (1998), yet adults learning science may not see themselves as 
meaningful learners. It may be that learners of science, at an elementary level, 
utilize rote (surface) learning because of methods of testing, or because it involves 
less effort, or even because they are encouraged to by teachers, or because, to all 
intents and purposes, it is effective for the task in hand. This study will ascertain
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what kind of learner an individual considers him or herself to be, when dealing with 
new information; it may be that the Novak view (that is so dismissive of rote learning) 
should be reviewed, as it might have a more useful role than it has hitherto been 
accorded. Those learners who are not meaningful learners could, perhaps, be 
helped to broaden their repertoire of learning, by changing their conception of 
learning. A central aim of this research then, is to establish a means of recognizing 
whether a learner has responded to new information by learning meaningfully, or by 
rote. Reference has been made to a more biological view of learning. Schaverien 
and Cosgrove (1999) argue that, if profoundly biological, education could then be 
well explained in terms of more fundamental biological principles. Essentially, theirs 
is a selectionist account -  a development of Campbell’s (1960) theory of selective 
retention in creative thinking, and Popper’s (1968) argument that science progresses 
by means of the survival of those theories that are the fittest. Their evolutionary 
epistemology posits that brain learning is a process of adaptation that can be 
explained in terms of selection: “first, variants are generated, next they are tested 
and then those selected by the test are propagated” (Schaverien and Cosgrove 
1999:1229). By taking an epigenetic view of brain development (i.e. not reducible to 
genetics alone), adaptations resulting from chance variations can be considered 
developmental -  which learning certainly is. The question as to whether selective 
retention applies to both rote and meaningful learning, or to only one of these, might 
be worth investigating in a further study.
This section has focused on the two types of learning (rote and meaningful) that are 
recognized by many of those interested in the nature of learning. How learning is 
achieved is still largely a matter of conjecture, as the review of some of the literature 
charting attempts to establish an alliance between reason (teaching us how things 
must be) and empirical inquiry (teaching us how they really are), in Chapters 2 and 3 
indicate.
1. Core question
How do adults learning science respond to new information, 
especially information which conflicts with their existing 
knowledge?
2. Subsidiary questions
a) Is there a link between a conception of learning (as viewed 
by the learner), and the type of learning that actually takes 
place?
b) Can learners be helped to become meaningful learners by 
changing their conception of learning?
The remainder of this chapter is devoted to consideration of the methods by which 
these research questions are addressed.
3. TOOLS 
a) Concept Maps
The core question in this study is to do with how adults learning science respond to 
new information - especially if it conflicts with their existing view, and how cognitive 
change is going to be tracked (mainly) by the use of concept maps. Concept maps 
were developed by Novak’s research group in the 1970’s, working from Ausubel’s 
theory of meaningful learning, “to meet a need for an evaluation tool that can show 
easily and precisely changes in students’ conceptual understanding" (Novak 1998: 
192). They consist of an hierarchical representation of concepts and propositions 
that a learner has, as he or she relates to events or objects discussed, or taught. 
They differ from flow charts which show sequences of events rather than 
superordinate -  subordinate relationships between concepts (Novak and Gowin 
1984).
The research questions addressed in this study are:
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Although interviews are seen as the ‘gold standard’ for evaluation of cognitive 
structures, Edwards and Fraser (1983) showed that concept maps constructed by 
students were as revealing of their knowledge structures, as clinical interviews of 
students. Novak says that his research group was led to devise this tool due to the 
problem of the interpretation of knowledge expressed in interviews (Novak 
1998:194). It is for this reason, and because concept maps are a useful learning 
tool, that they are being used in this study. Novak’s claim (1998 p 194), that concept 
maps encourage meaningful learning and discourage rote learning, arises from his 
observation that long chains in a concept map are indicators of rote learning. Kinchin 
(2000a) concluded that linear structures are resistant to change, and that change to 
linear structures constitute meaningful learning. He further found that simple 
additions to a concept map do not, of themselves, constitute meaningful learning -  
although, of course, meaningful learning could still have taken place.
In relation to this study, the options for a learner, when presented with new 
information which may conflict with their existing world view, are:
1. Rejection -  of what is new and persistent reliance on existing understanding. 
Evidence that this occurs in children learning science at primary and secondary 
levels is given in Chapter 3 of this thesis. A concept map, which is essentially 
unchanged after presentation of new information, may indicate rejection of the 
new information. An interview will be used to corroborate this conclusion 
because other reasons could exist; for example, the learner had simply not seen 
the significance of the new information, and so had ignored it.
2. Bolt-on -  existing understanding is retained and used preferentially. New 
information is placed in a parallel compartment and applied, but only after there is 
a failure to apply existing understanding successfully. This is additive or rote 
learning that can lead to a misconception, because there are competing
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frameworks held by the learner. If contextual switching (moving from one 
framework to another in response to a contextual cue, compared with conceptual 
change where the structure of a framework is altered) is developed here, this 
may be a functional framework, although meaningful learning of the new 
information has not occurred. A concept map drawn after presentation of the 
new information would show the additional information added in parallel to 
existing information, but probably no cross linking to, or from, it. This may be a 
transition phase, and a learner passes on to meaningful learning after 
acknowledging the inefficiency of the competing frameworks position.
3. Replacement of existing understanding, by new understanding which is built 
into a restructured concept map. Meaningful learning can be said to have 
occurred, and the learner has ‘moved on' from the previous state, in some 
cases, the learner may discover the set of situations in which the old 
understanding still applies, and may use this as a short cut; for example, in 
mathematics.
Thus, once a learner has been shown how to construct a concept map, if they draw a 
map before and after being presented with new (and possibly conflicting) information, 
it should be possible to compare the maps and establish the kind of learning that has 
taken place. This can then be compared with the conception of learning held by the 
learner, as discovered by interview before and after the presentation of the new 
information. Strategies to help poor learners become good ones could then be 
worked out - noting that Suppes and Ginsberg (1963) infer that information learned 
by rote inhibits subsequent learning of additional similar information -  even if it has 
been forgotten.
No tool is perfect and so some possible limitations of concept maps ought to be 
mentioned. Integrative reconciliation, observed as cross linkages within a concept 
map, is seen as a sign of meaningful learning. This corresponds with
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accommodation learning in Piaget’s development theory. However, if learners are 
aware that inserting cross links into a concept map provides an indication of 
meaningful learning, they will simply learn to insert these. A consequence of this will 
be that the indicator no longer functions as designed. This potential problem, which 
could be more troublesome if concept mapping was being used as a tool to promote 
learning rather than tracking it, can be effectively minimised by examining the map 
for other indicators of expertise, such as ‘connectedness’ and ‘link quality’. Issues 
relating to ‘assessment’ of concept maps are explored in more detail later in this 
section. Additionally, any relationship that might exist between learning styles such 
as visual, and the ability to work with concept maps, has yet to be established.
The hierarchical representation of concepts and propositions a learner has, are 
suitably illustrated in a concept map:
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Fig. 6 A concept map showing key ideas and principles exhibited in a good concept 
map -  after Novak 1998 p 32
DIFFERENT MAP 
SEGMENTS
A concept map showing key ideas and principles exhibited in a good concept map
after Novak 1998:32
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Generally, these maps have been used to support and enhance learning, but in this 
study they are being used as a tool to track the kind of learning that has taken place 
after teaching. This requires that concept maps can be described and compared, 
and both quantitative and qualitative options are available. Although this is a 
qualitative study, these options need to be considered with respect to the analysis of 
the concept maps.
For quantifying concept map characteristics, a scoring protocol devised by Novak
and Gowin (1984) is available:
Fig. 7 Scoring model for concept maps (redrawn from Novak and Gowin 1984)
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Hierarchy = 4 layers @ 5 points per layer 20 points
Cross links = 10 points per cross link 20 points
Examples = 1 point per link _4 points
58 points total
Note: the points are arbitrary and without units. A greater number of points equate 
with more meaningful learning.
The procedure is not without its critics, however, Caine and Caine (1994:166) 
make the point that it is impossible to communicate the scope and depth of a 
student’s abilities by means of a letter, or numerical grade. White and Gunstone 
(1989:38) express concern at the threat to students’ potential to learn, that could 
result from a changed attitude (to concept maps) following the award of a grade or 
mark for them; and Kinchin (2001:1259) is unhappy that only ‘valid’ links are 
considered, arguing that this is unsupportive of the learning process. He claims that 
invalid links could have value to the student. Kinchin also refers to problems of 
consistency in scoring schemes, as demonstrated by Liu and Hinchey (1996).
The alternative qualitative approach, which avoids the problems associated with 
scoring maps, has also to steer clear of assessing a map for ‘correctness’ -  as this 
would be more in line with the objectivist philosophy of ‘transmission teaching’ than 
with the constructivist approach. The scheme devised and used by Kinchin (Kinchin 
et al 2000), divides concept maps, based on their gross structure, into three broad 
categories - spokes, chains and nets. These categories are illustrated in Fig. 8, with 
a table of characteristics of each given below:
Note: Relationships = 1 point per link 14 points for above model
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Table 3. Characteristics of spoke, chain and net style concept maps (after Kinchin et 
al. 2000)
SPOKE CHAIN NET
Hierarchy One level only Many levels, but 
often unjustifiable
Several justifiable 
levels
Processes Simple association 
with no
understanding of 
processes or 
interactions
Shown as a 
temporal sequence 
with no complex 
interactions or 
feedback
Described as 
complex 
interactions at 
different
conceptual levels
Complexity So little integration 
that concepts can 
be added without 
consequences for 
‘map integrity’
Map integrity 
cannot cope with 
additions, 
particularly near 
the beginning of 
the sequence
Map integrity is 
high. Adding one or 
more concept often 
has minor 
consequences as 
‘other routes’ are 
available
Conceptual
development
Shows little or no 
‘world view'. 
Addition or loss of 
a link has little 
effect on the 
overview
Integrated into a 
narrow world view, 
suggesting an 
isolated conceptual 
understanding. 
Loss ofa link can 
lose meaning of 
the whole chain
Can support 
reorganisation to 
emphasise 
different 
components to 
appreciate a larger 
world view or to 
compensate for a 
missing link
Represents National
Curriculum
structure
Lesson sequence Meaningful
learning
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SPOKE
which develop
NET
feed on
from
4
MALE
PARTS
to
FEMALE
PARTS
called
I
OVULES
SEEDS 4
to form
i
SEEDS
CHAIN
Fig. 8 Categories of Concept Maps -  redrawn after Kinchin et al 2000
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Of rather more use as indicators of the type of learning that is taking place, is a 
consideration of link quality. A table identifying som e of those indicators of expertise 
is given below:
Table 4. Indicators of expertise in concept maps (from Kinchin 2000a)
Characteristics Expert Novice
Connectedness Highly integrated structure 
with numerous cross-links
Disjointed structure 
dominated by linear 
arrangements in isolated 
clusters
Link quality Appropriate linking 
phrases which add to the 
meaning of concept, using 
the specialist language of 
the domain.
Links are often 
inappropriate -  usually 
single words that add little 
to the meaning and using 
non-specialist terminology
Link variety A diversity of linking 
phrases illustrating a 
range of thought 
processes
The sam e linking words 
are used for a number of 
links, suggestive o f a 
narrow range of thought 
processes
Dynamism Changes over time, 
reflecting active interaction 
with alternative knowledge 
structures
Stable over time 
suggesting a lack of active 
engagem ent in knowledge 
restructuring
Concepts Concentration on 
overarching concepts to 
create an overview
Concentration on specific 
concepts indicating a 
limited perspective
It is my understanding that the terms expert and novice here refer to the subject 
matter, and not to expertise in drawing concept maps. Kinchin says (Kinchin 2000a: 
Ch. 5 p. 43), that the "structures of the framework held by a student will have 
implications for the mechanism of further meaningful learning”. So, if a learner uses 
a spoke structure, then the addition of any new knowledge will not disrupt the existing 
framework, it can simply be added in, with a link to the core concept, but without links 
to associated concepts. Kinchin g oes  on to say that the knowledge can be 
assimilated quickly, but this claim d oes  not appear to have been tested, and may be 
simply a theory laden observation, as is his (Kinchin 2000a: Ch. 5 p. 44) comment 
that, “the addition o f new knowledge will be easy” for a pupil with a chain structure if 
there is an obvious break in, or premature end to, the sequence. His claim that the
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addition o f a concept near the beginning of the sequence may be so  disruptive to the 
knowledge structure lower down, that incorporation of the new knowledge is rejected, 
is interesting, but also untested. Kinchin (2000a: Ch. 5 p. 4 4 )  further draws attention 
to a possible explanation for the different styles o f concept map appearing in 
students work by suggesting that the National Curriculum is designed and 
constructed in a spoke like arrangement, whereas many teachers prepare lesson 
plans for delivery of this Curriculum based on chain like arrangements. These 
possible explanations raise questions about the reliability of using different styles of 
concept maps as indicators o f the type of learning, and leave link quality as the most 
secure basis for making judgem ents about learning type. However, it is not easy  to 
find examples of linking phrases which ‘add to the meaning of the concept’ and ‘use 
the specialist language of the domain’ (Kinchin 2000, see  Table 4 above), and 
Novak’s text (Novak 1998) is uninformative in this area, due to a lack of examples. In 
this study, when instructing participants in the writing of concept maps, I tried to 
em phasise the importance o f both link quality and variety, and, also, the language 
used to describe the concepts. One example used to support this was from Novak 
(1 9 9 8 :6 0 ):
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Fig. 9 Concept Map to illustrate Failure to Recall, from Novak 1998 p 60
OBLITERATIVE
SUBSUMPTION
follows remainingenhancement
remaining
interference
follows
of
enhancement
of
Note: 1. Obliterative subsumption: a subsuming concept (Ausubel 1968) has a role of 
facilitating movement of relevant information through perceptual barriers, and provides a base 
for linkage between newly perceived information and previously acquired knowledge (Novak 
1998:59). Subsuming concepts may become established in the course of meaningful 
learning, or may become obliterated in that process. This is discussed further in the section 
of Chapter 3 relating to learning as conceptual change.
Note: 2 . Forgetting: this has both an everyday meaning - i.e. a failure to recall something, 
and a specific technical meaning - i.e. the kind of failure to recall after rote learning (Novak 
1998:60). This is discussed further in the section of Chapter 3 relating to learning as 
conceptual change.
The concepts in this diagram are described in the specialist language o f the domain. 
There is cross linking to indicate an integrated structure, and som e variety in link 
quality, although som e novice terms are included as well, for example ‘can be ’ and 
‘follows’. Repetition, while extensive, is used in som e places to highlight contrast, for 
example, ‘provides enhancement o f  and ‘no enhancement o f .
There seem s to be agreement between Kinchin (2001 )and Novak (1998) that
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concept maps which are dominated by linear structures with few integrating cross 
links indicate limited understanding o f the topic(s) depicted. Conversely, more 
extensive integration and more cross linking are indicators of meaningful learning. 
This study is trying to identify the type of learning and to com pare and, or, contrast it 
with the type of learning as stated by the respondents in the Questionnaire.
b) Questionnaire
The questionnaire and the interview have com e to be the dominant methods of 
collecting information in the social sciences. However, the asking o f questions does 
not just produce answers but also reconstructs the meaning of the situation in which 
both questioner and respondent are involved. Questions, therefore, create a 
situation, and answers are only meaningful in the context of the interaction. 
W henever questions are to be asked, and a choice made from a limited list of 
answers, it is a safeguard if they are tried out in advance, because the trial would, 
therefore, check that the questions are feasible for the sample. Som e questions may 
be found useless because the range of answers will be limitless, others may force 
similar choices on everyone, and yet others may be beyond the understanding of 
som e o f the respondents. Without any pilot stage, the actual research is at risk of 
“addressing unsuitable questions to bewildered people” (Shipman 1972 p. 79). A 
further problem is the difficulty in avoiding the asking of leading questions which may 
add to the unreliability o f the research; also, leading questions can lead people to 
ch oose  what they consider to be ‘right’ answers, rather than what they know, or 
believe, to be the ‘correct’ answers. For this study I have tried to ask questions 
which will result in my being able to know with what conceptions the learners identify. 
A  pilot study was conducted with the aim of avoiding the pitfalls mentioned above.
All participants were asked to com plete the ‘Descriptions of Learning’ questionnaire 
given in Appendix 1. The six categories of learning are identical to those given in 
Marton and Saljo (1984), w hose work w as corroborated by Giorgi (1986). One
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advantage I have found in using Marton and Saljo’s terminology is that it d oes  not 
include the terms ‘deep ’ or ‘surface’ learning, nor ‘meaningful’ or ‘rote’ learning. This 
rem oves a temptation that might have led som e participants to select a conception of 
learning which they thought they ‘ought’ to be using, in preference to the one which 
they were, in practice, really using.
The questionnaire fits into the field work schedule as indicated in Appendix 4. 
c) Interview
In interviews, the interaction between questioner and respondent is not only 
structured by the questions, but also by the personal feelings of both involved.
The choice between using questionnaires and interviews is, amongst other things, a 
choice between reliability and insight. In interviews adjustments for any 
misunderstanding arising from linguistic considerations can be made, and answers 
can be probed. But the cost is reliability o f the results because, if the sam e interview 
was carried out by a different interviewer, the chance of identical results would be 
low.
Interviews not only depend on the quality of the questions asked, but also on the 
awareness of, and control over, the interaction involved. Whilst the benefits of 
training have been illustrated by Durbin and Stuart (1951), the danger of interviews 
by only one researcher is that tone of voice, anticipatory gestures or som e other 
action may interfere with the process, with the result that the eager researcher 
conducting the interview will get the answers she, or he, seeks. Therefore, it may be 
observed that, as Shipman found, interviewees tend to pick up clues and give the 
answer the interviewer wants.
Short interviews are needed, a) to confirm the conception of learning held by the 
learner, and b) to ascertain whether any change in that conception of learning has 
taken place - as a result o f dealing with any new information presented in the
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4 CONTEXT FOR THE FIELD WORK
a) College Context
Field work was carried out at a W est Country college which offers courses at both 
Further Education and Higher Education levels. The latter is run under the auspices 
o f a relatively local university. The Further Education students are drawn from a 
catchment area that, while predominantly from the county in which the college is 
located, also includes parts of two neighbouring counties. Higher Education students 
are drawn from throughout the United Kingdom, with a small proportion from other 
countries. The study focuses on adults learning science. Data has been produced 
from students pursuing courses in which the science component is subsidiary to the 
main part of the course, for example, HND Media Make-up - which includes a 
cosm etic science module - and A ccess to Higher Education Health Studies - which 
includes the study of physics, and National Certificate courses for Pharmacy 
Technicians. These courses were selected partly for convenience - 1 could be sure in 
advance that these courses would be well subscribed and contain learners with a rich 
variety of learning histories.
b) Students
The learners have in com m on an absence of formal training in science beyond 
GCSE level, and a gap of at least five years since they left full time education. The 
majority of these are female and aged between twenty and thirty years; selected 
biographical details of two of the groups of participants are given in Appendix 5. A 
total of twenty eight students participated in the field work, ten of these having som e 
practical involvement with science - pharmacy technicians (although much of their 
work revolves around stock control, administration, and security procedures). Twelve 
students -make-up artists - have backgrounds in hairdressing, beauty therapy and 
artistic design work. They are creative artists by inclination, and scientific methods
teaching. Examples of the questions that were asked are given in Appendix 3.
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are (initially at least) viewed by them as alien to their environment and experience. 
The six A ccess  to Higher Education Health Studies students have not, for a variety of 
reasons, succeeded  in their career ventures, and have, therefore, returned to full­
time education; they have fewer academ ic qualifications than those in the other 
groups, though all aspire to Higher Education courses. Som e implications of the 
selection o f these students as participants in the study are considered in the section 
on ‘sampling’ , found in Quality Issues a). It should be added that motivation is 
universally high with, significant personal investment in the courses.
c) Teacher as Researcher
A stereotypical view o f the scientist is that of a person operating in an objective, 
unbiased way, accurately recording sen se  impressions, and consequently making 
factual statements about the phenomenon under investigation. A claim o f the 
scientific community is that the truth value of factual propositions concerning the 
world can be established through the unbiased use of the senses. Such observation 
statements provide a solid empirical basis of facts from which theories are worked 
out, though this is controversial territory from a philosophy of science aspect. The 
situation is different in this investigation, because the teacher is not an unbiased 
observer but an agent of change, who engages the learner in constructing and 
owning his, or her, learning (transformative methodology). The attitudes, methods 
and expectations o f the teacher will change over time - at least they have in my case, 
where a transmissive approach dominated the first half o f my working life. These 
changes have been prompted by a mixture of im posed constraints - curricular and 
institutional demands, personal development, and student agendas. The relationship 
between student agenda and amount and type o f learning is outside the scop e  of this 
study, but Anderson and Lee (1997) identify that where students hold different 
agendas, the chances of meaningful learning are reduced. Jarvis’s book, The 
Practitioner-  Researcher" (Jarvis, 1999), contains much that is helpful and relevant
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to the teacher as researcher, in particular the recognition given to the 
interrelationship between research and learning (p. 164)
Black (1993 p. 81) states that, “Human subjects are often capable o f identifying what 
the operational definition of a set of questions might be and answer accordingly” .
The act o f becoming involved threatens the maintenance o f objectivity and, as 
teacher, I cannot but be involved. So, though I can hope and, or, claim there has 
been no distortion o f the situation, som e doubt must be cast on the reliability of my 
findings. Rosenthal and Jacobson (1968) describe a striking experiment to illustrate 
how the teacher’s expectation of the learner’s  performance can be established 
without any real evidence, yet can som ehow  be used to bring the performance up to 
that expected. If I have expectations which serve as a model for moulding students, 
this may produce just the results I expect, or even want. Even so, I do  have a role in 
the assessm ent of my students, and it will be, as a consequence of this, that som e of 
them try to be overly helpful and provide information that is not wholly true, or will be 
exaggerated, or under emphasized. At least the information is not being gathered 
surreptitiously, and I am not asking for co-operation without explaining the situation to 
those who have agreed to participate. However, I am mindful of Black’s (1993: 81) 
caution, that “the best planned schem e for data collection may not be as good as 
hoped because of the fickleness of a significant number of members of the sample”. 
Som etim es this can be avoided by sufficient insight into the characteristics of the 
sample, and how the instrument will be perceived, but I identified it as a potential 
problem area when evaluating the data.
5. QUALITY ISSUES
a) Sampling
The classical position is that the sample is only representative of the population from 
which it w as selected, and inferences should not be made beyond that population.
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However, som e generaiisability can be obtained on the basis argued by Bryman 
(1988:90), that qualitative research follows a theoretical, rather than a statistical, 
logic: “the issue should be couched in terms of the generaiisability o f ca ses  to 
theoretical propositions rather than to populations or universes”. The nature of this 
link between sampling and theory is developed by Mason (2002: 93-94): “theoretical 
sampling m eans selecting groups or categories to study on the basis of their
relevance to your research questions, your theoretical position  and most
importantly the explanation or account which you are developing. Theoretical
sampling is concerned with constructing a sa m p le  which is meaningful
theoretically, because it builds in certain characteristics or criteria which help to 
develop and test your theory and explanation’ . So, som e sampling ch oices are more 
‘meaningful’ than others.
Black (1993) rightly draws attention to the numerous reported research projects that 
use students in the academ ic institutions of the researchers, simply becau se those 
students are, conveniently, available. I, also, have followed this pattern of 
‘convenience’ sampling, for reasons of availability and cost, but also because the 
results of a pilot study suggested that such a sample would provide a ccess  to 
enough data, and with appropriate focus, to enable me to address my research 
questions.
Concerning the size of the sample, Bertaux and Bertaux-Wiane (1981) claim that, the 
size o f sam ple is dictated by the social process under scrutiny, i.e. the researcher 
sam ples until he, or she, knows that he, or she, has a picture o f what is going on, and 
can generate an appropriate explanation for it. While this can be criticized for being 
unsystematic, it does, to som e extent, counterbalance an attitude that it is a 
requirement that a population be represented according to certain rules. In other 
words, there may be situations where an illustrative approach can be more 
illuminating than that which em erges from representational logic.
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Whilst I must allow that such things as gender, class and ethnicity, may all be 
relevant in exploring the learning of science by adults, I want to ascertain whether the 
commonalities that exist in my sample (limited and, or, poor appreciation o f science 
based on secondary school experiences more than five years ago), transcend these 
other issues. The pilot study suggested that age, gender, and class, were not the 
determining factors but, of course, I acknowledge that these may have som e 
relevance to the process of adults learning science.
b) Ethical
Whilst the application of constructivist beliefs may avoid som e o f the w eaknesses of 
the conventional paradigm (the objectivist approach) identified by philosophers, these 
beliefs do, however, pose greater ethical risks than traditional scientific inquiry.
These risks have been documented by Lincoln and Guba (1989 p. 132 -135).
The first one they identified is that of face-to-face contact -  the interview, which can 
be subject to violation of trust, to shading the truth, to misunderstandings regarding 
the purposes of an interview, or relationships with other respondents.
The second risk posed by constructivist evaluation is the difficulty of maintaining 
privacy and confidentiality. As Skirtic, Guba and Knowlton (1985:111) noted: “such 
protection (privacy, confidentiality and anonymity) must be difficult to extend and 
impossible to guarantee. Even if all the nam es and places and dates are changed ‘to 
protect the innocent’, it is quite likely that other locals will be able to pinpoint the 
agencies and parties involved”.
Lincoln and Guba’s (1989 p 134) third risk concerns violation of trust. Constructivist 
inquiry is built on an assumption o f non-manipulative trust between researchers and 
participants, but this can be difficult to achieve if, as is often the case, much has to be 
accomplished in a very short time.
The fourth possible risk to constructivist inquiry results from the need for open 
negotiations between researcher and participant, since deception is expressly
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forbidden, in conventional scientific inquiry, deception can be permissible under 
som e circumstances, for example, the so  called double blind test for assessing 
physiological response to ‘foreign’ substances. While there was no need to consider 
deception in this study, nevertheless, the constructivist researcher needs to be 
conscious of his, or her, motives.
The fifth risk identified by Lincoln and Guba(1989) is one that is inherent in the 
framing of case  studies. The inquirer has to ch oose  what the purposes of the case  
are to be, and to draw on data that could illuminate those choices. The problem of 
how to determine what shall be included, and what excluded, can be judged only on 
whether the product demonstrates ‘integrity, originality, passion, commitment and 
balance’ (Lincoln and Guba 1989 p 136). Like artistic renderings, there is no simple 
set of rules for saying whether a given product is better than som e other product.
Despite all of these problems, the ca se  for the ontological and epistemological 
positions of the constructivist paradigm, militate against many o f the difficulties of 
applying positivistic methods to social inquiry. All of those taking part were 
volunteers aged above eighteen years. Permission to involve these volunteers in the 
research for this study, w as sought and obtained from the Principal of the College at 
which they were studying. Much of the data for this study was generated via formal 
teaching sessions. Students had the option of not participating in the study, but the 
sam e learning opportunities were available to all. Their completing of the 
‘conceptions of learning’ questionnaire (Appendix 1), and my dealing with any 
queries arising from their participation, were carried out within contact tutorial time.
c) Validity and Reliability
Issues of validity will be considered first. Kirk and Miller (1986 p 21) summarise the 
issue of validity as “a question of whether the researcher sees  what he/she thinks 
he/she se e s ”, and they identify three types o f error: seeing a relation when it is not
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correct, rejecting one when it is correct, and asking the wrong questions in the first 
place. Flick (2002 p 222) neatly summarises Hammersley’s exploration of the 
researcher’s constructions by identifying three premises:
“a) the validity o f knowledge cannot be assessed  with certainty.
Assumptions can only be judged for their plausibility and credibility,
b) phenomena also exist Independently o f our claims concerning them. Our 
assumptions about them can only more or less approximate these 
phenomena,
c) reality becom es accessible across the (different) perspectives on 
phenomena. Research aims at presenting reality not reproducing it”.
Flammersley (1992 p 50-52)
Using these premises, Flick (2002 p 222) argues that the question of validity of 
qualitative research becom es a question of how far the researcher’s constructions 
are grounded in the constructions of those whom he, or she, studied. Thus the 
production of the data becom es one starting point forjudging their validity, and the 
presentation of phenomena of the inferences drawn from them becom es another 
one. The trend here is to locate validity in the process of research and the different 
relationships at work in it, the m ove being away from a level at which concrete criteria 
are formulated, in terms of which a study can be assessed . Glaser and Strauss 
(1967 p 5) are very sceptical as to the applicability of the canons of quantitative 
research as criteria forjudging the credibility o f substantive theory based on 
qualitative research. This scepticism has been the stimulus for attempts to develop 
‘alternative criteria’ , in which qualities such as trustworthiness, credibility, and 
dependability, are used. Procedures from other disciplines -  such as auditing from 
the world of finance -  are utilised to strengthen the assessm ent o f research work.
The wide range of techniques potentially available in assessing validity can appear 
quite daunting at the planning stage, and one needs to remember that not all of them 
will be used on any one piece of research. This project relies on the rather more
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‘traditional’ process o f triangulation to a ssess  validity. Denzin (1989 p 236) claims 
that the “triangulation o f method, investigator, theory and data remains the soundest 
strategy of theory construction”. Although triangulation was first conceptualised 
purely as a strategy for validating results, its focus has shifted somewhat, to becom e 
an alternative to validation which increases the scope, depth, and consistency, in 
methodological proceedings (Flick 2002 p 227). It has effectively m oved closer to 
Glaser and Strauss’s  strategy for theoretical sampling, where precise information 
illuminates emerging theory thereby extending the possibilities for producing 
knowledge.
In this study, methodological triangulation (Denzin 1989 p 237-241) is used to 
test the validity and reliability of data obtained from each participants’ questionnaire, 
interview, and concept map. This d oes  ignore the view that different methods and 
data sources are likely to throw light on to different social or ontological phenomena, 
and it also implies a view of the social world which says, there is one, objective and 
knowable social reality, and that all I have done is to work out which are the most 
appropriate triangulation points by which to measure it (Mason 2002 p 190). Yet this 
criticism can be levelled at any research design that includes multiple methods, and 
is a type of argument that states, ‘they would say that wouldn’t they’ . The weakness 
is important, because the validity of interpretation o f the results is dependent on the 
validity of the method used to obtain them.
Concerning interpretation, I have to be able to demonstrate that the evidence 
collected is both accurate and reliable, and that the interpretation I place on it can be 
justified in terms of the route by which it w as reached. As Mason (2002 :192 ) says, 
"the basic principle is never to take it as self-evident that a particular interpretation 
can be made o f my data”, but, rather, that the steps through which the interpretations 
are made are continually and assiduously charted.
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Concerning reliability, research in the quantitative tradition generally relies on the 
standardisation of research instruments, and on cross-checking the data yielded by 
such standardised instruments. Kirk and Miller (1986 p 42) urge the rejection of 
accepting as reliable the results of enquiry that are dependent on frequently repeated 
data collection which leads to the sam e results. They say, “if this form of reliability is 
used it may be more convenient to mistrust rather than trust the dependability of the 
data”. One of the reasons for this is that qualitative studies are not usually carried 
out on unchanging objects. Flick (2002) identifies som e ways in which reliability of 
interpretations can be increased through training of the researchers, with the aim of 
improving the quality and consistency o f their observation and documentation. 
Essentially, therefore, the criterion of reliability is rooted in the dependability of data 
and procedures against the background of a specific theory of the issue under study.
Concerning issues of reliability and validity with use o f concept maps, Novak (1998 p 
192) says,
The validity is relatively transparent because it is obvious that the 
fundamental characteristics of constructivist learning is exemplified in a well 
constructed concept map. For any competent evaluator, it is relatively easy 
to s e e  if propositions indicated on the map are valid and to determine if the 
superordinate/subordinate nature of concepts in the structure makes sense.
Novak (1998 p192) also says that,
Over the past two decades, in dozens of studies by our research group and 
other researchers, concept maps have been shown to be highly reliable 
assessm ent instruments.
The term ‘validity’ is also applied to the kinds of link made in concept maps; thus a 
link could be valid in terms of providing a factually correct statement, but 
Inappropriate when considered in context of the core concept under examination.
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Validity here is an indicator of link quality, and the map will be examined for 
‘indicators of expertise’ , particularly ‘connectedness’ and ‘link quality’ , when 
evaluating whether meaningful learning has occurred.
S om e of the hazards of both interviews and questionnaires have been hinted at in 
the section on T oo ls ’ . The interview is a very artificial situation, and if I ask a 
question about a conception of learning, there is no guarantee that the answer given 
is either the true opinion of the respondent or, if a true opinion, whether it is correct or 
not. By definition, I am setting limits to what the respondent can say, and finding out 
what these people will say when they are being interviewed, or filling in a 
questionnaire. My hope is that by integrating these approaches with the concept 
maps, a clearer picture of how adults respond to new information in science will 
emerge.
d) Generaiisability
Concerning generaiisability, the qualitative researcher has to try to find a balance 
between recognition o f difference and the justification of representativeness of 
findings and conclusions. As in any branch of science, the principal question must 
always be, ‘what is it that w e have evidence to believe is actually the c a s e ? ’, and to 
avoid, wherever possible, the unfruitful approach which asks what it might be 
reasonable to suppose. Mason (2002) em phasizes the importance o f contextual 
grounding for generaiisability claims - that is, the need to identify the grounds for 
making a claim, and not merely the claim itself. Bryman (2001 p 102) points out that 
it is difficult (without further work) to a ssess  whether there is a time limit on the 
findings generated by a research project. I shall have to accept, therefore, that there 
is the possibility that my findings could be  temporally specific.
In the world of the physical sciences, the word ‘generaiisability’ is never used, 
instead, the word ‘extrapolation’ is preferred, being used to describe a process
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applied to data in the search for laws which govern the physical world. Interestingly, 
Alasuutari (1995 p156-7) suggests that generalization is a word that should be 
reserved for surveys only, and that extrapolation better captures the procedure in 
which the researcher demonstrates that the analysis relates to things beyond the 
material at hand. It is not out of place to mention, though, that manuals of 
experiments in the physical scien ces caution the experimenter to note that 
extrapolation is often a hazardous undertaking. But to be practical, every scientific 
enterprise tries to discover something that will apply to everything of a certain kind, 
by studying a few examples; the key to legitimate generalization is cogency  of the 
principles on which the research is designed. The social sciences cannot provide a 
stock of law-like generalizations with strong predictive power; what they do discover 
are probabilistic generalizations, though, as Macintyre (1985) argues, the 
labelling of them as probabilistic d oes  not illuminate their characteristic of being 
generalizations.
Concerning generalisations, qualitative research tends to be context specific but, in 
order to generalise the findings, the context link has to be set aside so  that it can be 
seen whether these findings are valid, independently of the specific contexts. There 
is no obvious link between the sampling process and the degree of generalisability of 
the results; for example, if I mistake a small population for a sample, then I have no 
grounds on which to make inferences to a larger population. But the transferability of 
an emerging theory into other fields, is a wider issue in the evaluation of a research 
project, and Corbin and Strauss (1990 p 16) suggest four aspects on which to focus 
forjudging both theories, and procedures, that led to them. Firstly - the validity, 
reliability and credibility o f the data, secondly - the plausibility and the value o f the 
theory itself, thirdly - the adequacy of the research process which has generated or 
tested the theory and, fourthly - the empirical grounding of the research findings. The 
process by which this evaluating can be done involves constantly comparing the
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data, consideration of apparently anomalous and extreme examples, and the testing 
of findings and their context in more general and abstract situations. Put in very 
simple terms, generalisations require claims to be well supported.
e) Interpretation
When evidence is being interpreted, if only data which fits a particular hypothesis is 
selected, this will result in bias. Critics will, therefore, justifiably maintain that 
consequent evidence presented is not convincing, or that an alternative, or conflicting 
explanation is possible. Theory building by analogy, and dependence on case  
studies for credibility, are both forms of selective interpretation. Analogy, whilst being 
an important source of insight, is not evidence that can confirm the truth o f that 
insight. Whilst 1 have adopted the ca se  study style, my research is not built on the 
full ca se  study approach.
The opportunities for fallacious interpretation are many. When generalisations about 
individuals are made from examples of collective behaviour, this can result in what 
are termed aggregative fallacies. There is a reverse of aggregative fallacy, namely 
individualistic, or atomistic fallacy, which occurs when information collected from 
individuals is used to generalise about societal structures. There is a greater risk of 
this occurring in this study.
Evidence which has been gathered but is not considered during interpretation can 
result in conclusions not appearing to relate to that evidence -  a situation described 
as a disembodied interpretation. In relation to this study, therefore, there needs to be 
an adequate basis for any generalisations reached. Since I have no interests to 
declare, for example, I am not com m issioned to carry out this research, and no 
conscious incentive to produce a slanted study, I am less likely to avoid deceptive 
interpretations than if this were not the case.
The temptation to extend the meaning o f evidence - by treating facts as elastic, and
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to generalise from inadequate, or irrelevant evidence - can remove most of its worth 
from a piece o f work. The generalising from inadequate evidence, for example from 
ignoring non-response, and then making an assumption that those who did reply 
represent those who did not, is an illustration o f extending the meaning of evidence. 
The related fault of generalising from too small, or too unrepresentative, a sample is 
one that needs to be given due consideration in the discussion of the outcom es of 
this study.
The demand from the general public for com m ent on topical issues, by those with 
authority and responsibility, is one frequent excu se  for the use o f generalisations 
which outstrip evidence. For example, before the relation between social class and 
learning performance had been thoroughly investigated in the early 1960’s, there was 
a tendency by commentators within the sociology of education to generalise about 
‘the school’ , with, as Shipman (1972 p149) says, “very small bricks of evidence 
mortared with much guesswork”. There is always a danger of elaborating 
unsubstantiated theory and resting too much weight on too little original work.
Frequently there are competing pressures to produce evidence in an unambiguous 
form for decision making, with regard to such things as the gap between assumptions 
about real situations and the reality itself. The su ccess in demolishing established 
beliefs, com pared with the failure to provide conclusive evidence for, or against, 
such innovations as the modular curriculum, could be said to be an indication of the 
blunt nature o f social scientific instruments. They can produce evidence powerful 
enough to show  that things are not working according to expectation, or hope, but not 
precise enough to com pare different m ethods of learning. This is an example of 
where evidence can be produced to challenge but not to prove. The standard test for 
any theory is its ability to predict; however, being able to state that, ‘given this 
combination of factors, the following can be  expected ’ , is something that can be said
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An underlying question which is always present is, ‘how much can be reasonably 
expected from a theoretical m odel?’ . That ail the models used are, more or less, 
limited is obvious from the start of any project, because, if a com plete model were 
available there would be  no need for policy documents, as the problems would 
already have been solved. A good (though not recent) example is the Coleman 
Report (Coleman 1966) which received praise as a description, and powerful 
indictment, of the (then) effectiveness o f American schooling, but was criticised for 
the analysis of the results. The criticism (Cain & Watts 1970) focussed on non­
response, errors in measurement, interpretation of information used in the analysis 
but not collected as part of the investigation, the statistical analysis, and the 
theoretical model used. The author’s reply to the critics (Coleman 1970) accused 
them o f over estimating the state of knowledge about achievement in schools and, as 
a consequence, over-estimating the degree to which sophisticated statistical 
techniques were appropriate. Aiguer’s  (1970) comment on Caine and Watts’ critique 
and the author’s defence, pointed out flaws in both and so the verdict of ‘not proven’ 
becam e an inevitable fate for the report. Sadly, this can happen so  easily to policy- 
orientated research: if written for a wide audience it is vulnerable to criticism from 
professionals, if it em ploys sophisticated conceptual and analytic tools it may win the 
respect of the professionals but will mystify and thereby annoy the policy makers. 
Criticism is inevitable and yet the critiques are legitimate because both clarity and 
reliability are needed if far-reaching policies are to be based on the findings. The 
relevance of this to my study is quite specific - 1 need to demonstrate a level of 
com petence as a researcher that is appropriate to a doctoral thesis but, at the sam e 
time ‘the reader should be able to read the text without difficulty’ (University of Surrey 
Research student handbook 2007-2008 p. 48).
One o f the most famous projects in the history o f science was Gregor Mendel’s
rarely where people are involved.
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nineteenth century experiments with pea breeding, which led to the modern 
principles of genetic inheritance. His work has long been overshadowed, however, by 
accusations that his results were statistically ‘too good  to be true’ -  that he must have 
‘doctored’ data to fit his emerging theory of what are now labelled dominant and 
recessive genes.
Mendel observed (in the Augustinian monastery at Brno, today in the Czech 
Republic) how features of plants and their seed s changed over eight years. He 
published his results in 1865 but it was seventy years before the British biologist and 
statistician R.A Fisher suggested (Franklin 2009) that data must have been falsified -  
though probably by an assistant rather than by Mendel himself. The probability that 
real data would fit Mendel’s expected ratios between dominant and recessive traits 
w as only seven in one hundred thousand, Fisher calculated. Present day thinking is 
along the lines that Mendel may have neglected observations that would have made
his findings less clear-cut. Mendel’s note-books, which might have provided
/
evidence to support or refute these suggestions, were burned after his death. The 
example, nevertheless, remains a classic warning of the perils of data selection (or 
data fudging as it is som etim es described), irrespective of how significant a discovery 
might be for the development o f a theory or technology. Researchers and consumers 
of research alike need to remember that every “p roo f and every “truth" of science is 
brought to us by human beings who are far from infallible. New technology increases 
the s cop e  for alteration, for example, by digital manipulation of images. Though the 
efficient conduct of science, and m aybe of all investigative enterprises, depends on 
trust between researchers, scrutiny processes must be capable of detecting, 
reporting and resolving research misconduct.
Experimental anomalies (referred to in the paragraph above) are often the things that 
expose the shortcomings o f contemporary thinking yet, instead of being greeted with 
delight by the scientific community, the things that don’t make sense are often the
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downfall of any scientists who em brace them. The history of science is strewn with 
examples, from the seventeenth century Danish astronomer Ole Roem er w hose 
suggestion and demonstration that light d oes  not travel infinitely fast, w as dismissed, 
to Alfred W egener who proposed the idea of plate tectonics in 1915 only to have a 
symposium organised to discredit his idea. Little use seem s to be m ade of hindsight 
in this respect.
The relation between theory and practice differs in experience from the somewhat 
manicured accounts in textbooks on how to do research, and the situations 
presented in the field. Experience also brings to life phrases such as, ‘the value 
laden nature of facts’, and the concept that, the ‘sam e sets of facts can support more 
than one theory’ .
6. PRACTICAL MATTERS
a) Choosing Topics
Choosing topics suitable for the research w as done after identifying criteria to use in 
the field work: firstly, the topic would be part of the content of the course being 
studied by the participant. Secondly, the majority of participants could be expected 
to have an elementary knowledge of the topic -  ‘something to build on ’ . Thirdly, 
development of basic knowledge to the level required by the course could be covered 
within a  one hour teaching session. Fourthly, som e undisputed 'facts’ and 
terminology would be included.
Although these criteria may appear restrictive, a variety of topics suitable for the 
purpose was drawn up. An example illustrating the difference between basic 
understanding and extended knowledge is given in Appendix 2.
Novak (1998 p. 227 in his Appendix 1) gives suggestions on how to make ‘good 
concept maps’, and claims that young children learn quickly how to construct these, 
whereas secondary school or university students often have difficulty, partly, he
suggests, as a result of years of habit with rote learning. This may (or may not) be 
the only reason; I can se e  that introducing concept maps as an aid to achieving 
meaningful learning at a stage when a learner’s study pattern has already been 
established, may encounter som e resistance. Although the principal application of 
my proposed use of concept maps is to be indicative of a type of learning rather than 
to be a tool to promote learning, I recognized from both Novak and Kinchin (2000a) 
who used concept maps to promote meaningful learning, that adequate time for 
training in the construction of these was going to be necessary. Learners needed 
time to refine the (new to them) format for presenting information. Classroom 
experience has shown that adults are inclined to be more ‘risk averse’ than children; 
this technique could be viewed as ‘new’ and, therefore ‘risky’ . Pre-instructionai maps 
were drawn following presentation of material kindly supplied by the University of 
Surrey; these are included as Appendix 6. These maps have a pronounced and 
obvious hierarchical structure, and a ‘net’ structure (as opposed to a ‘wheel’ 
structure). Emphasis w as laid on the benefits to the students, since they were 
investing som e of their time and energy in the investigation.
b) Interviews
interviews took place, at times convenient to the participants, in my office at the 
college - a room known to them, and where there is a good chance of not being 
disturbed. Each interview lasted a maximum o f twenty minutes and, with the prior 
agreement of interviewees, the event was recorded. Anonymity and confidentiality 
were assured concerning the identity of each interviewee and their contribution.
c) Time Frame
Concerning the time-frame for the field work, a requirement of the method to be used 
is that it has to be quick to administer and simple to explain to the participants. But it 
must be rich in content if it is to yield useful insights. The time frame for each group
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must necessarily be tightly structured, because the programme for the courses 
m oves quickly through the topics it contains. An example is given in Appendix 4.
Som e uncertainty has to be acknowledged, and this arises from the work o f Vygotsky 
(1978), though his work was carried out with children. Vygotsky w as trying to 
discover how the developmental process related to learning capabilities, and found 
that he needed to determine both achievement (actual developmental level) and 
potential (his so-called zone of proximal development). He found (Vygotsky 1978 p.
90) that in children developmental p rocesses do not coincide with learning 
processes, since the former lags behind the latter. The time lag - if it exists in adults 
as well -  may mean that conclusions reached within the proposed time frame may be 
applicable only to the point at which measurements are made (i.e. the second  
concept map), and not be either a guide to, or predictor of, eventual achievement.
An obvious follow-up here is to repeat the concept map drawing exercise after, say, 
one month or three months. I did try this in the pilot study and found that, because 
the curriculum had moved on to quite different topics, som e ‘revision’, or reminder, of 
the original topic was needed. I could not be sure that I was not channelling their 
thinking in a particular direction, and considered the process to be too unreliable to 
repeat. It is possible that certain topics, or courses, where knowledge is regularly 
reinforced would provide opportunity to explore this.
d) Discussion of som e practical issues concerning my empirical research:
Earlier parts of this chapter have addressed issues relating to the methods of inquiry by 
considering them in a broad context. Som e discussion focusing specifically on the 
empirical work I did is now appropriate.
Firstly, concerning data production, and for the needs of this research project I was 
fortunately placed with regard to sources of volunteers to be participants. Though 
recruited and engaged as a lecturer in chemistry, I soon  found my services demanded
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across several departments for specialist inputs to courses which were not primarily 
science based but which contained mandatory modules in science. Thus it w as I cam e 
to teach cosm etic science to make-up artists (HND Media Make-up), physical sciences to 
trainee beauty therapists (BTEC level 3 Beauty Therapy), and textile technology to art 
and design students (BA Design (textiles)); this being in addition to courses with a more 
obvious science link, such as pharmacy technician training, GCE A-ievel, and A ccess  to 
Higher education courses.
T hese courses provided me with a source of participants rich in their variety of 
experience in learning science and their attitude to it, and in the level of teaching -  
though this did not em erge in the analysis because timetable constraints arising from the 
modular structure of the courses dictated the times for carrying out the field work and it 
happened to coincide with the early stages of each module being used. It was my 
original intention and plan to have parallel field work carried out in another, and similar, 
college by a former colleague who w as interested in the project. However, an unplanned 
career m ove intervened and the opportunity to expand the scop e  of my research with a 
second college and a second teacher was lost. On the positive side, I was able to 
proceed with 28 participants from 4 different courses at 3 different levels, and this 
generated plenty of data.
Secondly, concerning the ‘Descriptions of Learning’ questionnaire, all 28 of those who 
had agreed to participate in this study, completed the questionnaire. A copy of the 
questionnaire completed by Heidi is included in Appendix 1 page 224. The reasons for 
including the questionnaire are, firstly to try to determine whether there is a link between 
the conception of learning as viewed by the learner, and the type o f learning that the 
concept map indicates is taking place (subsidiary research question 2a, page 109, and 
secondly, the questionnaire is able to contribute to the reliability of the study by forming 
part of a triangulation strategy (see  below and page 149). Answers given in the 
questionnaire were confirmed at interview. The contribution m ade by the questionnaire is 
best seen  in the ‘Discussion o f Outcom es’ chapter (Chapter7), for example, with Heidi,
141
Thirdly, concerning the interviews, these were always intended to be both supportive of 
and additional to the concept map which is the prime indicator of the type o f learning 
taking place. The interview serves to sit alongside the concept map, either in 
confirmation of what is indicated, or, perhaps to provide an alternative insight, and to 
discover whether the learner is aware of any change in conception of learning is taking 
place, or has taken place. The interview also provides opportunity for a short tutorial -  
where necessary -  to clarify understanding of the topics that have been taught. To 
illustrate just how the interview informs the analysis of the concept maps, a transcript of 
the interview with Heidi is included in Appendix 3 (page 226). W hen this is read in 
conjunction with pages 154-157 and pages 178-180, the evidence based nature o f both 
the analysis of those aspects o f the nature o f learning that are being investigated in this 
project, and of the conclusions, becom e clear.
Fourthly, concerning selection from the total number of participants o f those for detailed 
analysis and inclusion in the thesis. Two students were not present for part of the training 
session in concept map drawing and were unable to complete concept map, though they 
did complete the questionnaire; their contributions were, therefore, not available for 
selection. Thus, 28 learners completed the Description of Learning questionnaire, 26 
completed one or more concept maps, and 28 learners participated in interviews.
The problems relating to the need to weigh width against depth when sampling from any 
population have been explored, albeit briefly, on page 145. Selection from the 26 eligible 
respondents could have been achieved in any number of ways, but som e obvious 
examples include:
1. random, for example every rR name from a list created according to som e schema, 
such as alphabetical by surname,
2. selective on the basis o f age  or gender, or course being studied, to give examples of 
each category,
on page 179.
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3. scientific correctness of concept map,
However, as explained on page 1 5 3 ,1 opted to select examples for inclusion which 
would ‘illuminate particular characteristics of the respondents’ , for example, disposition 
to learning as shown by Heidi and Jonathan. Of course, all the perils of data selection 
loom here and I hope I have not neglected observations that would have provided a 
different insight into the learning process.
Finally, a word about the triangulation process. While as originally conceptualised (by 
W ebb et al (1966)), it w as associated principally with a quantitative research strategy, 
increasingly, triangulation refers to a process o f cross-checking findings derived from 
any research strategy. In my study, this cross-checking opportunity between the 
conception of learning as viewed by the learner and as portrayed in their concept maps 
can give potentially useful information about the presence or absence  of any link 
between these two. The interview affords a further opportunity to clarify or confirm the 
learner’s views about the existence or absence of such a link. Thus, in the analysis of 
Heidi’s concept maps which indicate quite clearly that she learns by rote, reference is 
m ade (page 179) to the evidence from the questionnaire she completed, also to the 
com m ents in the interview (page 157 and Appendix 3 line 32). This cross-checking is 
an important feature of any study and I believe it adds credibility to the conclusions that 
were reached.
7. DATA ANALYSIS
While research methods generally adopt a linear model (theory, hypothesis, 
operationalisation, sampling, collecting data, interpreting data, validation), the central 
feature of grounded theory methods is circularity of the processual parts. This 
circularity is, it is argued (Flick 2002), is on e  of the strengths o f the approach, 
because it forces the researcher to, “permanently reflect on the whole research 
p rocess” (Flick 2002 p 43). This reflection, which arises from the close  link between 
collecting and interpreting data on the one hand, and the selection o f empirical
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material on the other, is not facilitated by the traditional linear method of proceeding. 
The circular interlinking o f empirical steps, as suggested by Glaser & Strauss (1967), 
is considered by Flick (2002 p 45) to do justice to qualitative research.
It is neither appropriate nor necessary to include here a history of the development of 
grounded theory methods, it is, nevertheless, important to define and describe the 
method that is to legitimise this research. Glaser and Strauss’ (1967) articulation of 
their research strategies was a timely challenge, in social science history, to the 
predominance of the quantitative research paradigm in the social sciences. 
Qualitative methods were viewed as lacking in rigour, and assumed to be capable of 
producing only descriptive case  studies, rather than theory development (Charmaz 
1995). Glaser and Strauss (1967) not only provided a persuasive intellectual 
rationale for conducting qualitative research, they also gave detailed guidelines both 
for research strategies and for analytical procedures. Grounded theory methods 
comprise systematic inductive guidelines for collecting and analysing data to build 
theoretical frameworks that explain the collected data (Charmaz 2000 p 509). Yet 
grounded theory Is impossible to position in relation to other methods, because the 
strategies it offers are flexible and not rigid prescriptions. Thus, it can com e close to 
traditional positivism (with its assumptions of an objective, external reality and 
objectivist rendering o f data discovered by a neutral observer), or it can lean in the 
direction o f post-positivism, by giving voice to respondents, in what Charmaz (2000 
p 509-535) terms constructivist grounded theory.
Som e relevant aspects of grounded theory techniques are given below:
Concerning data.
Data means, literally, things that are given, i.e. there, waiting to be found; it assum es 
a positivist view of the world. But, if knowledge is created and constructed -  as is 
believed by the author of this thesis, then data are not given, but produced.
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Therefore, a different word is needed, which stresses how knowledge is a product, 
and not a given. Every research method is really a means of producing, not 
collecting data, for none of them simply records ‘the facts’ or ’the truth’ as an external 
object. What distinguishes both social and natural science from com m on sense, and 
from ideology, is method. The evidence and how it was collected and treated must 
be m ade available to others, as is being done in this chapter. It also needs to be 
remembered that grounded theory methods specify analytic strategies, not data 
collection methods. Charmaz (2000 p 514), referring to Creswell (1997), points out 
that these methods have becom e associated with limited interview studies -  as if 
limiting grounded theory methods to interviews and limiting the number o f interviews, 
are both acceptable practices. Researchers can, in fact, use grounded theory 
techniques with varied forms of data production.
Glaser’s comparative approach and emphasis on process afford useful strategies for 
the making of data analysis to be efficient and productive, but without formulaic 
techniques. He (Glaser 1992) does, though, warn every qualitative researcher about 
forcing data into preconceived categories through the imposition of artificial 
questions. However, data producing often dem ands that questions are asked and 
hunches followed, though what respondents talk about may not be as important as 
what they assum e or do not apprehend. Charmaz (2000 p 514) sums up the 
situation succinctly by saying, “an acontextual reliance on respondents’ overt 
concerns can lead to narrow research problems, limited data and trivial analyses.”
A further problem can arise if the data are treated as though they have objective 
status, for example - “the data do not lie” (Strauss & Corbin 1998 p 85). But data are 
reconstructions, whether from interview accounts or from stories reflecting 
experience, such as that contained in personal diaries, private journals, reports etc. 
Data for this study are drawn from three sources: a questionnaire, an interview and 
from concept maps drawn by the respondents. These multiple sources are intended
to maximise richness and allow triangulation to occur, with a hoped for increase in 
validity.
Coding and categorising data.
Data is coded  as it is collected, the cod es  them selves being created as the data are 
studied. The aim of coding is to give a new perspective on the material, through 
defining and categorising it. Generating cod es  facilitates in the making of 
comparisons, which is a major technique in grounded theory methods. In this study, 
data com parisons are made between different individuals, and, also, com parisons 
are made between the data obtained by different methods from the sam e individuals. 
The categories for explaining the data arise from the codes -and each category may 
subsum e several codes. In turn, the categories shape the developing analytic 
frameworks.
Memo writing.
This is an intermediate step between coding and the first draft of the completed 
analysis. It allows the cod es  to be explored and expanded so  that they take on 
substance and structure. The aim of the m em os is to help the researcher se e  
interrelated processes rather than static, isolated topics. I have found them useful for 
noting down emerging trends and tentative suggestions.
Theoretical sampling.
This technique of returning to examine and, or, produce more data in order to fill 
conceptual gaps revealed as the categories are refined and developed, is considered 
a defining property of grounded theory methods. It has the aim of refining ideas and 
not simply increasing the size of the original sample. It is the mechanism by which a 
theory develops and becom es formalised. The process is repeated until ‘saturation’ - 
new data fit into the categories already devised, when the m em os can be expanded 
and rewritten in more analytic form. W here it is not possible to return to collect new
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additional data, the study may be informed by examination of an alternative source; 
the approach being used in this study, where three sources of data are used -  
questionnaire, concept map and interview. An example from my study can be seen  in 
Chapter 7 (Theme 2, issue No. 3) where progressive focusing on participants during 
interviews revealed the existence o f an informal network of co-operation between 
them which was previously unsuspected. This kind o f revelation of what could be 
new lines of enquiry is illustrative of one of the advantages of qualitative research 
over quantitative methods.
The nature of the method and its limitations, have not been without critical challenge. 
Richardson (1994), for example, identified selectivity in choosing evidence and 
the adoption of value-laden metaphors, as particular w eaknesses. More fundamental 
criticism com es from both Conrad and Riessman (in Charmaz 2000 p 521), who 
suggest that the process of ‘fracturing the data1 (by creating cod es  and categories as 
them es defined within the data) in grounded theory methods might limit 
understanding, because the aim is for analysis, rather than the “portrayal of subjects’ 
experience in its fullness” (Charmaz 2000 p 521). Yet Glaser and Strauss (1967) 
proposed this strategy in order to create a way for the researcher to organise and 
interpret data.
The separation by Charmaz (1995) into positivist (objectivist) and phenomenological 
(constructivist) approaches affords a way of focusing on the implications o f the 
methodology chosen. Grounded theory studies typically lie between traditional 
research methodology and the more interpretive, contextually situated approach. 
Objectivist grounded theory accepts the positivistic assumption of an external world 
that can be described, analysed, explained, and predicted. It is based on the 
assumption that, following a systematic set of methods leads to the discovery of 
reality and to the fabrication o f a provisionally true, testable and, ultimately verifiable,
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“theory” of it (Charmaz 2000 p 524). The approach provides both understanding and 
prediction, but at the cost of seeing the methods as being a set of prescriptive rules. 
Terms and categories take centre stage, and the observer is distanced from the 
‘experience’ , rather than having their attention concentrated on it.
By contrast, constructivist grounded theory recognises that, “the viewer creates the 
data and ensuing analysis, through interaction with the viewed" (Charmaz 2000 p 
523). What a viewer sees , will shape what he or she will define, measure, and 
analyse, and is a part o f it rather than being separate from it. But although a 
constructivist grounded theory attempts to define conditional statements that interpret 
how subjects construct their realities, these statements do not approach som e level 
o f generalisable truth. However, by offering both explanation and understanding, 
with positivist assumptions at least partially reconciled to postmodernist critiques, 
qualitative traditions are being fostered through the study of experience.
The question of how to make a choice from these two approaches is not left to the 
whim of the researcher, but is resolved on the principle that the research method 
must serve the question, and not dictate what the question is, or what questions can 
be asked.
My principal research question (‘how do adults learning science respond to new 
information?’), which uses concept m aps as a prime indicator of type o f learning, 
lends itself towards an objectivist approach. The subsidiary investigation, o f a 
possible link between a conception o f learning as viewed by the learner, and the type 
of learning that actually takes place, utilises both objectivist and constructivist 
aspects of grounded theory methods. Lastly, the issue of whether learners can be 
helped to becom e meaningful learners by changing their conception o f learning, is 
one which it is appropriate to consider within the constructivist model.
Though the traditional literature contains relatively few  examples in which
methodological procedures are constructed that really integrate qualitative, and 
quantitative, strategies in one method, the two approaches are more often combined 
nowadays. In the sphere of analysing qualitative data, Kuckartz (1995) describes a 
procedure, in which dimensional analyses lead to definition of variables and values, 
which can be used for a classification and quantification, though this is not being 
attempted in this study. The whole area of validation through different 
m ethodologies, is explored in more detail in literature on triangulation (Flick 1992 and 
Flick 2002).
The limitations o f both Novak’s concept of learning as a process, and of Marton and 
Saljo’s (1984) approach to discover conceptions of learning by interview, have been 
referred to at the beginning of this chapter. My approach, in using Novak’s concept 
maps, plus interviews and a questionnaire, allows the use of an integration strategy 
as a means of searching for a unified explanation of how adults learning science 
respond to new information.
The concept of triangulation, as applied, for example, in GPS (Global Positioning 
System) technology, is not a package that is transferable into the social science 
arena. So, measuring the sam e phenom ena from different angles or positions, with 
the aim of getting an accurate reading or measurement, is problematic because it 
implies a view of the social world in which there is one, objective and knowable social 
reality. Thus, the ‘products’ o f different methods may not corroborate each other, 
because each may be illuminating different social or ontological phenomena (Mason 
2002 p 190). However, by integrating the three methods I am using (concept maps, 
questionnaire and interview), I believe the validity of the research to be enhanced. At 
the sam e time, it is sensible to note o f the cautionary views of McCormick and James 
(1983) that there is no guarantee that a number of data sources that supposedly 
provide evidence concerning the sam e construct will ever do so. Though complete
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consensus among data must be unlikely, if incongruent sets of data do em erge from 
the different instruments, they will either have to be accounted for in som e way, or 
used as the basis of a further hypothesis.
8. SUMMARY
In this chapter 1 have tried to show  how theory and practice inform and support each 
other in the preparation for, and execution of, a research study. It com m enced with a 
description and critique of concept maps -  the metacognitive tool, being the central 
instrument used. Som e contextual issues were explored, and an appreciation of the 
importance of quality matters is reflected in the more thorough treatment of those 
matters. A justification of the adopted methodology is linked to awareness of som e 
of the potential problems that accom pany the gathering and analysis of data. The 
next chapter covers both the presentation and the analysis of this data.
CHAPTER 6
RESULTS and ANALYSIS
1. INTRODUCTION
It is appropriate at this point to remember that the view of knowledge creation 
adopted in this thesis is that it em erges as a product of an interaction between 
people. Different interactions will give rise to different results; the results are thus 
created by the interactions, as opposed  to being discovered as already ‘out there’ . 
The Danish Nobel science Laureate, Niels Bohr, argued in his ‘Complementarity 
Principle’ , put forward in a lecture to the International Physical Congress held at 
C om o in September 1927, that the results of any study depended upon the 
interaction between inquirer and object, i.e. the findings of any study depend as 
much on the nature of the questions asked and on the order in which they were 
asked, as on any intrinsic properties of a “real” reality “out there”.
The principal question being asked in this study is, ‘how do adults learning science 
respond to new information?’ Twenty eight students spread over three different 
courses participated in the field work, further details being included in Chapter 5. 
The results are set out in the following pages, and data produced by a selection of 
those who participated in the study have been used, both to illustrate the process of 
the analysis, and the findings of this process. Each one illuminates a particular 
aspect of the learning process and/or, the analysis, and these points will be  the 
subjects of comments in their appropriate contexts. Collectively, these respondents 
support my contention that they are representative o f adults learning science.
2. RESULTS and ANALYSIS
All participants (each referred to by pseudonym s) were given basic training in the 
drawing of concept maps, plus a copy  o f the instruction notes (courtesy of University 
of Surrey) to be found in Appendix 6. It is recognised as inevitable that som e 
learners will not identify with this method of portraying knowledge, but each  was 
asked at interview if they experienced any particular difficulties with this method.
They were not shown examples of the different types of concept maps (spokes, nets 
and chains), but their training identified link quality as important, because cross links 
indicate integrated knowledge.
Regarding the content of the various lessons used in the study, examples of material 
used in teaching the basic understanding are included in Appendix 9.
The empirical material in this, and any sociological study, is determined substantially 
by decisions pertaining to the method of choosing the sample of participants, 
because sampling strategies describe ways o f disclosing a field. The need is to 
select a sample which will be rich in relevant information. The choice is between 
representing the field in its diversity - by using as many different ca ses  as 
possible in order to obtain evidence on the distribution of ways of learning, and 
permeating the field and its structure - by concentrating on a few examples. Thus, 
width must be weighed against depth, but the appropriateness of the sample chosen 
can be assessed  only with respect to the research question of the study. Concerning 
this study, I did not know what there w as to discover, and so  started with a small 
number of participants, recognising that the field may have to be widened if no 
pattern emerged. The ca se  study approach emerged as a promising strategy for 
analysis, and the six examples selected for presentation in this thesis, from a total o f 
twenty eight, were chosen for diversity within the group of participants available to 
me.
Concerning the reasons for choosing to present these particular exam ples as case
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studies, it is important, firstly, to dispel any ideas that I am relying on specific ca ses  
to support a theory. A trawl of all the evidence collected fails to show  any variation 
in the pattern of response to new information that could be identified as being due to 
age, gender, course being studied, educational background, or disposition to 
learning. I decided, therefore, to select examples for inclusion which would illuminate 
particular characteristics of the respondents, because such illumination would 
present an opportunity for differences to em erge in response to new information. 
Thus, Heidi and Jonathan were similarly aged students on the sam e course, but had 
rather different dispositions to learning -  the characteristic for comparison here. 
Nathaniel, not at all articulate, unless on anything to do with soccer, had caught my 
attention by his ability to transfer to the field of science, his understanding of the 
difficulties of correcting errors and, or, misunderstandings as they related to the 
‘beautiful gam e’. Much of what he knew had com e from his coach, and I was 
interested to see  how he responded to new information. Clare was typical of many of 
the adults who enrol at the college -  a single mother juggling many challenges, 
demands and worries, yet making time to satisfy a perceived intellectual need. I 
expected her to be accustom ed to ‘multitasking’ and to have developed efficiency in 
her learning; this might make for interesting comparison with those who had, on the 
face of it, less com plex dom estic environments. Sally with her unconventional 
upbringing, and absence of institutionalised education, might be expected to respond 
more uniquely to new knowledge, whilst Penny w as a much more academically 
experienced learner than the others; it would be interesting to se e  whether she 
exhibited responses to new information that could be identified with an intellect that 
had been subjected to more formal development.
I had plenty more data relating to other respondents, and was ready to pick up on 
any instances that suggested differences in response to new knowledge, but, as the 
thematic analysis given in Chapter 7 demonstrates, none of the characteristics
referred to above appears to influence the response of an adult to new information as 
presented in science courses. Further supporting data are included in Appendix 8.
1. HEIDI
Heidi is a twenty year old with GCSE in Science and other subjects, and is following 
a Pharmacy Technicians course at National Certificate level, on a day release 
schem e. She is conscientious, with a methodical approach to all she does, and 
enjoys her work as a technician In the laboratory of a large hospital in the W est 
Country. She lacks confidence and attributes this to having two brothers, who are 
older than she is, and who excelled in science at school. She said that, “without 
always being aware of it, they intimidated me and I lost confidence, so  science 
becam e difficult for m e”. After having received tuition and practice in writing concept 
maps, and following a two or three minute ‘brainstorming’ exercise, Heidi produced a 
concept map on acids:
Fig. 10 Heidi’s 1st Concept Map on Acids 
This map is useful only to show  that Heidi has picked up sufficient from the training 
to be able to transform a few  simple concepts into a map. The link words are 
adequate, and a hierarchical structure is present, with two layers included. The map 
identified a  base for Heidi, both in terms of her ability to draw a map, and in 
establishing her background knowledge of the topic. There followed about thirty 
minutes of teaching, mainly didactic, with a small amount of individual practical work
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to illustrate the concepts of indicators and neutralisation. Heidi then wrote a new 
concept map:
contain
can be replaced by 
metal to form
i
SALTS
T A"
"which can be shown by
UNIVERSAL
INDICATOR
Fig. 11 Heidi’s 2nd Concept Map on Acids -  based on initial teaching 
Heidi’s new map indicates an apparently secure grasp of the concepts covered in the 
teaching, and four levels have been included in the hierarchy of concepts. The lack 
o f any cross links suggests either, that the knowledge is held in linear structures, or 
that there is a lack o f confidence or expertise in concept map drawing. The map 
could have included several cross links if a slightly different arrangement had been 
adopted -  se e  Chapter 7 for an example.
One w eek later, the teaching session began with a five minute interactive 
recapitulation of the topic covered previously. S om e concepts were then extended 
after identification o f the limitations of explanations that had been given in the 
teaching of the previous week. Heidi then produced a revised concept map 
incorporating the extended knowledge:
Fig. 12 Heidi’s  3rd Concept Map on Acids -  incorporating extended knowledge 
The linear format continues and there is still an absence o f cross links, but the 
significant feature is the retention of the ‘old’ concept of acids containing hydrogen, 
alongside the introduction of the ‘new’ concept of acids being substances which 
contain an ex cess  o f hydroxonium ions. ‘Old’ and ‘new’ concepts appear to be held 
in parallel, and in a written end of unit test som e weeks later, Heidi showed she had 
in fact retained both ‘old’ and ‘new’ knowledge. It is appropriate here, at least to 
attempt to explain why I might expect ‘old’ knowledge to be dropped. In my 
experience, there is an expectation among teachers, and trainers, that they can so
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manage the learning of students that they will absorb those things required of them, 
and unlearn, or reject, other things. But, my expectation is not evidence based, it is, 
in fact, the opposite of this; because there is evidence (Piaget & Inhelder 1974, Pine 
& M essner 2000, Barker 2000a) that it is very difficult to unlearn knowledge -  this 
point is explored further in Chapter 7. Yet, the management of learning as it is 
imparted to those in training, makes the assumption that misconceptions and, or, 
errors etc. can be abandoned by learners.
At interview, Heidi said “rote learning is better for me”, whereas in discussion she had 
volunteered that learning “allows you to do something for yourself. She also said 
that she had gone through school relying on putting all her effort into memorising, 
rather than understanding, in order to learn, though she was fairly sure that she did 
“com e to understand lots o f things eventually”. When asked why she did not just 
forget the elementary ideas within a subject, when they cam e to be replaced by 
com plex explanations that allowed a more comprehensive understanding, she said: 
"I’m afraid to forget anything in ca se  I might need it again”, and, “I may understand it 
better than the more complicated explanation”.
As noted above, Heidi is, by nature, conscientious. She views all information given in 
a teaching situation as important, even precious. She appears to make no effort to 
discriminate between different p ieces of information, and seem s to regard it all as too 
valuable to ignore. She learns by rote because, for her, it is a tried and trusted 
method. Her experience is that her understanding develops over time, so  she shows 
no frustration at any initial non-understanding. Not surprisingly, physics -  where 
progress is linked more directly to the understanding of a few  principles -  w as a 
stumbling block for her at school. She dealt with this by avoiding the subject as far 
as possible (not impossible in combined science courses), and by “learning the 
descriptive bits really well”.
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Jonathan is a twenty four year old with G CSE ’s that include a Double Award in 
Science. He is in his first year of a National Certificate course for Pharmacy 
Technicians, and volunteers that he is intellectually lazy, although he harbours a 
belief that he could achieve anything he wanted. He has a casual attitude, and is 
careless over matters where precision, and being systematic matter. After a series of 
“unrewarding” jobs, his father had helped him to obtain his training post as a 
technician in a hospital laboratory situated on the South Coast of England. He 
seem s to resent the job because it was not something he was able to obtain unaided. 
Jonathan’s father is a professional scientist working locally; a responsible and 
respected public servant w hose achievements and standards Jonathan feels he is 
unable to match. His interests (music and pool) did not offer career prospects, and 
Jonathan said he felt “trapped”, although he had no specific yearnings: “I have all I 
need”.
Jonathan produced his first concept map after initial tuition and practice, plus a two to 
three minute ‘brainstorming’ exercise on the subject of ‘acids’ :
2. JONATHAN
using
LITMUS
Fig. 13 Jonathan’s 1st Concept Map on Acids 
This map, like the one drawn by Heidi, is essential only to show that Jonathan is 
capable of drawing such a map. There are no significant differences from the one 
which was produced by Heidi. After approximately thirty minutes teaching, with som e 
practical work to introduce the concepts of indicators and neutralisation, Jonathan 
wrote a new concept map:
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Fig. 14 Jonathan’s 2nd Concept Map on Acids -  based on initial teaching
Jonathan’s  map is dominated by linear structures and uses simple link words. Cross 
linking is absent but, as with Heidi, there was scop e  for it to have featured (see  
Chapter 7 for an example).
Jonathan’s  map, revised to incorporate extended knowledge, after further teaching 
one week later looked like this:
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Fig. 15 Jonathan’s 3rd Concept Map on Acids -  incorporating extended knowledge
The significant feature of this map o f Jonathan’s is the inclusion of both ‘old’ and 
‘new’ concepts in parallel linear structures. A cross link reinforces the intention to 
integrate new with old, and the link words suggest the concepts are understood -  
though not yet to the point of replacing the ‘old’ concepts by the ‘new’ ones.
In interview, Jonathan said he disliked the effort it needed to memorise, and 
preferred to understand things. When challenged that his maps suggested that he 
used memory more than he was acknowledging, he suggested that he “memorised 
what he understood”. He thought it was a  "bit o f a lottery” as to what w as retained 
and what was discarded.
Jonathan’s disposition to learning is complicated by his attitude to both his job and 
his father. Though he suggests his preference for understanding is simply because it 
involves less effort than memorising, I think it may be related to a natural curiosity - 1 
had observed that he liked to understand things. Jonathan’s suggestion that he
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memorised what he understood is a typical remark -  he enjoys defending his 
position, and often com es up with interesting ideas.
3. NATHANIEL
Nathaniel is a nineteen year old, with a Double Award in Science at GCSE level. His 
interests centre around sport, and he hopes to train in physiotherapy, having lost a 
place through injury in a W est Country professional football team. He is intelligent 
and willing, but has a short attention span and poorly developed communication 
skills, though he can think creatively. Around half way through his A ccess  to Higher 
Education course, he w as observed by a ‘head-hunter* from a football team in the 
United States while playing in the local league. He was offered a place in a football 
team in the United States which was linked to a place on a course at the nearby 
university. And so, Nathaniel went on his way.
Whilst still a member o f the A ccess  Course, Nathaniel drew this map after class 
discussion on the topic; the subject matter was, ‘Chemical Bonding and Related 
Properties’ :
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ATOMS
T
join with each 
other forming
Fig. 16 Nathaniel’s 1st Concept Map on Chemical Bonding and Related Properties
This is another map dominated by linear structures with an absence o f cross links. 
An important factual error is revealed at the bottom of the chain on the far left-hand 
side -  covalent bonds are not weak, and low melting points are due to weak forces 
holding small molecules together, although this is not relevant to this study.
After teaching, Nathaniel redrew the map to include the new knowledge:
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Fig. 17 Nathaniel’s  2nd Concept Map on Chemical Bonding and Related Properties
- incorporating extended knowledge
Nathaniel’s map after ‘new’ material had been taught appears quite comprehensive 
at first glance but, a) it is still com posed  of linear patterns with no cross linking, b) the 
factual error persists, and c) the new knowledge, which was taught as extending the 
covalent bond concept, has been separated out and presented in parallel in the first 
vertical column on the left-hand side o f the diagram. A further misconception has 
been generated as a result of this - that the three forces not previously mentioned are 
nothing to do with covalent bonds.
In interview, Nathaniel said that at school he had always relied on “thinking on my 
feet” (an interesting use of language for a footballer), whereas now he attaches more
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importance to understanding the theoretical content of a lesson, rather than to a 
spontaneous response; but he did volunteer that his old habit is still “there to help m e 
out”. On being asked about discarding old and irrelevant knowledge, Nathaniel said 
that this w as difficult for skills as well as for knowledge, because, “on ce  it’s there you 
can ’t get rid o f it”.
O nce he had m ade the connection between learning science and learning football, 
Nathaniel becam e much more animated in the interview. He had learned from 
previous experience that learning a flawed method in a technique or manoeuvre 
cau ses problems, because of the difficulty involved in correcting the error. In his 
world o f rapid responses to fast changing situations, Nathaniel said that it “didn’t 
matter whether the knowledge w as understood or held in memory, just the speed and 
accuracy of the response”. I reminded him that learning something, and the 
application o f that learning, are not the sam e thing, although application is an aspect 
o f learning. Nathaniel is versatile and d oes  seem  able to utilise both the techniques 
of rote and meaningful learning.
4. CLARE
Clare is a twenty seven year old, with a G CSE in Science, who has endured a menial 
but convenient job while her children were young. Taking advantage o f more 
freedom  to attend to her own development, she joined the A ccess  to Higher 
Education class, in order to “s e e  where my interests and abilities are, or are not”.
She showed som e initial talent and enthusiasm for chemical analysis, until an 
occasion  when she becam e very tearful during a practical class. She w as holding a 
test-tube containing a colourless liquid and repeating the words, "I can ’t s e e  anything 
there”. I did wonder if the process of analysis had becom e a vehicle for her to peer 
into her life, a life which she had deconstructed in similar fashion to the chemical 
substance. She completed the course and is now reading Applied Biology at 
university.
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After recall discussion in class, and training in concept map writing, Clare drew this 
map, which relates to the structure of matter:
made of
containing
Fig. 18 Clare’s 1st Concept Map on the Structure of Matter 
There are som e errors in this map which is formed of linear patterns and lacks cross 
links. The errors are that, on the left-hand side the pure substances need not be
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elements, and on the right-hand side the concept ‘com pounds’ appears twice. 
Following teaching to extend knowledge on atomic structure, Clare drew this map:
Fig. 19 Clare’s 2nd Concept Map on the Structure of Matter -  incorporating
extended knowledge
Here, the link between elements and nucleus and electrons is confusing, and almost 
certainly covers a misconception. W hen I asked Clare at interview to tell me what 
she knew about the structure o f matter, her confusion regarding atoms and elements 
becam e apparent. I gave her a short tutorial on the topic, and then asked her to 
draw a concept map to illustrate her understanding as a result o f this additional 
instruction. She changed only the link words, leaving the hierarchical order 
unchanged. It was not a new map which may have indicated how very difficult it is to
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change understanding. The map is dominated by linear structures and, while Clare 
has made som e attempt to incorporate the ‘new’ knowledge, clarity is lacking in 
respect of the principle that governs the filling o f shells. Thus, the ‘2 or 8’ box, 
referring to the number of electrons in orbits, has been retained, with an extension 
added to cover the larger atoms in which there are more than sixteen electrons.
Here, existing knowledge has been added to and not replaced. Clare said she would 
like to learn meaningfully, but has always had difficulty in “retaining her 
understanding”. She thinks she understands something in class but, “when I get 
hom e it’s gon e”. S o  she has to resort to memorising, regardless of whether or not 
she understands the material. Clare is hoping to make som e progress towards more 
meaningful learning in this course. Initially, she says, forgetting is very easy  for her 
but, on reflection she admits, the knowledge is “in there somewhere".
Clare views understanding as something that has to be memorised, hence her 
reference to “retaining understanding”. She says she has never thought about the 
process of learning until now, and she would quite like to learn how to learn. Arising 
from a hierarchical view that meaningful learning is ‘better* than rote learning, she 
places herself on the bottom rung of the learning ladder. Slowness with knowledge 
retrieval, and a fragile self-confidence, seem  to be factors that are a hindrance to any 
progress beyond rote learning for her at the moment.
5. SALLY
Sally had spent most of her thirty four years living with her parents on a motor sailing 
boat in various parts of the Mediterranean. Her parents had bought the boat from the 
proceeds o f the sale o f their hom e and possessions when Sally was a very young 
child, and it had provided the m eans to an alternative lifestyle. Sally had been 
educated by her parents who generated incom e by casual work in boatyards and 
cafes. Sally described her parents as being very attentive to her academ ic
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development; she was certainly outwardly self-confident (especially in languages) 
with an unusually broad perspective on life. She had enrolled on an A ccess  to 
Higher Education course with a view to obtaining a qualification with international 
recognition (in nursing), and then to return to life on the boat.
Although Sally said she had received encouragem ent from her parents for her plans, 
she w as troubled by the possible consequences o f “daring to contemplate being 
different from them”. She recognised that she could succeed in academ ic work, but 
that su ccess  could lead her away from her parents for ever; whereas failure, which 
almost seem ed to beckon her as she becam e increasingly anxious about the 
dilemma, would return her to the life she knew, and in which she had been very 
happy. Sally may, or may not, have resolved her problem but, however, she did 
continue with the course, and was offered nurse training at the hospital of her choice.
Sally described herself as a meaningful learner but, because she had no previous 
experience of theoretical chemistry, it was not possible for her to draw an initial map. 
After teaching, the map she drew show s clear understanding and is without factual 
errors. She demonstrates com petence in the procedures of concept map drawing 
and uses a variety of link words. Her map has been included because it show s that 
the knowledge I have described as ‘further knowledge’ can be incorporated into a 
concept map without having to include the ‘earlier knowledge’ in it. For Sally, this 
w as all “new knowledge”. Sally defended the memorising of routines as being 
essential in boat craft, “when the weather’s bad and, or, you are very, very tired”.
She also said that she “kept alive” knowledge which had “once worked”, and 
continued to do this unless, or until, something failed repeatedly to be of use. Then it 
would com e to mind as a "route not to go  down”, although, she claimed, the 
knowledge would still be retained. Sally illustrated her point with exam ples from boat 
craft. This is the map that Sally drew:
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Fig. 20 Sally’s  Concept Map on the Structure of Matter
6. PENNY
Penny had, at twenty two years o f age, withdrawn from a mathematics degree course 
in a college of a prestigious university at the end o f her second year, having had 
every prospect of achieving a high classification in the honours stage. Her 
withdrawal had been against the advice of parents and tutors but at the request of 
her boyfriend, who convinced her that she w as “losing her femininity” by living in the
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“man’s  world of maths”. Penny had, accordingly, enrolled on a HND Media Make-up 
course for which she showed, what I thought to be, an exaggerated enthusiasm. She 
had related these details to me by way of explaining her attitude to the module that I 
delivered: "science is a bit c lose  to hom e for m e”. She seem ed indifferent to the 
practical side of the course but w as unable to avoid pouncing on any intellectual 
challenge (see  comment at end o f next paragraph).
In the Descriptions o f Learning Questionnaire, Penny described herself as embracing 
every type of learning which w as identified in the list. When I raised this in interview, 
she said she had “never had any problems with learning”, was lucky to have accurate 
recall and the ability to understand things without difficulty. Her concept maps tend 
to confirm this, and it is interesting to note that new learning has been bolted on to 
existing learning and has not replaced it. Penny’s only comment about this was to 
say, "well, the knowledge w as there so  I put it down”. It is worth noting that Penny 
included the mathematical formula in one of her concept map boxes -  students had 
been given this information by way of explaining the principle, but told it w as not 
essential understanding at this level.
Penny’s first map drawn after recall stimulus is within the subject matter ‘Atomic 
Structure’ :
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Fig. 21 Penny’s 1st Concept Map on the Structure of Matter 
Penny’s first map uses a variety o f appropriate link words, but it d oes  not 
contain all the information given, e.g. no mention of the electrical charge o f the 
electron (negative), or of its m ass relative to the mass of the proton and neutron. 
However, it d oes  demonstrate com petence in the drawing of a concept map, and 
adequate understanding o f the subject matter at the stage before new knowledge 
was introduced.
Penny modified her map after new teaching which included reference to the Periodic 
Table, transition elements and the formula 2n2 for calculation o f the maximum, 
number of electrons which can occupy a shell.
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Fig. 22 Penny’s 2nd Concept Map on the Structure o f Matter 
- incorporating extended knowledge
The foregoing results are all concerned with the responses of adults to new 
information in science as this is revealed through concept maps. My study also asked 
each participant to com plete a ‘Descriptions of Learning Questionnaire’ (a copy of 
which is included in Appendix 1) in which each participant could indicate with which 
conception(s) of learning (Marton 1988) they most clearly identified.
173
Of the six conceptions, the first three, i) increasing on e ’s knowledge, ii) memorising 
and reproducing knowledge, and iii) applying knowledge, carry no notion of meaning 
in them selves and are each identified with rote learning. The other three, iv) 
understanding, v) seeing something in a different way, and vi) changing as a person 
through learning, are each identified with meaningful learning.
The results are suited to coding, and so  the letter ‘R’ is used to refer to the first three 
conceptions and the letter ‘M’ to the secon d  three. The questionnaire revealed that 
the participants indicated them selves as corresponding to: Heidi -  R, Jonathan -  M, 
Nathaniel - R & M, Clare -  R, Sally -  M, Penny - R & M.
My intention had been to use a similar system of coding in order to consider the type 
of learning indicated by concept maps and drawn by the sam e respondents. This 
would test the link between the conception of learning as seen by the participant, and 
that which the concept map show s to be actually taking place. However, as will be 
discussed in the next chapter, all respondents would be classified as rote learners 
due to the absence of cross links in the concept maps, and so the intention could not 
be carried out.
3. SUMMARY
In summary it can be stated, regardless of all other factors, for example, disposition 
to learning, background in science, age, gender or type of course, that the foregoing 
data have demonstrated that new information does not immediately supplant or 
replace existing information, but is accepted alongside the latter. Also, that the new 
information may not be integrated initially with prior knowledge, and that 
m isconceptions are not easily shed.
A full discussion o f the findings follows in Chapter 7.
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CHAPTER 7
DISCUSSION OF OUTCOMES 
&
CRITIQUE OF THE WORK
1. INTRODUCTION
While the ca se  study style of presentation was used for setting out the results, a 
thematic style will be adopted for this discussion. Three themes are identified,
1) learning science, 2) adults learning, and 3) conceptual change. Each of them will 
be examined, firstly by a brief summary o f what is known and accepted about them, 
secondly by considering the evidence from my research, and thirdly by critically 
reflecting on how that evidence relates to the literature on the subject.
The model used for interpretation of the findings is Ausubel’s  theory o f cognitive 
learning (Ausubel 1968), which is explained more fully in Chapter 4. This describes 
learning in terms of a process in which new information is related to an existing 
relevant aspect of an individual’s knowledge structure, and support for this theory is 
widespread in the field of education. Munn’s  study (Munn et al 1992 p11), relating to 
mature students on science, mathematics and engineering courses, is an example of 
this support Her report states that, “adults .... like to relate material to that which 
they already know”.
The critique aspect of this chapter will consider both the strengths and w eaknesses 
o f the research project, while the summary will focus on the significance of the 
findings, and enable a link to be made with the conclusions that are drawn in the final 
chapter.
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2. D ISCUSSION and CRITIQUE
Them e 1: Learning Science 
Accepted understanding
When considering what is known about learning science, it is important to make clear 
that the learning of science is not being com pared with learning other disciplines 
(though one might expect som e relation to other disciplines), nor is it appropriate to 
examine or defend the commonly held assumption that scientific rationalism is 
preferable to alternative traditions. It is worth noting, however, that science offers a 
distinctive way of acquiring knowledge by the methods it uses for getting results. 
Many would argue that these results testify to the excellence of the method, but this 
debate also occupies territory outside the scop e  of this thesis. Instead o f learning 
based on tradition, science offers knowledge based on experience, though to what 
extent science could, or should, becom e the foundation of our culture is also not 
under consideration in these pages.
Many of the factors relating to learning per se, apply equally to learning science, an 
example being that of the crucial role of existing knowledge in assimilating and 
describing new findings (Munn et al 1992 p12). The provisional and uncertain status 
of scientific knowledge is, however, not com m on to all types of knowledge, nor is the 
practice of encouraging learners to accept the knowledge of the time, without there 
being any attempts to justify or validate it.
A contribution which is pertinent to our knowledge o f the learning of science was 
made by Stavy (1990) w hose findings included that the reasoning which takes place 
when a substance being scrutinised remains visible, is different from the reasoning 
which occurs when the substance is invisible (whether with magnification or not). 
Perkins et al (1993) identified two problems faced by learners o f science: 1) they 
must possess the com petence to reason critically, 2) they must be able to dislodge
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their existing beliefs from evidence presented in the problems; the difficulties of doing 
this were referred to in Chapter 4.
It should be pointed out here that, although the m ethods of recording and comparing 
knowledge that the participants have learned by questionnaire, concept map and 
interview are behavioural, nevertheless, som e o f what was learned is an example of 
cognitive learning. However, it has to be acknowledged that, because students of 
science below higher education level are learning to conform to the accepted position 
in terms o f scientific knowledge, much of the teaching is behaviourist in nature. It 
may be rapidly changing knowledge, but, mostly at this level, it is taught as if it were 
unchanging fact -  so  the learners default to conformist positions; whereas, students 
of science at higher education level would be expected to p ossess more appreciation 
of the provisional nature of scientific knowledge.
Research evidence
i) Correlation between integrative reconciliation and meaningful learning. First on the 
list of indicators of expertise in concept maps (included in Chapter 5 and drawn from 
Kinchin et al 2000) is the characteristic of link quality. Experts are expected to 
produce highly integrated structures with numerous cross links, whereas novices 
tend to produce maps which are dominated by linear arrangements. The description 
‘expert’ would be at one end o f a continuum and might apply to a teacher, whilst the 
term ‘novice’ would be at the opposite end of the continuum and might apply to a 
learner with no experience o f the topic. The terms ‘expert’ and ’novice’ , ignore 
expertise in concept map construction, this being considered a constant factor 
among learners with no previous experience of concept maps. While this may be an 
acceptable assumption, it d oes  ignore any variation in aptitude with a new skill such 
as concept map construction -  this is a limitation in the design o f this study, and 
although som e may argue that the use of more participants in the study would show 
the extent o f this, there is no logical reason why sampling from a larger population
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should produce a ‘better1 picture. A total o f 28 adult learners participated in my study.
Novak (1998 p63-65) is unequivocal in his claim that, a consequence of meaningful 
learning is the appearance o f progressive differentiation and integrative reconciliation 
in concept maps. These feature as cross links, but Novak does not explore whether 
these links are necessary or sufficient conditions for meaningful learning. Certainly, 
they are absent in nearly all of the concept maps drawn by my students, yet they had 
been told during concept map training that, the ability to recognise opportunities for 
inserting cross links into their concept maps represented a desirable level of 
integration of their knowledge, and that they should aspire to this. Thus, taken on its 
own, Heidi’s second concept map, illustrated in Chapter 6, in which there is no 
attempt to insert cross links, might indicate that she was not confident in the use of 
concept maps, or it could indicate that her knowledge was not integrated and was 
held in isolated linear compartments. There were opportunities for adding cross-links 
into this map, as my re-drawing of her map, below, illustrates.
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Fig. 23 A redrawing of Heidi’s 2nd Concept Map (Fig. 11) showing addition
of some cross-links
Taken with her declared (at interview) faith in rote learning, her second map is 
valuable evidence that her knowledge is held in compartments, and that she does, 
indeed, learn by rote. This is supported yet further by the questionnaire, in which 
Heidi indicated that she chose to learn by rote. Heidi had, during schooling, worked 
out strategies for coping which were based on memory, being confident that 
understanding would quietly take its place at some later stage. Her habit is to retain 
what has been learned, and to use problem solving as a means of honing 
discrimination: “if the rules I think of first don’t work, then I try what comes next”. Set 
against this background, Heidi’s concept maps appear to be a clear illustration of her 
methods of learning. She sees no need to change her strategies, indeed the risk 
associated with such change has little to commend it -  why should she exchange
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something that has “always worked so far”, for something unknown?
Jonathan had declared himself a meaningful learner in the questionnaire, yet the 
second of his concept maps (illustrated in Chapter 6) is dominated by linear 
structures and includes simple link words. Cross links are absent in his second map, 
although he did include one in his third map - the map which incorporated his 
extended knowledge, and the link words used in the third map do suggest the 
concepts are understood.
Jonathan is on the same course as Heidi and is of a similar age, although very 
different in his outlook and attitudes. He is casual, whereas Heidi is conscientious; 
he appears not to value his job, whilst Heidi considers the setting of her work in a 
hospital, with its career prospects (modest) and status (also modest), as a major part 
of her identity. Heidi stands by rote learning, whereas Jonathan claims he can only 
learn in a meaningful way, but his claim does not appear to be reflected in his 
concept map. Those who declare themselves to be rote learners in the questionnaire 
and in the interview, produce concept maps that use simple link words and have no 
integrative reconciliation. The declared meaningful learners, on the other hand, were 
unable to substantiate their claims in their concept maps - which indicated that, either 
they had learned by rote, or, possibly, they were novice concept map constructors. If 
the latter is the explanation, I would have expected to find that some were showing 
indications of ‘expert’ ability, but this was not the case.
A comment by Penny, who had drawn her concept maps very quickly, although she 
had no previous experience of using them other than the training I had conducted, 
was cause for reflection. When I raised the issue of cross links with her, pointing out 
that they were taken as indicators of integrated knowledge, and that she had not 
included any, she said: “Oh! I’ll do you a map with some cross links, if they’re
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important”. Although Penny had considerably more intellectual maturity than the 
average student passing through a college of Further Education (she had completed 
two years of a maths degree course), her comment was unsettling. It raises general 
issues about teacher expectation in terms of responses during assessment, and 
challenges the claim by Novak (1998 p 64) that integrative reconciliation is 
consequent on meaningful learning. Perhaps it is, but you still may have to ask for it 
to be demonstrated, which weakens the claim somewhat.
In summary, it seems that, though there couid be doubts about Novak’s claim that 
crosslinks are consequent on meaningful learning because we do not know what part 
they played in the initial training he gave to students on concept map drawing, 
nevertheless, it does appear that when taken with interview evidence it is possible to 
claim that adults respond to new information in science by rote learning, initially at 
least.
ii) Use of the word ‘supplantive’ when describing learning. Atherton (1999 p78) 
claims that “most learning, even in the case of adults, involves simply adding to one’s 
stock of knowledge or skill, hence the label ‘additive’”. The term ‘supplantive’ is also 
used by Atherton, replacing his earlier terms ‘threatening learning’ (Atherton 1986 p 
78), and ‘traumatic learning’ (Atherton 1991 p78), but he appears to use the terms 
‘additive’ and ‘supplantive’ synonymously with ‘surface’ and ‘deep’ in a paper 
(Atherton 1999: p78) based on participants in in-service professional training 
programmes. Although Atherton does not define his term ‘supplantive’, the word is 
self-descriptive, and he contrasts it with the word ‘additive’, so I do not think there is 
much doubt about the meaning he intends to convey by using it. I would not consider 
using the term ‘supplantive’ interchangeably with ‘deep’ when describing learning, 
because ‘supplantive’ implies that replacement has taken place, and this is not the 
case where the knowledge is entirely new. Thus, to my mind, ‘supplantive’ is a 
category of knowledge, and could be ‘deep’ - as in the case of Sally, or ‘surface’ - as
in the alteration of the purchase price of an article, or the change of a code number.
My findings indicate that replacement of knowledge does not immediately take 
place. This was a surprise to me, since it is an expectation of those teaching science 
that simple ‘scaffolding’ knowledge will fall away as the edifice of new and more 
complex knowledge is put in place. The limitations and inadequacies of an 
individual’s previous knowledge are a usual starting point in teaching a topic, and 
new information is then developed to explain more adequately the complexities of 
observed data. To discover that all the ‘old’ knowledge is retained was unexpected, 
as teachers and trainers tend to proceed on the assumption that ‘old’ knowledge can 
be replaced, and replaced immediately. Thus, new knowledge is added to what is 
already known, and, whilst this is not actually in conflict with Ausubel’s (1962) 
assimilation theory of learning (new knowledge is related to an existing relevant 
aspect of an individual’s knowledge structure), this draws attention to a 
misinterpretation of his theory, namely - that new information replaces the old.
iii) Concept map interpretation. The evidence of the concept maps would suggest 
that much rote learning has occurred, both by self-confessed rote learners such as 
Heidi, and by declared meaningful learners such as Jonathan. Whilst one could 
challenge Novak’s claim that meaningful learning is always accompanied by 
integrative reconciliation, his findings are well established, and it would be surprising 
if a flaw of this proportion had not been revealed before. Bringing evidence from the 
interviews which I conducted into the picture suggests another possibility, namely, 
that mostly, or maybe always, new learning is additive and, therefore, not what 
Novak would describe as meaningful. This idea is certainly supported by the concept 
maps, all of which show that new knowledge is added -bolted on - to existing 
knowledge. It would require a longitudinal study to confirm this, and I regret not 
being able to pursue this. There is circumstantial evidence that this ‘additive’ 
learning is meaningful, at least to some extent; for example, i) evidence from
182
interviews -  it does not take an experienced teacher long to assess whether a 
student understands what he, or she, is talking about, ii) evidence from pre­
experiment planning exercises, where some aspects of an hypothesis are going to be 
investigated and, or, tested, and iii) evidence from written tests and home study 
exercises. Whilst the weight of evidence from any one of these sources could be 
challenged, it is submitted that, when considered together they add up to something 
not insubstantial. In other words, the use of additional sources of evidence in 
conjunction with concept maps, reduce reliance on an individual source at the same 
time as achieving some increase in the validity of the conclusions drawn.
Critical reflection
Considering how the evidence relates to the literature, both Novak and Kinchin (one 
being the initiator and the other an enthusiast for concept maps) are convinced there 
is a direct link between cross linking and meaningful learning. My evidence, which 
has been gained from adults learning science, is sufficiently equivocal to prompt a 
look at other possible explanations. For example, i) my research is with adults, 
whereas most of the published work relating to concept maps has been with children 
of primary and secondary school ages and, therefore, transferability of results cannot 
be assumed, ii) An assumption built into my methods (and also into those of Novak 
and Kinchin - in so far as it is possible to determine), is that meaningful learning 
displaces old learning without delay. For the various examples of material used for 
learning, and selected for my research, the time period over which the topic was 
taught, the questionnaires completed, and the interviews conducted, never exceeded 
six weeks, and was often nearer to four weeks. These were modular style courses, 
with assessment having to occur within the term, or semester, during which the topic 
was covered. It occurs to me -  and this is mere speculation -  that a temporal 
dimension is involved with, possibly, new learning held in conjunction with old 
learning for a period of time, before the former replaces or ‘swamps’ the latter. Such
an idea would, of course, need to be tested, and it would be interesting to see if both 
children and adults behaved in similar ways, or not.
Though he writes about ‘supplantive’ learning, Atherton does not offer any evidence 
of it having occurred. He writes (Atherton 1999) about in-service professional 
training programmes, where there may, or may not, be procedures in place in order 
to follow up and to monitor behavioural changes. My findings, relating to learning 
science, suggest that new knowledge does not, immediately, replace old knowledge.
While Atherton (1999 p78) acknowledges that, “most learning, even in the case of 
adults, involves simply adding to one’s stock of knowledge or skill . . . Novak 
(1998), on the other hand, promotes meaningful learning as the only kind of learning 
that is worthwhile (other than for recalling telephone numbers). My research findings 
show that much rote learning - some by intention and some regardless of declared 
intention - occurs by adults learning science when judged on the inclusion, or not, of 
cross links in concept maps. At this stage, I wish to avoid trying to establish a claim 
that rote learning is worthwhile, but I do believe it is necessary to consider the 
possibility that it is an essential link in the process of learning becoming meaningful. 
My evidence indicates that new learning by adults in science is, at least initially, not 
integrated into the learner’s knowledge system -  but added to it, nor does it replace 
previous learning. To call it ‘rote’ learning may be misleading, but the term ‘initial’ 
learning or ‘first response’ learning may identify it more precisely.
Theme 2: Learning by Adults 
Accepted understanding
Considering what is accepted about the way adults learn, while there is an 
abundance of literature on teaching adults, especially with regard to vocational 
education and assessment, there is less on the ways in which adults (specifically) 
learn, and some research findings need an improved model within which to explain
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them. For example, Ramsden et al (1986) found that, study skills training for those 
undergraduates who learn by surface learning methods, succeeded only in making 
their surface learning strategies more sophisticated, rather than developing deep 
learning strategies. The Armed Forces have a long tradition of implementing 
behaviourist principles by conditioning in the training of adults, and similar ideas 
underlie some approaches to therapy that have been used extensively with adults, 
but these approaches have been used with skills training rather than with cognitive 
learning.
Much understanding about the way children learn has been gained through the work 
of the cognitive theorists, the most influential being Jean Piaget, though his work did 
not extend beyond adolescents. Neugarton (1977) identified an increasing use of 
reflective thinking in adulthood, and Riegel (1973) focused on the fact that adults 
think in a way which results in the discovery of important questions and problems. 
Mezirow’s name is often quoted when adult learning is discussed, perhaps because 
he was an adult educator, but he was not concerned with the actual process of adult 
learning, more with meaning schemes and perspectives. Jarvis (1987), one of our 
foremost constructivists, distinguishes between non-reflective and reflective learning 
- but not according to age, recognising that adults may be non-reflective learners in 
which memorizing features prominently. Malcolm Knowles (1970), who introduced 
the term andragogy, as being the art and science of helping adults learn, used 
experience as pivotal when considering the ways that adults and children can learn; 
namely, that adults use their experiences as the basis of their learning, whereas 
children learn from being taught. The idea seems to take no account of adults being 
taught by methods similar to those used with children, and this muddied the water of 
Knowles’ andragogy versus pedagogy distinctions. Schauble’s (1996) work is a 
modern summary of what is known about adults learning, but in this she focuses on 
the outcome of their learning, rather than on the methods by which they learn;
further, that adults make more valid inferences than do children, but that these 
inferences show the existence of early errors. Candy (1981 p 63) argued that, the 
one feature which is consistently held up as the identifying characteristic of adult 
education (Candy did not say adult learning), is the propensity of adults to be self­
directed.
Research evidence
Looking now at the evidence from my research, it is relevant to state that this was not 
a study comparing the learning of adults with children (interesting though that might 
be). Three issues are selected for discussion:
i) The role of memorising in learning. A feature of the learning by the adults 
attending my classes was the extent to which they used, and relied on, memory. 
Interviews suggest that, for some at least -  for example, Heidi, this was related both 
to conformity to their own expectations, (they had decided that this is what the 
subject would require) and to fear of not ‘losing’ the understanding they had, or 
thought they had, in the classroom, for example, Clare. Many were avid note takers, 
and it was not uncommon at the end of a lecture to be asked to supply a word or 
phrase that a student had not managed to record -  as though every word was 
essential. All of the concept maps indicate accurate recall, and Novak would, no 
doubt, say they are good examples of where rote learning has occurred. An example 
is Sally’s concept map (reproduced on page 180) which she constructed by 
memorising both the data and the sequencing of it.
It is perhaps too easily forgotten that the classical art of memory was considered a 
crucial mental attribute which was revived in the later medieval and renaissance 
periods, and that it linked the eye and ear through remembered speech. Bantock 
(1980 p 43) describes this classical art which implies a capacity, under training, for 
the development of an intense capacity for internal visualisation; the visual structure 
emphasised and reinforced the mental one. The importance of memory was noted by
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Fig. 24 Sally’s concept map constructed by memorising the data 
and the sequencing of it.
Francis Bacon who wrote (quoted by Yates 1969 p 358): “what is sensible always 
strikes the memory stronger, and sooner impresses itself than the i n t e l l e c t u a l I n  
more recent times, Marton and Saljo’s (1984) phenomenographic approach revealed 
that students who viewed learning as the acquisition of knowledge utilised 
memorising to meet their needs.
In a study comprising an investigation of the epistemological beliefs and study habits
of students undertaking first year courses in Biological Chemistry and Biochemistry, 
conducted in 2004, Watters and Watters (2007) report that respondents speaking 
about their beliefs about learning, used words such as “if the exam is quite near then 
I have to memorise it” (p 32) and “at first you had to memorise the basics (p 34).
A number of these students had a strong orientation for memorisation that seemed to 
have evolved because they had found memorisation to be important for success in 
high school (in Australia). It seems that the learners who participated in my study are 
not untypical.
ii) The placing of new knowledge as revealed by concept maps. Reference was 
made in the previous theme (Learning Science) to the fact that new knowledge is 
added to the existing store and does not immediately, at least, replace it. The 
comments there are equally applicable to this theme. Nathaniel’s map, reproduced 
below, shows how the ‘new’ knowledge (1st column) appears alongside the 
knowledge gained earlier (2nd column), and has not replaced that knowledge.
A comment by Martin (1994) that teaching concentrates on one sequence of ideas 
after another, without demonstrating the links between them prompts the thought that 
this would result in learners producing concept maps that are dominated by chain 
arrangements. As has been pointed out in Section 3a of Chapter 5 of this thesis, 
chain structures which are less flexible than spoke structures, which are more 
resistant to disruption. Thus, it could be argued that basic teaching should be 
presented so the resulting knowledge conforms to a spoke-like framework as this 
allows inclusion of new material with greater ease. A legitimate objection would be 
that this approach stands or falls on the applicability of the chosen model, and further 
work would be needed to be sure that it could be employed in a wider context.
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Fig. 25 Nathaniel’s concept map showing ‘new’ and ‘old’ knowledge
Alongside each other
iii) Co-operation between adults in learning. An aspect of self-direction (not itself a 
feature of adult learning that was being monitored) was evident in three out of the 
four programmes involved from which participants in this study were chosen. Self- 
direction might well have been present in the fourth group, but this was the first group 
interviewed, and the existence of co-operation was not something of which I had 
been aware. As Knowles had observed, self-directed learning is usually a co­
operative exercise: “there is a lot of mutuality among self-directed learners” (Knowles 
1975 p18). The existence and extent of this co-operation was revealed in the 
interviews -  often in tentative, almost apologetic tone; for example, “I hope you don’t 
mind, but some of us get together after your lectures and go over what we had done”
(Clare), in laboratory work as well, it was noticeable that there would be conferring 
between small groups of students. When 1 raised the question of co-operation with 
others in the group with Sally, she was more open about it as an experience not 
expected by her, and from which she was able both to gain and to contribute.
One possible contributory factor to the positive comments about their co-operation 
with each other, offered by the research participants, is the lack of texts suitable for 
the science modules of the various courses which they were studying -  they may 
have needed this co-operation in order to reinforce their learning. Some learners did 
find material that was helpful on web sites, whereas those who used texts from the 
College Resources Centre found these unsuitable in one way or another - “too 
technical", "too advanced", “unreadable”.
Critical reflection
When I first examined the concept maps and noted the absence of cross linking, I 
was inclined to attribute this to my failure at enabling meaningful learning to have 
occurred. Further reflection suggested a variety of possible explanations, including:
i) the learner not being confident with the use of concept maps, ii) the learner not 
being motivated sufficiently to build cross links into map, iii) the knowledge is not 
integrated and so cross links cannot be provided, iv) the teaching and, or, learning 
had been aimed at compartmentalised knowledge, and so cross links are not 
considered important by learner, v) the assessment does not cover any integrated 
knowledge, vi) rote learning has been encouraged, and so cross links are not 
applicable, vii) Novak is incorrect in associating cross links with meaningful learning, 
viii) new learning is always initially ‘additive’, and ix) the learner is intended to 
memorise and not to integrate the new knowledge. Using the questionnaire and 
interview in triangulation indicates that, in some instances, no. 4 may be true, but the 
concept maps point clearly to no. 8 being the underlying reason for the absence to 
cross linking. This is supported by those studies, for example Schauble (1996), which
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found that there is reluctance and/or difficulty in abandoning what has been learned 
previously. It would be interesting to study both the process of transfer of reliance 
from ‘old’ to ‘new’ knowledge, and the timescale over which this transfer takes place.
The evidence of learners co-operating with each other is supported by the literature, 
for example, Henschke (1994:49) writes: “...interaction with others in small groupings 
that helps them internalise information...”. There was no evidence of what Benn 
(1994 p49) describes as, learners “not having their learning needs met through 
formal education”, therefore, the co-operation was not prompted by what the learners 
considered was ‘bad’ or ‘inadequate’ teaching. Kilpatrick, Bell and Falk (1999 p131) 
say that “learning can (and frequently does) occur when individuals and groups 
interact”, therefore suggesting that, learning occurs through interactions between 
individuals, as well as between individuals and groups. They (Kilpatrick, Bell & Falk 
1999 p131) also claim that, “the quantity of the social processes and relationships 
within which learning interactions take place is especially influential on the quality of 
the learning outcomes in informal learning”. Co-operation and informal learning are 
areas which have been fairly extensively researched and, generally, are considered 
beneficial to all involved, although Benn (1994a p 49) is right to caution about the 
discontinuity between formal and informal learning. My only reservation about 
informal learning, that students acquire from work place or hobby sources, concerns 
possible misconceptions that may arise from experience unsupported by theory. 
Sometimes the misconception can be cleared easily by supplying the theory, but 
there are times that, the ‘evidence of experience’ becomes ‘set in concrete’, and this 
can present a hindrance to progress (see ’barriers to learning’ in Chapter 4)
Though I attempted no measurements to judge the impact of this co-operative 
learning, I was alert to identify any disadvantages that might be arising from it. For 
example, I looked particularly to see whether those whom I had recognised as having 
weakness in mathematics were improving their skills or ‘hitching a ride’ in a group.
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My impression was that most adults were gaining in both understanding and 
confidence through co-operative learning, though a few would use the opportunity to 
support them in their aversions and weaknesses. The limitations identified by 
Brookfield (1989 p 161) concerning self-directed learning, namely, that it can be too 
comfortable and allow existing assumptions and prejudices to go unchallenged, 
seemed not to apply with co-operative learning. Hence co-operative learning is 
better to overcome conservative tendencies which let new learning reinforce old 
patterns.
Theme 3 Conceptions of Learning 
Accepted understanding
Any alteration to existing knowledge involves altering concepts, or acquiring new 
ones. Falk and Harrison (1998 p609 -  627) developed the idea that learning has two 
components: its process, and the outcomes of that process. This is useful here, 
because change is an outcome of the process, and it can be observed. This 
contrasts with Lundvall’s (1992) argument, that change is a cumulative process 
which builds on existing knowledge and practices. The researchers’ who have 
written on types of conceptual change, though they may use differing terminology, 
seem to agree that there are two basic kinds of change. Thus:
Researcher Terms used to describe learning type
Atherton (1999) Additive Supplantive
Botkin et al (1979) Maintenance Innovative
Brookfield (1987) Non-critical Critical
Jarvis (1987) Non-reflective Reflective
Novak (1998) Rote Meaningful
Marton et al (1989 p 283), identify six conceptions of learning; three of these do not 
contain notions of meaning - increasing one’s knowledge, memorising and 
reproducing, and applying knowledge, whilst the other three do imply that meaning is 
present - understanding, seeing something in a different way, and changing as a
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person through learning.
Jarvis (1999 p 38) argues that all learning begins with an experience of disjuncture, 
which occurs when there is disharmony between a person’s constructed 
experience of a situation and their biography. So, a disjunctural situation is a 
potential change situation from which one can learn. The problem is that while 
current conceptions provide a framework that a learner can use to interpret and 
understand new information, it can potentially constitute momentum that resists 
conceptual change. This paradox that exists for the learner has been explored by 
Pintrich, Marx and Boyle (1993).
Barriers to the development of learning are common to all types of learner and in any 
type of learning; and they can vary in origin, from issues relating to the learning 
environment, to personal experiences in the lifetime of the learner. The work of 
Boud, Cohen and Walker (1993), Atherton (1999), Tytler and White (1996),
Klaczynski and Narasimham (1998), and others, has been referred to in Chapter 3. 
The barrier that I encountered most frequently in those who participated in this study, 
and in others who did not, was a lack of self-belief and confidence. The learners 
often managed to overcome formidable obstacles in areas of finance, 
accommodation, transport and health, yet when confronted with an elementary (for 
example, secondary school year 9) problem in physics, their other problems seemed 
mere trivialities. Fortunately, in many instances, these ‘Berlin Walls’ were not 
immovable.
Research evidence
Considering the evidence both for conceptual change and for resistance to it, 
the questionnaires provided the opportunity for the participants’ answers to a 
question about the conception of learning with which they identified most strongly. 
One of the intentions behind this research was to see if the self-assessment matched
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the conception of learning identified by examination of the concept map, using the 
idea advanced by Novak (1998), that meaningful learning can be spotted from the 
presence of cross links (integrative reconciliation). Contrary to expectation, I found 
that none of the participants inserted cross links, although there were other indicators 
that the learning was not entirely without meaning, for example, interviews, end of 
module tests, pre-experiment planning exercises, and even the link words used in the 
concept maps. Thus, a question to Penny about the fact that her concept map 
specified the equality of mass in the nuclear particles, but omitted any reference to 
the mass of the electron, brought an immediate and confident response - “Oh! But it 
has negligible mass and the mass of the atom is concentrated in the nucleus”. This 
indicated to me that her learning had been meaningful. Although the evidence 
indicates that all learning in science by adults is initially not meaningful learning, I 
suspect that meaning, and therefore integration of the knowledge, develops over 
time. This is a clear reminder that it would have been a mistake to have built this 
study on reliance of concept maps alone for evidence. However, as the design 
involved gathering data from three sources, namely, concept maps, interview, and 
questionnaire and, considering only what was suggested by examination of all of the 
data together, I do not think that Penny’s comments undermined the methods in any 
way.
it is inevitable when considering conceptual change that, any resistance to such 
change, and the factors responsible for triggering the resistance, will need to be 
considered. Evidence for barriers to learning was gathered at interview, in questions 
that were focused on difficulties relating to learning science. Although respondents 
were not discouraged from talking about “situational” (Atherton 1999 p 86) factors 
such as administrative failures etc., nineteen out of the twenty eight participants in 
my study reported difficulties with texts, such as reading and being able to 
understand the texts, and being able to pursue an inquiry. Although many were
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accomplished in their abilities to access information via the internet, the skills 
required to do this are not identical to those needed in order to use the index of a 
book.
Twenty two of the respondents expressed some degree of apprehension about their 
study in science. Mostly, they did not have positive memories that could have fuelled 
self confidence, and even those who showed every indication of having a secure 
grasp of what had been covered, seemed to be ‘waiting for the catch’. Fifteen of the 
twenty two feared they had an inadequate foundation on which the new material 
could be built.
Critical reflection
Considering ways in which this evidence relates to the literature, it does not appear 
that Novak’s (1998) claim that cross linkage is indicative of the type of learning that 
has taken place, has been supported by this study. It is quite possible that a temporal 
dimension exists in the process of adults responding to new information and that my 
respondents drew their maps before it had become integrated with other knowledge. 
Further study would be needed to test this.
Referring to the fear of failure through a lack of background knowledge, Munn et al 
(1992 p 40) found that five out of nine failures mentioned lack of background 
knowledge; this was from a total of nineteen Higher National Certificate physics and 
engineering students, and with the term ‘failure’ here describing performance in the 
assessment process as being below that deemed necessary in order to proceed 
further with the module and, or, course. My data does not refer to failure, rather to 
anxiety about being able to succeed, but it seems that, for some, the anxiety is well 
founded. Munn et al (1992 p 11) dug more deeply into this, and found that a 
particular aspect of the foundation needed by learners on which to build is familiarity 
with basic concepts. Students whom they questioned said how difficult it was to 
come to grips with abstract knowledge, about electricity, for instance. Interestingly,
most of the aduit learners involved in my study had studied some science to GCSE  
level, although they were generally weak on basic concepts, and were not confident 
in accessing information from texts. One of the conclusions reached by Munn et al 
(1992 p 26) in their final section, on what providers could do to help adults cope, was 
to encourage students to acquire study skills. Lack of confidence and fear of failure 
feature prominently as obstacles to learning and there may be a widespread need for 
upgrading the study skills in most adult learners.
3. SUMMARY
The findings of this study are interpreted in terms of the model provided by Ausubel’s 
(1968) assimilation theory. This theory, although framed within the perspective of 
cognitivism, is broadly compatible with social and pragmatic learning theories in its 
focus on interaction and its central stress on the environment. Commonalities exist 
in the academic histories of all the students who participated in this study; they arise 
from science being a compulsory element in the National Curriculum. However, their 
dispositions to learning and their social histories are often quite different, yet there is 
a surprising constancy in the way they learn. It seems that new knowledge in 
science is learned by adults -  initially at least - in a non-reflective way - by rote or as 
surface learning. This is not in conflict with the constructivist approach, as new 
understanding can amount to an enlargement of existing understanding, as much as 
to replacement of it. There is no evidential support that ‘new’ learning displaces ‘old’ 
learning without delay; however, knowledge that is already established is retained, at 
least for some weeks. There is, also, no evidence that conceptions of learning are 
other than as declared by learners, but because all ‘new’ learning appears to be 
other than fully meaningful, it has not been possible to test the link between these 
declared conceptions of learning and the conceptions indicated by their concept 
maps. Adult learners co-operate voluntarily with each other and benefit from this co­
operation; they tend to have anxieties about the extent and state of their background
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knowledge, and experience difficulty in using standard texts. Learning can be 
hindered when barriers are triggered, some of the barriers and triggers being specific 
to adults.
Knowles asserted that adults are taught like children because adult teaching 
methods are based on theories about child learning. He argues (Knowles 
1990) that teaching adults is different from teaching children because adults 
bring motivations, goals, expectations and experiences to learning situations 
that are different from those of a child. He stated as self-evident-truth that the 
techniques for teaching adults must reflect those differences (Knowles 1990, 
p 27-65). Jarvis (1994,p 61-63) has pointed out that the distinction between 
andragogy and pedagogy is not sustainable when related to biological age, 
but there need be no difference in the way Knowles envisaged between 
teaching adults and teaching children. Jarvis also suggests (Jarvis 1994 p 
63), that there may be a difference in vocational education which relates to 
levels of experience of the learners, thus initial vocational learners have no 
experience within their vocation and so are pedagogic learners, whereas 
continuing vocational learners do have experience, and so the teaching needs 
to be appropriate -  what Knowles would call andragogy.
It seems to me that when Knowles (1990, p 120-125) writes about the 
importance of the teaching environment, that this is really to do with barriers 
to learning and not to some more fundamental difference arising from 
chronological age. Also, it seems possible that Knowles proposed his 
techniques for teaching adults without discovering whether or not they were 
equally effective when used with children. Though my experience with 
teaching children has been entirely with children above eleven years of age, I 
have always found that such elements as collaboration, mutuality, respect,
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and experiential techniques as opposed to transmittal techniques, to be far 
more effective than the authority-orientated, formal, competitive approach that 
Knowles identifies with pedagogy. Knowles does not refer to his direct 
experiences with teaching children, and he may be making assumptions 
which contrast rather conveniently with his alternative methods. I wonder 
what he would have made of the finding that adults resemble children in the 
way that their initial learning of new information is consistently by rote.
Knowles does identify some potentially negative consequences arising from 
experience, for example, the development of mental habits, biases and 
presuppositions that can cause an adult to close his/her mind to new ideas, 
and the risk that if an adult’s experience is ignored or devalued, this may be 
perceived as not just rejecting their experience, but rejecting them as persons 
(Knowles 1990, p59-60). However, he fails to develop the first of the above 
examples into the paradox that it is, namely that the very same experiences 
that can constitute momentum that resists change can be the ones which 
provide frameworks that the learner can use to interpret new information. 
Classroom experiences also suggest that more experience can mean existing 
knowledge (whether incorrect or erroneous) is more deeply entrenched and 
resistant to change; certainly it will not be abandoned.
I first read Knowle’s (1970) work shortly after switching from teaching children 
of secondary school age to teaching in a Further Education College. The 
differences between the two age groups (when taught the same course, for 
example, GCE CA’ level) were not, however, identifiable with those of the 
andragogical and pedagogical models, but more to do with, for example, 
excuses for work uncompleted which, in the case of adults, were more often 
identified with parenting issues and barriers to learning. Issues relating to the 
process of learning science were very similar in both age groups and I was
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never convinced that Knowles had identified something that is both real and 
universal. He makes an interesting case and, of course, there are many 
differences between secondary schools and Further Education Colleges, but 
my experience does not persuade me that the methods of learning are 
different. However, my study was with adults and not a comparison of 
learning between adults and children.
The interpretation of the empirical work for this study is based largely on 
claims made by Novak; i.e. that long chains without cross linking in a concept 
map are indicators of knowledge that is not integrated and that the learning is 
not meaningful. Having examined a number of concept maps produced by 
my students, I am less confident about accepting such a claim, because if I 
present an argument or a topic in a sequential style -  perhaps in a 
developmental or historical context, it seems to me almost inevitable that the 
information will be housed by the learner in that format, at least initially. Thus, 
whereas I was searching for cross linking as indicators of meaningful learning,
I am now of the opinion that, mostly at least, it was unrealistic to expect them. 
Whilst their absence has rather undermined one of my subsidiary research 
questions, nevertheless, I consider that an important insight has been gained 
into the limitations of interpretation of data produced by concept maps.
Novak is very dismissive of rote learning (Novak 1998 p 61), but my findings 
indicate that most learners (from my samples) use memory to anchor new 
knowledge. A number of current practices, for example, the modular structure 
of courses which are examined/assessed on completion of the teaching 
programme, undoubtedly are supported by the rote learning style. My 
classroom experience indicates that a transference of knowledge from that 
acquired by rote, to that which is integrated with other knowledge (thereby
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becoming meaningful), tends to occur. The mechanism of, and time-scale 
over which this transference takes place, need to be investigated.
The comments above do not detract from other useful attributes of concept 
maps, but an appreciation of their limitations is recommended to both 
classroom teachers and education researchers.
This study has focused on the responses by adults to new information in science, 
and may, therefore, be described as being both small and compact. Whilst there are 
certain advantages to compactness (one can hope to achieve some clarity in answer 
to a limited range of specific questions), nevertheless assumptions still have to be 
made. In this case, for example, it is assumed that any variation in aptitude with 
regard to the drawing of concept maps, will not have interfered with the results. It is 
also assumed that the selection strategy used to recruit participants is not seriously 
flawed, and that the results generated by the study are not artefacts of my teaching 
idiosyncrasies. The triangulation of data from concept maps, questionnaires and 
interviews has minimised errors of interpretation and strengthened the validity of the 
study, as well as revealing interesting nuggets of dissonance. These nuggets act as 
valuable reminders that not everything a learner knows is necessarily going to be put 
into a concept map. As always data must be the subject of critical scrutiny.
There are implications to some of these findings. If adults learning science do 
not learn meaningfully at the time the learning takes place, then modular courses 
have an inherent weakness when compared to courses which do not include ‘short’ 
modules. There may be a tendency by those delivering in-service training courses to 
think that content should be presented on the assumption that meaningful learning 
will occur more or less simultaneously with delivery. If the new learning is going to 
be learned additively, maybe the teaching strategies of these courses should be 
reviewed with recognition, perhaps, of the need to upgrade study skills. These 
implications will be considered in more detail in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSIONS
!  INTRODUCTION
The summary of the findings of this research, which will also identify the specific 
contributions to our knowledge about the learning process, will be preceded by some 
general remarks on assumptions and interpretative problems in science that have 
some relevance to this study. The conclusions will then be set into a wider context, 
after which a brief discussion of further work 1 hope to undertake will be included.
2. ASSUM PTIONS
At this stage of the study it is appropriate to note that empirical testing does not make 
things right or wrong. For example, it could be true that the most important factor in 
the successful learning of science by adults is the personality of the teacher. The 
fact that no adequate research programme, that I am aware of, has been devised to 
look into this has nothing to do with its truth or falsity. This does, however, have the 
consequence that all observations of learning strategies must be imperfect, to some 
degree, in as much as this variable at least, is not under control. Also, there is no 
reason to assume that things have to be quantifiable to be significant -  though this is 
the basis on which much investigative work in the natural sciences is undertaken.
Patton (1980 p 119) claims that the assumptions which under-gird qualitative 
research are, firstly, the importance of understanding people and programmes in 
context; secondly, a commitment to study naturally occurring phenomena without 
introducing extra controls or manipulation; and thirdly, that understanding emerges 
most meaningfully from an inductive analysis of open-ended, detailed, descriptive 
and quotational data, gathered through direct contact with the programme and its 
participants. However, Morgan cautions by saying that,
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attempts to judge the utility of different research strategies in terms of 
universal criteria based on the importance of generaiisability, predictability 
and control, explanations of variance, meaningful understanding, or whatever 
are inevitably flawed: these criteria inevitably favour research strategies 
consistent with the assumptions that generate such criteria as meaningful 
guidelines for the evaluation of research. It is simply inadequate to attempt to 
justify a particular style of research in terms of assumptions that give rise to 
that style of research. ... Different research perspectives make different kinds 
of knowledge claims, and the criteria as to what counts as significant 
knowledge vary from one to another.
Morgan 1983 p 14 -15  
So readers must make their own decisions about the relative value of any given 
perspective, for there is no universal standard that can be applied to choose among 
the different frameworks.
It is not only the assumptions which underlie theoretical perspectives in qualitative 
inquiry that have to be taken account of, for they also underpin every calculation and 
experiment that is made. An example relates to a calculation made in 1941 by a 
distinguished Canadian astronomer, that one million tonnes of fuel would be required 
to take a five hundred gram payload on a return trip to the Moon. However, the 
strategy employed by NASA in 1969 was to detach the spent part of the rocket as 
soon as it had completed its task - since only the small capsule containing the 
astronauts needed to complete the return journey, thus fuel would not be used 
unnecessarily in transporting the spent part of the rocket to the moon. There was 
nothing wrong with the astronomer’s calculation, only the assumption underpinning it, 
namely, that the entire assembly had to make the full journey in both directions.
There is an important difference in the assumptions made by a physical science 
experimenter and a sociologist undertaking qualitative inquiry though, and this relates
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to what is known as the ‘faithful measurement postulate’. This refers to the physical 
world where, say, an instrument is thrown into a definite state by a specific state of 
the system it is measuring. Because it is assumed that the same state of the world 
always produces the same state of the instrument, it is possible to infer the state of 
the world from the state of the instrument. The point of relevance to this study is that 
the ‘faithful measurement postulate’ cannot be applied to questionnaires and 
interviews -  sometimes considered as the analogues of the physical scientists’ 
instruments.
An illustration of how prejudice can affect conclusions may also be taken from the 
world of astronomy: due (at least in part) to the Wilkinson Microwave Anisotropy 
Probe (WMAP) satellite, which revealed the density of matter and dark energy in the 
early universe, most astronomers are confident that the world is flat. But Reich (2009 
p15) reports that view is now being questioned by J. Silk, at the University of Oxford, 
and colleagues, who claim it is possible that the W MAP observations have been 
misinterpreted. They took data from W MAP and analysed them using Bayes’s 
theorem, which can be used to show how the certainty attached to a particular 
conclusion is affected by different starting assumptions. The analysis produced a 
ninety eight per cent probability that the universe is indeed flat but when the 
calculation was rerun starting from a more open-minded position, the probability 
changed to sixty seven per cent, making a flat universe far less of a certainty than 
astronomers generally conclude. Ideally, a case should start to look compelling no 
matter what the starting assumptions are.
Assumptions featured in the work of the French physicist and philosopher Pierre 
Duhem (1861-1916) who emphasised that the prediction a phenomenon will occur is 
made from a set of premises, and that failure to observe the predicted phenomenon 
falsifies only the conjunction of these premises. He believed that, when discontinuing 
evidence is produced, the decision about which assumptions of a theory are to be 
modified has to be left to the judgement of scientists for there is nothing in the logic of
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disconfirmation that pinpoints the erroneous part of the theory. Duhem applied his 
analysis of the logic of disconfirmation to the idea of a “crucial experiment”, the 
existence of which had been suggested by Francis Bacon, and which would 
conclusively decide the issue between competing theories. In the nineteenth century 
it was supposed that Foucault’s determination that the velocity of light is greater in air 
than in water, was a crucial experiment, demonstrating not only that light is not a 
stream of emitted particles but also that light is a wave motion. Duhem pointed out 
that the Foucault experiment falsifies only a set of hypotheses, and argued (Duhem  
1962 p186-190) that an experiment would be “crucial" only if it conclusively 
eliminated every possible set of premises save one. There can be no such 
experiments.
Knowles (1990, p63) makes a useful distinction between an ideology and a 
system of alternative assumptions. He defines ideology as ‘a systematic body 
of beliefs that requires loyalty and conformity by its adherents’ and suggests 
that the pedagogical model has taken on many of the characteristics of an 
ideology.
In contrast, the andragogical ‘model’ is put forward as a system of alternative 
sets of assumptions. The critical difference between the two models is 
summarised in the statement: T h e  pedagogical model is an ideological model 
which excludes the andragogical assumptions. The andragogical model is a 
set of assumptions which includes the pedagogical assumptions.’ Knowles 
(1990, p63)
Knowles suggests that, in practice the pedagog insists that learners remain 
dependent on the teacher, whereas the andragog helps learners to take 
responsibility for their learning.
Some further comments on Knowles’ contribution are given later in the 
chapter.
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Teachers may well be interpreters of science, but this research has focused more on 
the interpretation of science by the learner. An illustration of the difficulties this can 
cause is seen in a journal article by Mpembra & Osborne (1969), describing an 
apparently surprising experimental finding. According to the authors, when two 
beakers of water, at different temperatures but otherwise identical, were placed in a 
refrigerator and allowed to cool, ice appeared first in the beaker which started at the 
higher temperature. Thus, if two beakers are taken, containing equal volumes of 
water, but at different temperatures - one at 100°C and one at 40°C - and put into a 
refrigerator, the one that started at 100°C freezes first. Moreover, for a given beaker 
of water, the higher the initial temperature the more quickly ice is observed to form 
within it when placed in the refrigerator. Thus it appears that the higher the 
temperature of water in given conditions, the faster it freezes.
The authors were puzzled by the results of their work, which seemed implausible and 
in need of explanation, for the water in the hotter beaker must do all that the cooler 
water does, and more, yet in less time. Newton’s law of cooling (that the rate of heat 
loss of a body is proportional to its excess temperature relative to its surroundings) 
suggests that identical beakers at the same temperature in identical surroundings 
should take the same time to cool. It would seem that, if the underlying observations 
were correct, then at least one accepted law of physics must be false.
Barnes has composed a list of possible interpretations of the ‘Mpembra effect’, the 
observation that warm water appears to freeze faster than cool water:
1. A practical joke
2. An erroneous set of observations, perhaps due to faulty equipment or 
confusion of materials. Results not replicable.
3. Result of hot vessel melting into ice, and making better contact with cold 
refrigerator shelf.
3. INTERPRETATION
4. Result of heating evaporating water, so that less is left to cool.
5. Something to do with super cooling.
6. Something to do with convection currents in the water.
7. Something to do with convection currents in the surrounding air.
8. Newton’s law of cooling false.
9. Current thermodynamics and physical theories of heat false.
10. Modern scientific world view seriously defective.
Barnes 1985, p 60
It is necessary to consider all possible explanations because the results clash with 
our existing common sense expectations, which are, in turn, consistent with our 
understanding of the accepted knowledge of physics. My only reason for introducing 
the apparently anomalous results of this experiment, is that it illustrates the crucial 
role of existing knowledge In assimilating and describing new findings. The puzzling 
nature of the results, as Barnes says (1985, p 61), “derives from their relationship 
with existing knowledge”, namely that they are incompatible with that knowledge.
The reliance we place on existing knowledge in making sense of new experiences is 
brought into focus by consideration of the results of this particular experiment. It also 
provides an example of cognitive dissonance, the mental conflict that occurs when 
beliefs or assumptions are contradicted by new information.
Interest in what was formerly a central theme of human psychology, namely that 
cognitive inconsistency is intrinsically disturbing and demanding of resolution 
appears to have waned during the last fifty years or so. The drive for mental balance 
- that our beliefs, attitudes and values must square with our actions -  was explored in 
the 1940’s and 1950’s and led Heider (1958) to formulate his Balance Theory: that 
dissonance causes psychological stress and discomfort which motivate behaviour at 
reducing the gap between the two sets of attitudes, and finding consistency. It was a 
forerunner of Festinger’s (1957) more elaborate cognitive dissonance theory which 
takes account of the cognitive strategies that let us live with the discrepancies
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between what people do and what they think. Both theories are drive-reduction 
theories, that is, behaviour that reduces unpleasant physiological arousal, but 
Festinger invokes the principle of least effort: that we will move in the direction of 
easiest change, often via a perceptual distortion rather than any fundamental change 
of attitudes or behaviour. An example from science teaching may be seen in the 
student who is taught evolution but believes in religious creationism; they do not 
bother to reconcile these opposing beliefs but just keep them in separate mental 
compartments.
Reference has been made in Chapter 3 to the fact that some of the information 
presented to adults learning science conflicts with their existing beliefs or 
assumptions, and to the ways in which children have been observed to respond to 
such situations. I was anticipating observing such dissonance being resolved in a 
variety of ways but, invariably, the opposing beliefs were kept intact in separate 
compartments (‘mental compartmentalisation’), which mirrored the storage of all new 
information.
Barnes (1985, p 64) also makes the interesting point that, although we interpret 
actual situations using existing knowledge, such actual situations - when probed in 
more detail, are found to be more complex than our interpretations suggest, this 
indicates that there can be a degree of uncertainty present in our existing knowledge. 
Landsberg alludes to this with a reference to adding milk to coffee, that
it seems an odd procedure to ‘explain’ everyday occurrences, such as the 
diffusion of milk into coffee by means of theories of the universe which are 
themselves less firmly established than the phenomenon to be explained. 
Most people believe in explaining one set of things in terms of others about 
which they are more certain and the explanation of normal irreversible 
phenomena in terms of cosmological expansion is not in this category.
(Landsberg cited by Coveney & Highfield 1991, p 34)
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So, the adding of milk to coffee, and two beakers of water in a refrigerator, may seem 
to be very simple systems, but if cosmological theories need to be called in to 
interpret some observations made about aspects of their behaviour, then a 
consequence is that the assessment of new knowledge claims has to be left to the 
expertise of a very few specialists; this would have far reaching consequences for the 
learning and teaching of elementary science.
Reference was made in a previous paragraph to common sense expectations, and it 
is appropriate both to uphold the value of the human instinct in making judgements 
about sense experience, as well as to note that there are instances where ‘common 
sense’ had to be discarded in order to gain insight into a problem. In 1905, Einstein 
put forward two fundamentally new postulates of physics, one of which stated that 
the speed of light is constant and independent of the motion of the light source. The, 
seemingly, outrageous nature of this claim is usually illustrated by attempting to 
imagine, whether the speed of a rifle bullet fired by a motionless foot soldier is the 
same as when fired from an aeroplane cruising at supersonic speeds. Since the 
speeds are not the same for the bullets, why should the speeds be the same for 
light? Einstein dealt a body blow to common sense by showing that no matter how 
fast one observer is travelling with respect to another the speed of light is constant. 
Therefore, when adults learning science encounter examples of situations where, for 
the first time, their common sense view must be set aside, the experience is 
frequently disconcerting for them, and the ‘setting aside’, or unlearning, becomes 
fraught with difficulties (Chapter 3). Common sense, while necessary, is not sufficient 
for scientific work.
Another aspect of interpretation that can cause confusion concerns the use of 
metaphors as aids to understanding. If a metaphor is taken too literally it becomes a 
myth. A scientific myth is “what develops when an imaginative construct becomes
identified with the theory it helps to create” (Turbayne 1970, p 39), an example being 
that of Descartes (cited by Brehier, 1966 p 94), ‘I have described the earth and the 
whole visible universe as if it were a machine’. Unimaginative successors of 
Descartes have taken such words as ‘machine’ literally, and in so doing have created 
the myth that the world is a machine.
Bastin (1977 p 126) reminds us that “familiarity makes us see a reasonable 
coherence where in fact there are great areas of ignorance, while denying any 
coherence to unfamiliar ideas which may be no worse in their incoherence"
It is appropriate also, at this stage of the thesis to examine and reflect briefly on the 
nature of discovery and to contrast the type of discovery familiar to science where 
something that has existed for a long time is first noticed and recorded (for example, 
that light travels in straight lines), with discovery where the phenomenon is recent 
and transient, for example, a footprint in sand. In the former case, the data (on 
shadows) had existed for a long time and is very consistent, while in the latter 
instance, Robinson Crusoe, we are told, knew the data had not existed twenty four 
hours previously. Crusoe reached a conclusion by making an inference on the fresh 
data, i.e. he looked at a new phenomenon in a familiar way. On the other hand, light 
was discovered to travel in straight lines by looking at a familiar phenomenon in a 
new way. To attempt to look at the optical phenomenon by using a familiar approach 
would not result in new insight and Toulmin (1953 p 20) calls this the ‘Man Friday 
fallacy’. Toulmin is making the point that it is not simply a matter of how long the data 
may have been in place, but that a different inferring technique applied to the optical 
phenomenon leads to new points of view which permit specific predictions to be 
made. Thus, from the dimensions of the shadow (which can be measured), can be 
calculated (inferred) the size of the object which casts it and its distance from the 
object. Such inferring techniques are the core of many scientific discoveries, which 
cannot be made from the kind of inference applied to a footprint in the sand. In my
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study, I have sought to bring a fresh perspective to a problem that has perplexed 
people over many centuries, nameiy, how new and more complex knowledge arises 
from less complex knowledge.
One further problem with interpretation (in all fields of inquiry) concerns the ability to 
both use and understand language. Both Kant and Witgenstein believed it to be 
easy to stray unwittingly beyond the limits of what language can express, into a kind 
of “specious nonsense” (Pears 1971 p12) that seems to express genuine thoughts, 
but in fact does not do so. It would be so helpful if we knew the location of the 
dividing line between sense and nonsense, but we do not - and this can certainly be 
an obstacle to communication within some areas of science. McHugh (1970) reminds 
us that events are transformed into truth only by the application of a canon of 
procedure, a canon that truth-seekers use and analysts must formulate as providing 
the possibility of agreement. In other words, we do not consult what a proposition 
proposes, rather we consult the rules used to decide if what the proposition proposes 
is warranted.
4. A W IDER CONTEXT FOR THE LEARNING OF SCIENCE  
It is appropriate when trying to provide a wide context for a study into learning, to 
consider what sort of research is research into education. The point is that different 
sorts of questions will yield differing sorts of answers, and these in turn will offer 
varying possibilities of validation and probability. Criticism of some modes of 
research in the social sciences, in which rigour of the methods used has been 
compared with the so-called exact and natural sciences, has been made by, for 
example, Wall (1959:3), in spite of a clear analysis by Winch (1958:72). Winch 
considers a classical exposition of the view that social phenomena are of the same 
order as physical, only very much more complicated, and involving more variables. 
He demonstrates its falsity by showing that the natural scientist is governed by only 
one set of rules, those relevant to scientific investigation, whereas the social scientist
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has to take into account another set of rules as well, those involved in the 
phenomenon she, or he, is investigating. The phenomenon itself will, inevitably, be a 
manifestation of social activity which is likely to be subject to human purposes and 
meaning, in a way in which natural phenomena are not. Thus the understanding of 
social phenomena involves a qualitatively different approach to that needed with 
natural phenomena, because such understanding implies something more than just 
external observation. This ‘something’ is concerned with what the phenomena mean, 
and this has to come from experience of it, for example, an historian or artist must 
have “sympathetic understanding” of what it is like to be an historian or artist in order 
to “grasp what they are driving at" (Gibson 1960, p 47-48). Gibson denies that such 
“sympathetic understanding” can provide any evidence of an alternative kind to that 
supplied empirically, but he considers that it places the investigator in a “peculiarly 
favourable position to give evidence” (Gibson 1960 p 51). I fail to see how I can 
become my own student in order to be in this position, although I accept that my 
previous experience of being a student may help me to appreciate how 
understanding the social and natural world may differ. However, Sorokin (1956, p 
159-160), while arguing forcefully that, “only through direct empathy ... can one 
grasp the essential nature and difference between a criminal gang and a fighting 
battalion”, does not attempt to justify the analogy to educational research.
The ability of the mind to discover new patterns or meanings within the information it 
already possesses - which may be identified as insight or intuition - does not depend 
on faultless chains of reasoning. Neither reasoning, nor analysis, can explain the 
process by which the mind is able to perceive the truth of things, although the 
knowledge may be fallible, perhaps due to the kinds of assumptions made when we 
search for an analogy by which to link a current problem to previous experience. 
Casey (1966, p 17-29) refers to the analogy - or, perhaps to the mythology - of 
Newton who, in seeing an apple fall, saw the possibility of explaining the movement
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of the planets. No new facts had been discovered, but the concept of ‘falling’ had 
been enriched by it being applied, for the first time, to the whole solar system. Thus, 
a new application had been found for the concept of ‘falling’ and, at the same time, 
an ‘explanation’ had been provided of what it is for earthly objects to fall, by 
connecting their movements with the movements of the planets. This is an example 
of the power of seeing through an ordinary perceptual phenomenon, to something of 
which it then became only an illustration. Casey argues that the ‘reasoning’ behind 
Newton’s perception was neither inductive nor deductive reasoning, as it was not 
capable of proof. Kant (1790, 1952, p 117) said, that the imagination is "a powerful 
agent creating as it were a second nature out of the material supplied to it by the first 
nature". The creative imagination is free from the constraints imposed by the laws of 
understanding on our perceptions of nature. Kant calls these representations of the 
creative imagination ideas, because they cannot be apprehended in the appearances 
of things in the same way that objects that conform to natural laws can be. He uses 
the word idea in a special sense for something which cannot be experienced directly 
but for which the imagination “finds an expression and makes it communicable” (Kant 
1790, 1952, p 223).
An understanding of the fundamental concepts of science is reached through 
measurement, followed by insight, and this leads to a grasp of the relations of things 
to one another. In making such a transition, the learner of science moves from the 
realm of the imaginable to the unimaginable, the concepts and laws of science being 
unimaginable and unable to be sensibly apprehended. For example, there is a 
radical difference between the concept of temperature and the feeling of hotness or 
coldness. It was recognition of the need to shift from a consideration of the relations 
of things to the observer, to a determination of functional relations, that marked the 
difference between Galilean and Aristotelian science; the Aristotelians were content 
to talk about the nature of something, whereas Galileo insisted that a shift to
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explanatory understanding was required.
It is the ability to explain phenomena in terms which are scientifically useful as 
opposed to merely describing them, that is an indicator of meaningful learning in 
science. Thus, it is a matter of simple observation that when a rubber sucker is 
pressed against a smooth surface it requires some force to pull it off, but it requires 
insight to comprehend, let alone construct, an explanation for this observation in 
terms of the greater bombardment of particles of gases in the atmosphere on the 
outer surface of the rubber, compared with the inner surface. A cognitive 
developmentalist would identify the inability adequately to explain why the sucker 
sticks, as evidence of the immaturity of the processing mechanism of the person 
attempting the explanation, whilst an alternative conceiver might emphasise that 
person’s inexperience, and the need to link new experiences to existing conceptions. 
Adey and Shayer’s (1994) study of alternative conceptions theory makes use of 
Ausubel’s (1968) assimilation theory of meaningful learning, in which new knowledge 
is linked to a framework of existing knowledge. However, Bruner (1998) argues that 
the cognitive revolution with its fixation on mind as the ‘information processor’ has led 
psychology away from the deeper objective of understanding mind as creator of 
meanings.
One of the confusions that can hinder the process of meaning creation in science 
concerns the role of the senses in scientific method. Lonergan (1957) argued that 
the senses provide data and nothing more. Science may begin with observation but 
its basis lies in data and not facts; facts are reached only at the end of the process of 
knowing. Because observation yields only data, the problem is to determine the 
relationship between data and theories, rather than between theories and facts. 
Insight grasps relations in the data and leads to the formulation of theories, which 
must then be verified. Verification is not a logical operation, and is quite different
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from proof. In the world of science, though, attention has shifted towards verification 
and away from viewing scientific method as a sequence of logical operations. This 
trend is evident in Kuhn’s (1962) notion of competing paradigms, and Lakatos’ (in 
Lakatos & Musgrave, 1970) notion of competing research programmes, which 
conditions the way in which problems are solved and meaning is created.
Popper tried to find a demarcation criterion between the scientific and the non- 
scientific and argued that the theory of falsifiability provided it. The theory proposes 
that scientific generalisations (including the laws) are falsifiable but not confirmable. 
While Popper advocates applying the test of falsification to any new proposition as 
part of the verification process, I found that adults learning science were more 
inclined to falsify data in order to support present understanding, or predictions based 
on present understanding, rather than attempt more overtly to falsify a proposition. 
This observation is confirmed by other researchers, for example Schauble (1996), 
working with children and adults, as explored further in Chapter 3. It is interesting as 
an example of a link between the philosophy of science and actual learning as seen 
in the behavioural approach to experimental science. It would be interesting to look 
for the existence of other similar kinds of link between philosophy and practical 
science.
Mention of teaching methods and curriculum content has been avoided deliberately 
throughout this thesis, but awareness of the possible Influence of these factors must 
now be registered. After decades of research effort in comparative studies of 
teaching methods, the persistent belief remains that significant differences do exist, 
yet findings, from Dubin & Tarregia (1968) onwards, proclaim that evidence fails to 
affirm claimed experiential observations, and theory arising from those observations. 
It may be that no significant differences are identified, because it is student 
performance in examinations that are measured, and examinations are generally not 
related to any definition of learning objectives. Yet there are very great differences
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between teaching methods, in terms of student motivation, for example. From a 
constructivist perspective, learning occurs when learners are actively involved in the 
process of building their knowledge about the world around them, through physical 
experiences as well as social interactions. In order to accomplish this, teachers have 
to be facilitators of the learning process where learners participate actively. If an 
issue orientated approach is used - which will necessarily be student centred, then 
classroom activities are also likely to be consistent with constructivist pedagogy.
One of the most significant ways in which teaching has changed during the last 
decade, is through the introduction of specified learning outcomes for each taught 
session. Leaving aside the question of whether or not this policy can be shown to 
have benefits to learners, it seems to me that it could be responsible for learners 
opting to choose to learn by rote. If these specified outcomes form the basis of 
assessment, then learners could be more likely to use them in preparation for 
assessment, and this could explain the extensive use of rote learning by those who 
participated in my study.
5. CONTRIBUTION TO KNOW LEDGE and PLANS FOR FURTHER W ORK  
The core question that this research set out to answer concerns how adults learning 
science respond to new information which, in some cases, is very likely to conflict 
with their existing understanding. Freud (1958 p 112) cautioned that “if you follow 
your expectations there is a ...danger of never finding anything but what you already 
know; if you follow your inclinations you will certainly justify what you perceive". 
Though the constraints may be formidable, I think a little progress may have been 
made with the complex problem of responding to new information.
The findings indicate that when new information is presented to adults, it is - initially 
at least - added to the existing store, and does not supplant it. This response seems 
to be automatic, although it could be fuelled by teaching styles and assessment
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techniques. Adults respond to new information with surface learning strategies, 
placing considerable reliance on memory, whether or not they declare a preference 
for meaningful learning. While I have no direct evidence that this approach is a 
response to increased use of the modular structure of courses, it is an adaptation 
that is well tailored to this style. Adults learning science co-operate with each other 
in self-selected small groups, evidence for this being particularly clear where any 
mathematical processes are required. Barriers to learning are common, and many of 
these are overcome, although fear of failure, and anxieties over the absence of a 
sound background understanding of basic science, is volunteered as a problem by 
most adults.
The results of a study by Watters & Watters -  published after 1 had concluded my 
research but before completion of this thesis, both complement my study and 
corroborate my findings. The authors investigated the epistemological beliefs and 
study habits of students undertaking first year courses in Biological Chemistry and 
Biochemistry at a metropolitan university in Australia. They found (my numbering):
i) student epistemological beliefs are strongly oriented towards a philosophy 
that learning involves the accumulation of knowledge that is functional in 
solving routine-type problems. Approaches to learning are by and large of a 
surface nature... The common mode of study is memorising...
ii) students have diverse backgrounds ... Few acknowledged experiences in 
schooling that engaged them in problem solving tasks that would encourage 
deep learning techniques...
iii) in order to understand new material the activation of pre-existing 
knowledge is critical. The student needs to reconcile existing beliefs with the 
new experiences. If the models and ideas held by the student are 
inappropriate then conceptual change has to occur...
iv) The most salient outcome was the emphasis that students placed on
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learning by rote; but even in the context where rote learning appears to be 
valued, those students who by SPQ data adopted deep approaches were 
more likely to achieve.
Watters & Watters 2007 p 39-40  
Watters & Watters (2007 p19-43), who arrived at their conclusions by a mixed 
method approach that included both qualitative (interviews) and quantitative (surveys 
and performance records) methods, end their report with the words: “...a  better 
understanding of how biological science students approach learning is needed".
With this I concur, and my modest plans for further work are included at the end of 
this chapter.
The conclusions that emerge from this study illuminate some aspects of the learning 
process, at least in so far as it applies to adults learning science. Firstly, and in 
response to the core research question (given in Chapter 5), the study has identified 
the response of adults to new information as being addition rather than a 
replacement of existing knowledge. This outcome appears not even to have 
been considered, or maybe even anticipated by, other researchers. Thus,
Stahly et al (1999, p160) posit that ‘When children encounter new 
experiences, or stimuli, the new information may be integrated into existing 
frameworks; or the conceptions, both new and old, could be reorganised; or 
the currently held conceptions could be rejected.’ The work was, of course, 
carried out with children, and my study relates to adults; but Pringle (2006, 
p292), referring to the work of Carin & Ban (1997) and Toiman (2002), makes 
the point relevant to classroom teachers that, if alternative conceptions are 
ignored or dismissed, they may persist.
My finding was a surprise to me, as both teacher training and teaching as 
practised in the classroom is, and has been, based on the assumption that 
learners will simply abandon ideas and knowledge which may have been held
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and perhaps reinforced (in the case of adults) by daily experiences over some 
years on the basis of an argument presented in a lesson, is not true. This 
surprise in spite of indications that the knowledge is incorporated in 
conceptual structures that provide a coherent understanding of the world 
(Gredler 2001), and the evidence of experience that resides in all adults that 
we are often resistant to change and reluctant to shed old practices or 
techniques.
There are implications of this conclusion for both educators and trainers, 
whether involved in short training courses in skills and/or management, or in 
longer courses of study. When identifying the intended outcome of their 
instruction, trainers and educators must accept that learners will not simply 
abandon what they have known and used in favour of the new information. 
New information will be added to the store and, at present it is rather 
speculation to talk about what may happen to it after being added to what 
exists already.
Secondly, and in relation to the subsidiary research questions (Chapter 5), the 
study presents a new application of concept mapping, which has been used 
here for tracking learning rather than as a tool for helping people to learn. In 
this respect it has proved a useful tool though, based on experience gained in 
this study, it would be recommended that it be used in conjunction with other 
tools (in this case the other tools were interviews and questionnaires) and 
data from all the sources can be triangulated for enhanced validity. The  
concept maps indicated that adults learning science do so as surface 
learning, as opposed to deep or meaningful learning. This discovery is 
supported by the findings of Ramsden et al (1986), who showed that 
study skills training for first year surface-learning undergraduates succeeded 
only in making their surface learning strategies more sophisticated, rather
than developing deep-learning strategies.
Thirdly, concerning the issue of whether learners can be helped to become 
meaningful learners by changing their conceptions of learning, the indications 
are quite clear that, though learners may aspire to be meaningful learners, 
they are very resistant to abandoning rote learning where this method has 
appeared to be effective on previous occasions during their learning history. 
The findings of Berry & Milroy (2002), Stofflett (1994) and Taber (2001) do 
suggest that learners’ ideas can be reconstructed through teaching if their 
personal understandings are first uncovered and brought to the surface. All of 
these studies were based on studies with children and employed conceptual- 
change approaches to the teaching; such work as would be needed to 
investigate the effect of such approaches with adults was beyond the scope of 
this study.
The claims made in these conclusions relate only to adults learning science. It 
is possible the findings may be applicable to young learners but no claim to 
this is being advanced. Equally, while it is hoped that, arising from a clearer 
understanding of hindrances to learning, learners could be helped to conceive 
of these as susceptible to influence rather than deficiencies about which little 
can be done, no claim can be made for this on the basis of my study.
Finally, some reflections on the work which will address, firstly, some aspects 
of research quality:
Early thoughts on this study prompted an awareness that experience should 
have supplied, namely, how much easier it is to identify limitations and 
weaknesses at the completion of something than at the planning stage. I am 
also aware that accepting responsibility for shortcomings does not make this a 
better study and, in effect, changes nothing. My experience and
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understanding have, however, increased and I am more conscious of the 
dependence of all kinds of research on philosophy, in that good research is 
entirely dependent on good conceptualisation and logical procedures.
Barrow (1981, p 181-183), in a critical appraisal of some research conducted 
by Neville Bennett and his associates at Lancaster University on teaching 
styles and pupil progress involving thirty seven teachers (Bennett 1976), 
highlights a long list of variables that were not, apparently, controlled. These 
included the type and background of different children, differences of social 
class, different qualities of schools, differences in quality and experience of 
teachers, differing aims of teachers etc. He says:
... a great deal of empirical research in education is, 
like this, both conducted on so small a scale that its 
significance is inevitable minimised, and beset by glaring 
weaknesses such as failure to control variables, and yet 
its findings are broadcast abroad, without any reference 
to such devastating distortions or crucial qualifications as 
maybe involved.
Barrow (1976, p 182)
Barrow develops his theme and points out that whilst the work inevitably 
furnishes some ‘results’, these cannot be particularly illuminating because one 
knows very little about the causes or reasons for any differences in outcome 
observed. He distinguishes between work which is dubbed inconclusive’ and 
that which is just not good enough; in the case he is describing it is the latter 
because it lacks a solid conceptual base, i.e. an armoury of precise and 
specific concepts. I realise that if one tries to take account of all the subtleties 
then it limits what can sensibly be researched into, yet the issues in the field 
of education are so complex that approaches that are not rigorous are set 
only to disgrace the reputation of both researchers and publishers.
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I must hasten to add that, in writing the foregoing, I am not distancing myself 
from my own study and its results. From reflection on both of these I am more 
aware of the difficulties involved in researching the field of education. 
Investigation of the inanimate is easier in some respects, though the 
construction of instruments suited to the detection and measurement of 
invisible phenomena has frequently taxed the ingenuity of research scientists.
Secondly, reflecting on the results of my study, and on the explanations 
constructed from those results, prompts me to reflect on the nature of 
explanation itself. The aim always is to relate the proposition that is found 
puzzling, to something that is already known. It is generally assumed, though 
should always be confirmed, that the recipient of an explanation is in 
possession of the relevant theoretical and factual background in order to 
understand the explanation. Thus, an explanation fails if it does not make 
more intelligible what was previously found to be incompletely understood. 
Applying this criterion to my study, what was incompletely understood was 
how new and more complex knowledge can arise from simpler things that 
were known. The full story has yet to be told, but some new facts to help us 
along the way have been established, with respect to adults learning science. 
W e have at least moved a distance from Rousseau’s constant inveighing 
against book learning: ‘Reading is the scourge of childhood...’ (Bantock 1965, 
p 82, quoting from the Everyman edition of ‘Emile, ou Traite de I’education’ by 
J-J. Rousseau), and ‘... Let him not be taught science, let him discover it’ 
(Bantock 1965, p 67).
Thirdly, my views on the ideas of Malcolm Knowles, with respect to adult 
teaching and learning, and on the concept maps of James Novak in the light 
of using them in this study, have been set down in the summary to chapter 7
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of this thesis. Expressed in briefest form, 1 emerge from the study with 
confidence a little less secure, both in the distinction between andragogy and 
pedagogy, and in the reliability of concept maps as indicators of meaningful 
learning.
Having shown that adults tend to respond to new information by adding it to 
their existing knowledge store, rather than using it to replace any of that store, 
I want now to investigate whether this response is related to the modular style 
of course delivery, and to trace the development of rote learning into 
meaningful learning.
Adam and Eve lost Paradise for having eaten of the fruit of the Tree of 
Knowledge, but they still retained that knowledge. Whilst it is unwise to rest 
serious research on analogy with legend and symbol, the myth warns us that 
the wresting and the exploitation of knowledge are perilous acts. The adult 
returnee to education is every bit as much a pioneer as the experimental 
scientist, since both must have a willingness to take risks, and to be 
intellectual adventurers.
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APPENDIX 1
This exercise is aimed at discovering what the word learning means to you.
I am here referring to academic learning, i.e. the kind of learning that occurs in 
academic institutions such as this college. The findings of some researchers can be 
summarised by saying that learning can be seen as including some of the following, 
to varying extents;
1. increasing one’s knowledge -  adding to the store
2. memorising and being able to reproduce something
3. something that results in the ability to apply some knowledge or procedure
4. understanding, e.g. how things happen or work
5. seeing something in a different way -  new insights
6. changing as a person
DESCRIPTIONS OF LEARNING
Based on your own experiences, please indicate your views by putting ‘X ’ marks 
where these seem appropriate in the diagram below:
DESCRIPTION EXTENT
hardly at all very much so
Increasing knowledge
Memorising & reproducing
Applying
Understanding
Seeing something 
differently
Changing as a person
There are no ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ answers here but, if you think these options are 
incomplete or inadequate, then please give your own description of learning as you 
have experienced it.
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Heidi’s completed questionnaire:
This exercise is aimed at discovering what the word learning means to you.
I am here referring to academic learning, i.e. the kind of learning that occurs in 
academic institutions such as this college. The findings of some researchers can be 
summarised by saying that learning can be seen as including some of the following, 
to varying extents:
1. increasing one’s knowledge -  adding to the store
2. memorising and being able to reproduce something
3. something that results in the ability to apply some knowledge or procedure
4. understanding, e.g. how things happen or work
5. seeing something in a different way -  new insights
6. changing as a person
DESCRIPTIONS OF LEARNING
Based on your own experiences, please indicate your views by putting ‘X ’ marks 
where these seem appropriate in the diagram below:
DESCRIPTION EXTENT
hardly at all very much so
Increasing knowledge X
Memorising & reproducing X
Applying X
Understanding X
Seeing something 
differently
X
Changing as a person X
There are no ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ answers here but, if you think these options are 
incomplete or inadequate, then please give your own description of learning as you 
have experienced it.
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APPENDIX 2
ILLUSTRATION OF THE DIFFERENCE BETW EEN CONTENT REQUIRED IN 
‘BASIC UNDERSTANDING’ AND THAT REQUIRED IN ‘EXTENDED KNOW LEDGE’
REVISION OF SIMPLE IDEAS RE: ACIDS AND BASES
1. Acids are compounds which contain hydrogen that can be replaced by a metal to 
form a salt.
2. Acids can be weak with a fairly low pH, or they can be strong with a very low pH.
3. Acids can be neutralised by bases, such as sodium hydroxide, which have a high 
pH.
4. The pH is shown by using universal indicator.
SUMMARY OF EXTENDED IDEAS RE: ACIDS AND BASES
1. Acids are substances that contain an excess of hydroxonium ions H30 +
2. Bases contain an excess of hydroxide ions OH —
3. When nuetralisation takes place, water is formed by the union of the hydroxonium 
and hydroxide ions
4. A salt is also produced in this reaction. If no replaceable hydrogen remains, the 
salt will be neutral
5. An acid is an acceptor of electrons
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APPENDIX 3
S P E C IM E N  IN T E R V IE W  T R A N S C R IP T
with Heidi = H and Philip Brimson = PB
Line
No.
1 PB Hello Heidi, and thank you for coming in, and for being on
2 time, too.
3 I shall try as hard as I can to rem em ber to call you Heidi
4  all through this interview -  which you had earlier agreed I
5 can record -  hence this big card with H E ID I written on it
6 in front of me. It’s important because it sets up and
7 maintains your anonym ity. You will never be referred to
8 as anyone other than Heidi and only I will know your real
9 identity. If I do slip up, then I will delete the mistake and
10 replay it to you afterw ards to show it has gone. Is that
11 OK?
13 H Yes, that’s OK.
15 PB Good. Now, if you have any questions about confidentiality
16 or w hat will happen to the information, then do ask me,
17 either now or anytim e in the future. You will be w elcom e to
18 have copies o f everything I w rite that mentions Heidi. Is
19 that OK?
21 H Yes, sure.
23  PB Good. W ell, let’s start then, and let m e m ake it c lear from
24 the start that in these questions, I’m going to ask you about
25 how you learn and not com pare w hat you do with any
26  ‘right’ w ay  -  because that doesn ’t exist, yet anyway.
27  So, you are not being criticised or judged, OK?
28 I’d like to begin with the Description of Learning
29  questionnaire you filled in a  couple of w eeks or so ago -
30 there’s a copy on the table to remind
31 you o f it. Now, there are  no ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ answ ers here,
32 but you had indicated that ‘memorising and reproducing’
33 was by far the most clear w ay o f saying how learning is for
34 you. I just w anted to confirm that that is the w ay you see  it
35 and to ask you to say som ething more about it.
37  H W ell, umm, w here  do you w ant m e to start?
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39 PB Just talk about how you got on at school
41 H OK. W ell, I started by really liking science and doing O k in
42  it. But, gradually I found I w asn ’t doing so well, it w as like I
43  w as finding it harder and couldn’t see why. It didn’t help
44  that I had two brothers -  older than m e -  in the sam e
45 school, and they w ere  brilliant at science, always at the top
46  of the class. I couldn’t match that, m aybe I thought the
47  teachers expected m e to be like them. My brothers didn’t
48  set out to m ake it hard for m e but, I think without always
49  being aw are o f it, they intimidated m e and I lost
50 confidence, and thought I w as thick. So, science becam e
51 difficult for me.
53 PB Did you stop trying or lose interest in science?
55  H Oh no. I w as just as interested and determ ined to do well
56 and stay in the science stream  of the school -  and, if
57 possible, work in a hospital. I w as always fascinated by
58 hospitals when I w as little. But I think I began to change
59  the w ay I worked at i t .... I put all my effort into memorising,
60 and found I could do O K  in most tests and exam s.
62  PB Yes, your concept m aps suggested that you really depend
63 on rote learning.
65 H I found rote learning is better for me. It’s hard work and my
66 m em ory’s not brill. But I’ve  got used to it and it’s alw ays
67 worked -  so far!
69  PB How did you m anage with physics, for exam ple?
71 H Ah, well, I avoided it as much as I could, but I got by
72 through learning the Descriptive bits really well. I had been
73 put down into the ‘Com bined Science’ class -  but I think
74 that w as because of M aths which I w as really rubbish at -
75 and you can ’t do stuff you really can ’t m anage, and still get
76 an O K  mark.
78 PB Hmm, well, coming back to your concept map, umm it w as
79 fine. W a s  it drawn by rote learning?
81 H Oh yeah.
83 PB So, understanding doesn’t really com e into the picture much?
85 H Oh, I think I com e to understand lots o f things eventually.
86 It just takes tim e and so I have to let it go and not worry
87  about it. I do like to understand stuff but it just takes time
88 for me.
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90
92
93
94
95
96
98
99
100
102
104
105
106
107
109
110
111
112
114
115
116
118
119
120
121
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
133
134
136
137
H Yeah. I think I probably understood what's in this m ap
(points to copy o f 2nd concept map on the table in front o f 
her). It was when you got to the hydroxy...um m  things, 
that I didn't understand it. But I could learn it O K  for the last 
map.
PB Do you try to discard or forget the simpler ideas and
explanations and concentrate on the more advanced ideas  
which give better or m ore com plete explanations o f things?
H I'm afraid to forget anything in case  I might need it again.
PB So, even if I tell you not to use a set of rules, or a w ay  of
doing something any m ore because w e ’ve moved on to 
something that’s better in every way, are you saying that 
you will still hold on to the earlier way?
H Y e s .... I think so, it’s because I m ay understand it better
than the more com plicated explanation. If the rules I think 
of first don’t work, then I try w hat com es next until I think 
it’s OK.
PB Your concept m aps didn’t have any cross links -  do you
rem em ber I m entioned cross links as a w ay o f anchoring in 
new information so it’s linked to other things?
H Yes, I do rem em ber and I think ! thought these things are
going to confuse me. W ith memorising stuff, you just need  
to keep things a bit separated from other things like, 
otherwise it’s in danger of all getting muddled up.
PB Heidi, I think I’ve  alm ost finished with my questions now. I
want to thank you for being so helpful and open about the  
w ay you work. It will be a great help in my study. I also  
w ant to say that you impress me as a tidy, very organised  
student w ho puts a big effort into this subject, and you are  
m anaging just fine. Now, is there anything you w ant to ask  
me about -  e ither on the discussion w e ’ve just had, or 
about acids, o r ....
H I can’t think of anything just now, but if I do get stuck I will
com e and ask you.
PB OK. W ell, thanks for your time, and see you in class next
w eek.
PB So with the ‘acids5 topic, was there understanding of some of it?
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APPENDIX 4
FIELD W O RK  SCHEDULE
Example of a proposed timetable: 
W eek beginning 09/01 
16/01 
23/01 
30/01
06/02
First mention
2nd mention + recruitment of participants
Concept map training + Questionnaire
Topic introduced with revision + drawing of 
1 st concept map
New knowledge introduced + drawing of 
2nd concept map
13/02 Interview
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APPENDIX 5
SELECTED BIOGRAPHICAL DETAILS OF SOME PARTICIPANTS
Course: Access to Higher Education 2005 -  2006 
Subject: Chemistry
Code Name Gender Age Previous science education
Sally F 34 3rd year of secondary school
Clare F 27 GCSE Science
Caroline F 32 Year 9
Catherine F 21 Year 9
Nathaniel M 19 GCSE Double Award Science
Stuart M 26 Year 9
Course: NC in Pharmacy Services 2005 - 2006
Subject: Pharmaceutics
Code Gender Age Previous science education
Heidi F 20 G CSE Science
Clare F 24 GCSE Science
Kelly F 26 GCSE Double Award Science
Sara F 26 GCSE Single Science Subjects
Nina F 46 None at all
Lucy F 31 3rd year secondary school
Hayiey F 20 GCSE
Rose F 28 “very little”
Rebecca F 21 ‘A ’ Chemistry & Biology
Jonathan M 20 G CSE Double Award Science
MATERIALS USED IN TEACHING ON CONSTRUCTION OF CONCEPT MAPS 
Supplied by the University of Surrey
APPENDIX 6
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APPENDIX 7
Thus the Gunning Fox Index (first published by Robert Gunning in 1952) gives a 
good approximation to the readability scores produced by more com plex formulae.
The steps for the calculation are:
1. Find the average number of words per sentence. Use a sample o f at least one 
hundred
words long. Divide the total number o f words by the number o f sentences. This 
gives average sentence length.
2. Count the number o f words of three syllables or more per hundred words.
Do not co u n t:
a) words that are capitalised:
b) combinations o f short, easy  words - like ‘book keepers’ :
c) verbs that are made three syllables by adding ‘ed ’ or ‘e s ’ - like ‘created’ or 
‘trespasses’.
3. Add the two factors above and multiply by 0.4. This give the Fog Index. It
corresponds roughly with the number o f years o f schooling a person would 
require
to read a passage with ea se  and understanding.
4. Check the result against this scale:
5 fairly easy
7 or 8 standard
9 to 11 fairly difficult
12 to 15 difficult
17 or above very difficult
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Further supporting data -  concept maps gathered in the study but not used in the 
main text of the thesis.
APPENDIX 8
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C arol's  1st c o n ce p t  m ap on  'C hem ica l B onding and R elated  P roperties
C ode nam e: Carol Age: 32
Course: A  ccess to H igher Education Subject: Chem istry
Pre-course science education: to year 9
234
Carol's 2nd concept map on 'Chemical Bonding and Related Properties incorporating
extended knowledge.
235
Catherine's 1st concept map on 'Chemical Bonding and Related Properties'
Code name: Catherine Age: 21
Course: Access to Higher Education Subject: Chemistry
Pre-course science education: to year 9
236
Catherine's 2nd concept map on 'Chemical Bonding and Related Properties' incorporating
extended knowledge.
237
Code name: Stuart
Course: Access to Higher Education
Pre-course science education: to year 9
Age: 26
Subject: Chemistry
Stuart's 1st concept map on 'Chemical Bonding and Related Properties'
where electrons are
T
join with each other 
by making
BONDS
T
these are of two kinds -
where electrons have been
Stuart's 2nd concept map on 'Chemical Bonding and Related Properties' incorporating
extended knowledge.
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Clare's 1st concept map on 'Acids'
Code name: Clare Age: 24
Course: NC Pharmacy Technician Subject: Chemistry
Pre-course science education: GCSE Science
240
Clare's 2nd concept map on 'Acids’ incorporating extended knowledge.
241
Kelly’s 1st concept map on 'Acids'
Code name: Kelly Age: 26
Course: NC Pharmacy Technician Subject: Chemistry
Pre-course science education: GCSE Double Award Science
242
Kelly’s 2nd concept map on 'Acids' incorporating extended knowledge.
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Code Name: Sara Age: 26
Course: NC Pharmacy Technician Subject: Chemistry
Pre-course science education: GCSE Single Sciences - Chemistry, Physics, Biology
Sara's 1st concept map on 'Acids'
which is shown by 
using
1
UNIVERSAL
INDICATOR
244
Sara's 2nd concept map on 'Acids' incorporating extended knowledge.
and when neutralisation 
takes place
Old concept retained but an effort has been made to link it into the new concept of acids
Code name: Nina Age: 46
Course: NC Pharmacy Technician Subject: Chemistry
Pre-course science education: "none at ail"
Nina's 1st concept map on 'Acids'
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Nina's 2nd concept map on 'Acids' incorporating extended knowledge.
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Lucy's 1st concept map on 'Acids'
Code name: Lucy Age: 31
Course: NC Pharmacy technician Subject: Chemistry
Pre-course science education: 3rd year secondary school
Lucy's 2nd concept map on ’Acids' incorporating extended knowledge.
to produce
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Code name: Hayley Age: 20
Course: NC Pharmacy technician Subject: Chemistry
Pre-course science education: GCSE Genera! Science
Hayle/s 1st. concept map on 'Acids'
Hayleys 2nd concept map on 'Acids' incorporating extended knowledge.
Code name: Rose
Course: NC Pharmacy Technician
Pre-course science education: "very little"
Age: 28
Subject: Chemistry
Rose's 1st concept map on 'Acids'
Rose's 2nd concept map on 'Acids' icorporating extended knowledge.
Code name: Rebecca Age: 21
Course: NC Pharmacy Technician Subject: Chemistry
Pre-course science education: GCE 'A' levels in Chemistry and Biology
Rebecca's 1st. concept map on 'Acids'
Rebecca's 2nd concept map on 'Acids' incorporating extended knowledge.
Code name: Caroline
Course: HND Media Make-up
Age: 23
Subject: Cosmetic science
Caroline's 1st concept map on the 'Structure of Matter1
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Caroline's 2nd concept map on the 'Structure of Matter' incorporating extended knowledge.
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Code name: Michelle
Course: HND Media Make-up
Age: 24
Subject: Cosmetic science
Michelle's 1st concept map on the 'Structure of Matter'
Michelle's 2nd concept map on the 'Structure of Matter' incorporating extended knowledge.
Code name: Sylvia Age: 23
Course: HND Media Make-up Subject: Cosmetic science
Sylvia's 1st concept map on the 'Structure of Matter'
which have at 
its centre
arranged in
Map contains fundamental errors of misunderstanding.
260
Sylvia's 2nd concept map on the 'Structure of Matter' incorporating extended knowledge and a tutorial 
aimed at correcting misconceptions.
Errors have been corrected and map is accurate
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Code name: Patricia
Course: HND Media Make-up
Age: 24
Subject: Cosmetic science
Patricia's 1 st concept map on the 'Structure of Matter'
ELEMENTS
T
are made up of a 
single type of
Concept map has identified confusion between proton and neutron. 
Attempt to introduce cross linking has been made.
262
Patricia's 2nd concept map on the 'Structure of Matter' incorporating extended knowledge.
ELEMENTS
Tare made up of a single 
kind of
263
Code name: Chloe 
Course: HND Media Make-up
Age: 24
Subject: Cosmetic science
Chloe's 1st concept map on the 'Structure of Matter1
What has been included is correct, though 'orbits' was somewhat out of place.
264
Chloe’s 2nd concept map on the 'Structure of Matter’ incorporating extended knowledge.
1st shell contains 2nd shell contains 3rd shell contains
a maximum of a maximum of a maximum of
2 8 18
ELECTRONS ELECTRONS ELECTRONS
This concept map, although it does not repeat knowledge that has not been extended, has built 
new knowledge on to what pre-existed.
265
Code name: Sam
Course: BTEC Beauty Therapy
Age: 17
Subject: Physical sciences
Sam's 1 st concept map on 'Introduction to the physics and chemistry of depilation*
266
Sam's 2nd concept map on the'physics and chemistry of depilation' incorporating extended 
knowledge of electrochemical methods.
can be removed by - can be removed by
and salt in tissue fluid 
is
and
T
when the current is 
turned on and this kills 
the root so the hair can 
be pulled out easily
which rots the root so 
the hair can be pulled 
out easily
A very linear approach which probably reflects the practical instruction on these techniques.
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Code n a m e : Julia
Course: BTEC Beauty Therapy
Age: 18
Subject: Physical sciences
Julia's 1st concept map on 'introduction to the physics and chemistry of depilation'
Julia's 2nd concept map on the 'physics and chemistry of depilation' incorporating extended 
knowledge of electrochemical methods.
269
Code name: Sabrina 
Course: BTEC Beauty Therapy
Age: 18
Subject: Physical sciences
Sabrina's 1 st concept map on 'Introduction to the physics and chemistry of depilation'.
270
Sabrina's 2nd concept map on the physics and chemistry of depilation incorporating
extended kowledge of electrochemical methods.
271
Code name: Cathy Age: 18
Course: BTEC Beauty Therapy Subject: Physical sciences
Cathy's 1st concept map on 'Introduction to the physics and chemistry of depilation.
dissolves the hair root
27 2
Cathy's 2nd concept map on 'Introduction to physics and chemistry of depilation incorporating 
extended knowledge on electrochemical methods.
DIATHERMY
where electricity makes 
a needle hot inside a
HAIR
FOLLICLE
fand this
______
KILLS 
THE ROOT
so the hair can be
I
PULLED OUT 
EASILY
SUPERFLUOUS
HAIR
1
can be re 
\
r
moved by
r
ELECT'RICITY
T
r
ELECTROLYSIS
where a small current 
of electricity in a probe in a
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Example of material used in teaching a basic understanding o f atomic 
structure.
A P P E N D IX  9
E l e c t r o n  A r r a n g e m e n t
1 E le c tro n  S h e lls
13) Give the f u l l  e l e c t r o n i c  a r r a n g e m e n t  in the following dot and cross diagrams.
( T h e  f i r s t  t h r e e  h a v e  b e e n  d o n e  f o r  y o u ) .
—X—-
Atomic no. = 1
)/
 2____
Atomic no = 2
2, 1
Atomic no = 3 Atomic no = 4
Atomic no = 5 Atomic no = 6 Atomic no = 7 Atomic no. = 8
Nj> } !
Atomic no = 9 Atomic no = 10 Atomic no - 11 Atomic no = 12
S I
J i  I
f/Y ~\\\
p  >) iV V \ ' J i '
Atomic no r 13 Atomic no = 14 Atomic no = 15 Atomic no - 16
Atomic no - 17 Atom i - no = 18 Atomic no - 19 Atomic no - 20
T i n e *  ^ou no* see P°,n* fo ‘s y e* (y °u soon W'M. don't worry),
-  buf jn Exams they're always asking you to draw out electronic
a r r a n p e m e n t s . or " c o n f i g u r a t i o n s " as they sometimes call them —  jus t make sure you can work 
them out from a t o m i c  n u m b e r s  or the P e r i o d i c  T a b l e .  Qometimes they only ask for the o u t e r  
s h e l l  to be drawn —  easy or w hat '
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